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REFLECTIONS

ON

THE POLITICAL AND MORAL STATE

OF

SOCIETY,

AT THE

CLOSE OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY.

BY JOHN BOWLES, ESQ.

AUTHOR OF REFLECTIONS ON THE POLITICAL STATE OF SOCIETY
AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE YEAR 1800, &c. &c.

*Ætas parentum pejor avis tulit
Nos nequiores, mox daturos
Progeniem vitiosorem.*

Hæc.

"We are capable of moral Improvement by Discipline, and how much we
want it, need not be proved to any one who is acquainted with the great
Wickedness of Mankind."

BUTLER'S ANALOGY.

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IN the Title of this Publication, it is taken for granted that the 19th Century will commence with the year 1801. This opinion (of the correctness of which the Author is, after much consideration, convinced) is so generally prevalent, that the above assumption, it is trusted, will not appear disrespectful to those who entertain a different sentiment. But the accuracy of the above opinion is immaterial with regard to the object, for the sake of which an allusion is here made to a change of Century. That the period of such a change is arrived, is admitted by all, with only a difference of very trifling amount, when compared with the portion of time, of which it designates the conclusion on the one hand, and the commencement on the other. And, surely, no one will deny, that so rare and solemn an occurrence should dispose the mind to the most serious reflection; particularly when it is distinguished by a Crisis, the most awful and alarming, which the World has ever beheld.

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ERRATA.

- Page 5. l. 4. for "but if that the immense," read "but that if," &c.
- P. 32. note †, l. 8. for "present Lord-Mayor" read "late Lord-Mayor."
- P. 37. note, for "nuos irons voir dans la Turquie," read "nous irons voir," &c.
- P. 41. l. 11, for "the name of a Republic which" read "the name of a republic, and that which,"
- P. 62. l. 11. for "exceed" read exceeds."
- P. 83. l. 19. for "we had even done," read "than we had ever done."
- P. 113. l. 29. for "Statefmen of the day" read "many Statef. men of the day."
- P. 114. l. 16 from bottom, for "attention of Foreign Powers," read "attention of the rest of Europe."
- P. 123. l. 26. for "practical exertion, read "practicable exertion."
- P. 134. l. 8. "But though while the great caufes," *dele* "while."
- P. 146. l. 11. for "in the minds," read "in the mind."
- P. 155. l. 14. for "and his coadjju," read "for his coadjutors."*
- P. 161. l. 7. for "ture," read "true."
- P. 165. last line, but one, of note, for "news-napers," read "news-papers."
- P. 171. l. 2. for "he triumphs," read "he is sure to triumph."
- P. 171. l. 3. for "Louis the Fourteenth," read "Louis the Sixteenth."
- P. 172. l. 16 from the bottom, for "Visfition," read "Visitation."
- P. 174. l. 10. for "signalized by," read "signalized for,"

REFLECTIONS, &c.

AS the transition from the calamities of war to the blessings of secure and honourable peace is the happiest change which can take place in human affairs, so a proposal, which has for its object to produce an accommodation between belligerent powers, is at once the most pleasing and the most important that can occur in the various communications of mankind. Such a proposal, indeed, excites so many grateful emotions in the mind, that the inconsiderate part of the world will at all times be disposed to condemn its rejection, and to think themselves thereby deprived of a chance, at least, of again enjoying the sweets of tranquillity. And if that rejection happens to be followed by disasters, it will be viewed in a still more unfavourable light, and regarded as the cause of every calamity which may have ensued.

The question, therefore, respecting the propriety of the rejection of the overtures for negotiation, which were made by Buonaparte to the British Government at the commencement of the present year, important as it was at the moment, derives additional consequence from the reverses which have since attended the combined arms. Those persons whose constant

object it is to render administration unpopular, will not neglect so favourable an opportunity of making it appear responsible for all the misfortunes which have since occurred, and, indeed, for the present awful situation of Europe. While others, and a much larger party too, will readily join in condemning the British Government for refusing to listen to the invitation to negotiate, who would have extolled that refusal to the skies, if the present campaign had been brilliant and successful like the last.

To guard against this *ex post facto* wisdom, it is necessary to bear in mind the manner of the overture, and the circumstances under which it was made. For no one will venture to contend, in direct terms, that a proposal to negotiate ought at all times, and under all circumstances, to be accepted; though such a proposition seems to be implied in the argument which has on this occasion been chiefly relied on as a ground of censure—that we should at least have waited to learn on what terms our enemy was disposed to make peace. Whoever argues in this way, must surely forget that pacific overtures may originate in other motives than a desire to terminate hostilities, on just and reasonable terms—that their real object may be, not to restore peace, but to render war more destructive, and ruin more complete—that they may be suggested by artifice and perfidy—that they may be intended to ensnare confidence, to interrupt preparation, to favour intrigue, or to dissolve a formidable confederacy. It is also possible that the party offering to treat may be so destitute of stable and permanent authority, as to be incapable of ensuring the performance of his stipulations.

It must therefore be allowed that it would be imprudent in the extreme to accede to overtures for negotiation, without a due consideration of the probable motives in which they may be supposed to originate, and of the ability, as well as disposition of the

the enemy, to give effect to his engagements. Negotiation is not one of those experiments, if any such there be, which may at all times be made without danger, and which, if they do no good, can produce no harm. It may be as injurious as it can be beneficial. It may prove a more fatal enemy to peace than even war itself. To accept the advances of an enemy for the sake of knowing what terms he is disposed to offer, and in the blind hope that, some how or other, the result may be a deliverance from the calamities of war, would be scarcely less absurd and frantic than to run a ship upon a rock in order to preserve her from the waves.

If the subject be examined in this light, it will be found impossible to deny that every circumstance, which can render negotiation dangerous and unadvisable, concurred to induce an instant rejection of the overtures made by Buonaparte.—The most formidable confederacy that had existed during the whole war, was then preparing to follow up the severe blow, which had been given to the French Republic in the preceding campaign, and with the most brilliant prospect of delivering the world from the grievous scourge, by which it had for so many years been afflicted. A negotiation, at such a moment, would have inevitably defeated the expectation of so desirable an event. It must have been attended with the immediate defection of one of the allies from the confederacy—an ally whose recent services had revived the hopes of the civilized world, and whose zeal in the cause had excited the admiration, as well as the gratitude, of every friend of social order. This illustrious Prince had declared, in the most explicit terms, that his object in the war was “to restore Royalty in France, and to crush the monster which threatened to destroy all legal authority.” To enter into negotiation with that monster would, therefore, have been to reject the further assistance of the great Northern Potentate, on whom, under Heaven, our

principal reliance, at that time, was placed. Deprived of such aid, the confederacy, in a weakened state, and under the greatest disadvantage, would have been exposed to the artifices of the most subtle of all the rulers of Republican France, who has shewn that negotiations and separate pacifications are his grand instruments of mischief. This expert intriguer would have had an opportunity of practising those arts, in which he is known so eminently to excel, in order to excite jealousies, and to sow divisions among the remaining confederates, and to render them suspicious of each others designs. Under such circumstances, a confidential connection could scarcely have been preserved; and judging from preceding events during the war, it is most likely that Austria would have been drawn into a separate peace, and that Great Britain would, once more, have been left alone in the contest.

It is no answer to this reasoning now to say that, notwithstanding the rejection of the overtures, our Northern ally has seceded from the confederacy, and thereby exposed it to disasters, as dreadful as any which could have resulted from negotiation. For unless that inexpressibly great misfortune could have been foreseen, it could have no effect upon our conduct. It is necessary to act according to the circumstances of the moment; and the subsequent occurrence of unexpected events cannot operate in condemnation of measures, framed with a due regard to those circumstances. Our judgment of futurity can be founded only upon our knowledge of the present and the past; and, though not secure against misfortune, we are free from blame, if we make that knowledge the rule of our conduct. There was not a man in Europe, who, at the beginning of the present year, would not have thought us mad, if we had voluntarily lost the assistance of Russia in the war. And when we reflect, that in the battle which has, unfortunately, decided the fate of the campaign, the Austrian arms, without such aid, were

were on the point* of obtaining a victory, which would have made the First Consul appear as little, as those who judge by events now think him great, it is not to be doubted but if that the immense weight of the Russian force had not been withdrawn, the scale must have decidedly turned in favour of the Allied Powers. But we should have inevitably lost the assistance of Russia if we had acceded to the proposal of the First Consul of France. And our rejection of that proposal having been therefore indisputably right at the time, it is not possible for subsequent events—it is not possible even for the battle of Marengo—to make it wrong.

It being so evident that the direct tendency of the negotiation proposed by Buonaparte was to effect a dissolution of the confederacy, it was fair to presume that the proposal was made with that intent:—for every agent must be supposed to intend whatever his acts have an obvious tendency to produce. To have accepted, therefore, his invitation, would have been to run, with our eyes open, into the snare which was laid for us, when prudence bade us remember how fatal that snare had proved to other countries—when prudence bade us remember, that, to a reliance on the pacific professions of the French Republic, more states had been indebted for their ruin, than to the operation of her arms—that under the mask of friendship, and of a peaceable disposition, she had acquired possession of the Swiss Cantons, Piedmont, Rome, Tuscany, Venice, Genoa, and almost the whole of Italy—while America had been preserved from a like fate only, by the intervention of the Atlantic—that not a treaty had been made by her which she had not violated—that there was not a neutral state which she had not insulted and abused.

* So desperate at one moment was the state of the French army, that the first intelligence which reached Paris from the plains of Marengo, announced the discomfiture of the hero of Italy; and his own express only arrived in time to prevent the new revolutionary movement, which his enemies, profiting by his defeat, were beginning to excite.

The situation and character of the individual, who offered to treat, were also considerations of very great importance. Numerous and rapid fluctuations had proved that the governing Powers in France had not, during the whole Revolution, been possessed of sufficient stability to ensure the performance of their engagements, and this truth had just before been confirmed in the strongest manner, by the acknowledgment of one who had the confidence of the First Consul, and who had declared that "the Republic" "was so destitute of permanence with respect both to" "men and things, that she found it difficult to" "stipulate conditions of peace, and still more so to" "preserve them"—and "that the treaties which she" "had actually made, were only the source of a new" "war, still more desperate and bloody than the" "former †". Such a state of instability could scarcely be said to be terminated by a new Revolution, which had just placed the chief authority in the hands of a single individual, and that individual a foreigner. The character, too, of the man who had thus obtained the supremacy, and the first act of whose reign was this overture for negotiation, ought surely to be attended to. It could not be forgotten, at once, that he had had a very large share in the most atrocious of the acts of his predecessors; nay, that the most flagitious of those acts, the subversion of the Governments of Genoa and Venice, were exclusively his own, for which he could not plead even the authority of his masters—that he had effected most of those treaties of peace which had proved fatal to the states with which they were made—that he had manifested an extraordinary degree of ardour in promoting the revolutionary plans of France—that his distinguishing characteristic, in all these transactions, was perfidy—that he had displayed a peculiar animosity against Great Britain, and that,

† Speech of Boulay de la Meurthe to the remnant of the Council of Five Hundred.—See *Reflections on the Political State of Society at the Commencement of the Year 1800*, p. 135.

moreover, his immediate agent Monge had just before declared " that the Government of England and the " French Republic could not exist together."

The above considerations were surely more than sufficient to induce even the most credulous to suspect that in pretending to hold out the olive branch, Buonaparte, in reality, only tendered a bough of the poisonous tree of liberty. If, however, in spite of so many reasons to induce a contrary opinion, he had really been actuated by a wish to restore to mankind the blessings of peace—if it was indeed his intention to suffer Europe to enjoy security and independence, it was easy, and it would have been natural for him, in the letters which contained his overtures, to present such prospects to the view. He must have known both the suspicion which was attached to his situation, as the head of a Republic which had excited the terror of the world, and the additional alarm and distrust which accompanied the mention of his own name: consequently, if his views had been truly pacific, he would have endeavoured to inspire Europe with confidence, by an express renunciation of the foreign system of France—and by an assurance that, as a ruler, he meant to observe the long established principles of civil society, to which, as a general, he had shewn himself so dangerous and determined an enemy, and that he was willing to restore the Balance of Europe, which was essential to the general security, on condition only that he should be allowed to retain the Gallic Sceptre. Some intimations of this nature were the least that could be expected from him, in case his views were really favourable to the general tranquillity. But in his overtures to the British Government, nothing of the kind is to be found. Those overtures, indeed, abound with the most pathetic lamentations on the ravages of war, and with animated descriptions of the benefits and glory of peace. But they do not go beyond some inflated *phrases* of that description. They do not afford the least ground to hope that the

First Consul intended any change of system—that it was his inclination to respect the authority of other Governments, and the independence of other States—that under his reign society would cease to have any thing to apprehend from the disorganizing principles of the French Republic—that the Decrees of Fraternity would at length be repealed—that, governed by him, France would confine her attention to her own affairs, without intermeddling with the domestic concerns of other countries—that she would again recognize the Laws of Nations—and that she would be satisfied, if peace could be made on such terms, with limits which might be compatible with that Balance of Power, for the formation and preservation of which Europe had sustained so many contests. The total neglect of Buonaparte to give any such assurances, must convince every impartial mind that his professions of a desire for peace were fraudulent—that he meant to adhere to the known system of the Republic—that the same revolutionary zeal inspired the First Consul, as had animated the conqueror of Italy and the invader of Egypt.

But it is not by negative proof alone, however strong and conclusive, that the pacific professions of the new Government of France are shewn to be perfidious. The letters, which were addressed to the British Government, contain internal evidence, of the most positive and unequivocal kind, that nothing was farther from the mind of Buonaparte than a desire to be the means of restoring Peace to the world. The avowed object of the overture, as explained in the first of those letters, was a *general pacification*. Now when a number of Powers are confederated in war, against either a single Power, or another confederacy, the natural, the obvious, the accustomed mode of effecting a general pacification, is a *general Congress*. We should look, therefore, to the dispatches of Buonaparte, for a proposition of that sort as a matter of course, if he really desired a general pacification. But in

in his letters on this occasion there is not the most distant allusion to the only measure calculated for the attainment of the end, which he professed to have in view. This is doubtless, very suspicious. But suspicion is exchanged for certainty, when we read the subsequent letter of Talleyrand. For in that letter the Minister waves all idea of the *general* Pacification, which his Master had declared to be the object of his overture, and without even noticing either the Allies, with which his Britannic Majesty was known to be in close union, or the Spanish Monarch with whom he was at war, proposes "to put an immediate end to hostilities by agreeing to a suspension of arms, and naming Plenipotentiaries on each side, who should repair to Dunkirk, or any other town advantageously situated for the quickness of respective communications, and who should apply themselves, without any delay, to effect the re-establishment of Peace and good understanding *between the French Republic and England.*"

Such is the inconsistency between the First Consul and his minister. The former talks, though in the most indefinite terms, of a *general Pacification*—the latter proposes a *separate negotiation*, than which, nothing could be more unfavourable to a *general* peace, and an immediate armistice, of which, considering the comparative state of the naval force, and of the commerce of the two countries, the whole benefit would have remained with France, and which would have been productive of the greatest disadvantage to Great Britain*. Such evident marks of

* The very important circumstance, that an immediate Naval Armistice, was one of the propositions contained in the overture of the First Consul, has not been noticed as it deserves. With a recollection of that circumstance, let the people of this country judge of the sincerity of the pacific professions of Buonaparte, and of the propriety of the conduct of the British Government in rejecting his advances. They will be the better able to form their opinion on those subjects in consequence of the attention they have recently paid to the *distinct* question of a Naval Armistice.

duplicity prove, to demonstration, the propriety of the rejection of the first overture, and the necessity there was of rejecting the second. When men convict themselves of contradiction and falsehood, it would be madness to confide in their professions, or to comply with their desires. But the letter of Citizen Talleyrand, besides containing, when viewed in conjunction with the previous dispatch, undoubted marks of a treacherous purpose, unfolded the real designs of France, and suggested that her views, in offering to negotiate, were really inimical to the peace and security of Europe. An attempt to engage the different Powers, with which she was at war, in separate negotiations, (for a like offer was made to Austria), instead of leading to a general peace, could only be the result of a plan to break the confederacy, to draw off, if possible, some one of the allies from the league, in order to overpower the others, and ultimately to accomplish those schemes of universal ambition and subversion, which had been so long pursued. The perseverance with which the endeavour to draw the Court of Vienna into a negotiation was persisted in, evinced the greatest anxiety to detach that Power from the coalition. While the little care that was taken to give the pacific dispatches, addressed to the British Government, an appearance either of sincerity or consistency, proves that they were intended rather to afford the English *Fructidorians** an opportunity of labouring in their vocation, by raising a factious clamour about Peace, than to produce an accommodation with this country.

It is probable, indeed, that Buonaparte thought it impossible for the British Ministry to venture upon a rejection of his overtures—that he did not suppose them possessed of sufficient resolution to encounter the

* For an authentic definition of this term, see Reflections, &c. p. 133.

reproach which was sure to be brought against them, not only by the factious, but by the unreflecting, of refusing even to hear the terms which he might have to offer. Such a reproach, has, indeed, been made, by well-affected persons; who do not consider that it was not only possible, but highly probable that, like some of his predecessors, the First Consul would have availed himself of the opportunity which negotiation was calculated to afford him, of drawing from them their propositions, without advancing, on his part, any of a specific nature. It is also forgotten, by the persons who advance this censure, that, in order to have an opportunity of learning the terms which the enemy was inclined to propose, the negotiation must have been fully accepted, and that its acceptance would have been instantly attended with the consequences which have been already described.

It should not escape notice that the proposal of Talleyrand to treat for a separate peace, followed directly an intimation, on the part of Lord Grenville, that his Britannic Majesty would only treat, whenever an opportunity should offer, *in concert with his allies*. To propose, therefore, a separate treaty, was to propose what it was known would not be acceded to, and afforded a strong additional proof that no serious thoughts of peace were entertained. Indeed, the omission of all mention of a General Congress, when a wish for General Pacification was expressed, and the offer of Separate Negotiation, when it had been declared, by the other party, that no treaty would be entered into but in concert with allies, evinced, not only a desire to obtain false credit for a pacific disposition, but a studious endeavour to avoid any distinct or practicable proposition leading to negotiation, lest, by possibility, it should be accepted.

Nor are the overtures of Buonaparte destitute of evidence of his adherence to the Jacobinical principles and practices of the French Republic. Of this, a more convincing, and, indeed, a more insulting proof

proof can scarcely be conceived than that ostentatious and unnecessary display of Jacobinical forms; which appears at the head of his epistle to the British Monarch. Fearful, as it were, lest a doubt should exist respecting the character which he meant to assume—lest some hope should arise that, in the exercise of his new authority, he might conform to the principles of social order—he prefixed to that epistle, in the most conspicuous manner, the Jacobinical Insignia of the “Sovereignty of the People—Liberty, Equality!” What more solemn pledge could he give of a fixed determination to adhere to the revolutionary system of France? How could he more clearly display his inveterate hostility to all established Government, than by such an avowal of principles, which had been instruments of destruction to half the Governments of Europe, and which were at open and irreconcilable enmity with all legitimate authority? It was not a *domestic* concern in which he was then engaged. He was addressing his first public act to a *Foreign Power*! He was making an *OVERTURE FOR PEACE*! Could any thing prove more strongly that it was a *Jacobinical* Peace which he had in contemplation, than his taking such an opportunity of displaying the *Jacobinical* banners of the Republic? Nay, he did not content himself with exhibiting, on those banners, the ordinary emblems of Republican France: he chose, in honour no doubt to his Accession, to blazon her Escutcheon with a new Quartering, and to ornament her Shield with the Device of “*THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE PEOPLE*!”—the most Jacobinical of all Jacobinical symbols—which, though it had been the fundamental principle of her Revolutionary Code, had not, till then, been entered upon her Armorial Bearings.

Having thus announced himself as a Jacobinical Ruler, he maintains that character, throughout the correspondence, with a consistency, which shews that it was perfectly congenial with his disposition and habits.

Who

Who but an adept in Jacobinism would have thought of so insidious an attack upon the established Forms of intercourse between States, as that which is contained in his mode of address. Any but a *Jacobinical* Usurper would have rejoiced in being able to shelter himself behind those Forms—to have been allowed to participate in them—to have been permitted to correspond, through his Ministers, and, by official communications, with Sovereign Princes. Not so the First Consul. He must display his independence on Forms, and his contempt of rule and usage, by addressing himself *personally* to the King of Great Britain. But that is not all. Not content with setting himself above all established *Forms*, he dares to tell the King, whom he has the audacity thus to address, and whose confidence he presumes to ask, that if his Majesty, instead of following his example, should continue to adhere to such Forms, he would do so *only* for the purposes of deception. He has the temerity, in addressing himself to the Monarch who wears the most ancient Crown now remaining in Europe, to say of the Forms which the ancestors of that Monarch have observed for centuries, that though “necessary, perhaps, to disguise the dependence of weak States,” they “prove only in those which are strong *the mutual desire of deceiving each other.*” Who does not feel that the faggot of the common hangman would have been a much sadder reply to this unparalleled insolence, than the official and dignified dispatch of the Secretary of State? It is to such insolence, however, that Mr. Whitbread is reported to have given the epithet of *respectful*.—Oh Shame, where is thy blush!

But the First Consul seems to have been aware, that he could not adequately sustain his appropriate character without the aid of falsehood. He therefore introduces himself to the notice of his Majesty by one of the most bare-faced lies, that ever came from the mouth of profligacy: “Called,” says he, “by the wishes of
 “ the

“ the French Nation, to occupy the First Magistracy of the Republic, I think it proper, on entering into office, to make a direct communication of it to your Majesty.” This lie was perfectly Jacobinical, as it borrowed the name of the people, in whose name it is the peculiar privilege of Jacobinism to do or say any thing. But it was not the less a gross and palpable falsehood, exhibiting the most perfect and notorious contrast to the real fact that could possibly be conceived. Who does not know that the French people, instead of calling the First Consul to his new office, had no more idea of honouring him with such an elevation, than the Chinese or the Mahrattas?—that he had forced himself upon them by the most flagrant military usurpation, which had taken place since the time of Cromwell?—that he had, by the bayonet, driven out their representatives, and overturned the constitution, which they and *he* had often sworn to observe? Was such a falsehood, placed at the very beginning of his overtures, the best pledge that Buonaparte could give of the *sincerity* of his pacific professions?—Was it the best expedient he could devise to open a friendly and confidential communication with the British Court, in order to bring the war to a speedy and happy termination? or rather, was it not an insulting mockery of an illustrious Monarch, and, through him, of all legitimate authority?

After such a display of Jacobinical principles, insolence and falsehood, it seems impossible that the pacific overtures of the First Consul should be misunderstood. Left, however, conjecture, or the dazzling lustre of the word Peace, should mislead any one in his judgment respecting the real nature and drift of those overtures, Buonaparte has himself subjected them to an infallible test—the test of actual experience. He refers to the treaty of *Campo Formio*, as a specimen of his talents and services as a negociator—as a pledge of his sincere and ardent desire for a general pacification.—The reference is certainly apt; and it is calculated to convey

convey a very accurate idea of the benefits which may be expected to result from his pacificatory endeavours. On the occasion referred to, a treaty of peace was concluded with the King of Hungary and Bohemia; and conferences were holden at Rastadt, for the purpose of terminating all differences between the German Empire and the French Republic. But his Majesty was not able to obtain even a confirmation of the preliminary terms, which Buonaparte had *solemnly* engaged should form the basis of the treaty; and the conferences at Rastadt afforded a complete specimen of Jacobin negotiation. Not only did France, pending these amicable communications, violate her neutrality with the King of Prussia, who was a party in the discussion—not only did she infringe the line of demarcation, which had been *agreed* upon, *ad interim*—not only did she, on her part, continue hostilities by the capture of Mayence and Ehrenbreitstein—but the very negotiation itself was made by her an instrument to undermine, step by step, the civil and Religious constitution of the German Empire, and to reduce it to such a state of disunion, weakness and dis-arrangement, that Peace would have served only to render it an easy prey to the machinations of the Republic. At length, the effect of these insidious conferences became so alarming, and their design so obvious, that no other chance remained for the preservation of Germany, than to break them off, and to renew the war with increased vigour; and thus, as Boulay de la Meurthe has emphatically observed, “The Treaties and Diplomatic “conferences” of France, “appear to have been the “source of a new war, still more desperate and bloody “than the former.”

In the mean time, however, the great work of *general Pacification* was pursued, in the true French manner, by the overthrow of the Papal Government, and by the subversion of the neutral Republics of Venice and Genoa—by the conquest of Switzerland, another neutral state—by prosecuting the war with unprecedented

fury

fury against Great Britain—by a rejection of her overtures for Peace at Lisle, and a dismissal of her Ambassador, because he was not authorized to restore, as a *Preliminary* to negotiation, and without any compensation, “all the possessions which, since the beginning of the war, had passed into the hands of the English,” allowing France, at the same time, to retain the whole of her immense conquests—by the formation of the army of England, which was to carry “the Genius of Liberty” into “Great Britain,” to wreak vengeance “on the Cabinet of St. James*, to crown the glorious life of Buonaparte,” its commander, “by a conquest which the Great Nation owed to its insulted dignity†,” and to “punish Albion for its long catalogue of crimes against humanity‡”—by the most indefatigable and too-successful endeavours to stir up a rebellion in Ireland—by the *preliminary* attempt at an invasion of England, under the direction of Colonel Tate§;—and finally, by the

* See the Proclamation of the Directory of the 26th October, 1797, the day on which it was decreed that “there should be assembled without delay, on the coasts of the ocean, an army which should be called the Army of England.”

† Speech of the President of the Directory, addressed to Buonaparte, General of the Army of England, on his presenting the ratification of the Treaty of Peace with the Emperor of Germany.

‡ Speech of Jean de Brie in the Council of Five Hundred, when the merchants of Paris offered a Loan to be employed in the expedition against England.

§ This expedition, according to the well-authenticated instructions given to its leader, had for its objects, 1st, to raise an insurrection, “by exciting the poor,” who, it is said in those instructions, are “in all countries the class most prone to insurrection,” and to plunder “the public stores and magazines,” and “the property of the rich, whose affluence is the natural subject of envy to the poor.”—2dly, to destroy the commerce of the country, at its very sources, by breaking down the bridges, cutting dykes, ruining causeways, plundering convoys of subsistence, public stages and waggons, and even private carriages, cutting off supplies from the principal towns, burning all vessels and boats on the rivers and canals, destroying magazines, setting fire to arsenals, docks, and coal-yards, rope-walks, great manufactories, &c. by which means (it was observed) “a crowd of artificers would be thrown out of employment.”—3dly, to “prepare and facilitate the way for descent, by distracting the attention of the English Government.”

expedition

expedition to Egypt, which, in its comprehensive design, embraced the vast objects of the subversion of the neutral and unoffending Empire of the Ottomans, and the destruction of the British Establishments in the East. Such is the precedent referred to by Buonaparte, in illustration of his "sincere desire to contribute efficaciously, *for the second time*, "to a general Pacification*." A precedent which he contributed more than any one else to establish, but which, if he had had no part in it, yet, being selected and quoted by him, must be considered as affording just criterion of the nature of his views in proposing a negotiation.

To the letter of the First Consul, Lord Grenville *officially* replied, in a manner which evinced a sincere desire, on the part of the British Government, for the return of safe and substantial Peace. His Lordship judiciously refers to the causes which, not only produced the War, but have hitherto prevented its termination, and which, while they continue to exist, must operate in the same manner; and he infers, that until their removal, it would be vain to expect any real advantage from Negotiation. He insists on the frequent proofs which his Majesty has given of a sincere desire for the re-establishment of secure and permanent tranquillity, as well as on the justice and inexpressible importance of the objects for which he has been obliged to contend against an unprovoked attack. The British Minister further points out the unprecedented and almost inconceivable mischiefs and dangers, which have resulted from the system originally adopted and invariably pursued by the French Republic, and he clearly shews that the relinquishment of that system must necessarily precede the return of general repose and security. He mentions the Restoration of the Hereditary Line of Princes in France as an event, which would at once remove all obstacles in the way of negotiation, as it would give to all

* Letter from the First Consul to His Majesty.

the other Nations of Europe that security, in tranquillity and peace, which they are now compelled to seek by other means. But though his Lordship alludes to such an event as best calculated to restore general quiet and safety, he disclaims, on the part of his Britannic Majesty, all pretensions or wishes to interfere in the domestic affairs of France, and he declares that his Majesty will always be ready to concert, with his Allies, the means of general Pacification, whenever that security, for which alone he is contending, can in *any* manner be attained.

A reply to this Letter was soon transmitted from France, and the First Consul deigned to descend from that eminence, on which he had attempted to place himself above all the lawful Sovereigns of Europe, and to adopt the accustomed forms of communication which those Sovereigns invariably observe in their public intercourse with each other. This condescension was considered by some persons as an auspicious symptom of a pacific disposition; but if he really entertained such a disposition, it is natural to look for solid and conclusive proofs of its existence, in the official letter of his Minister, Talleyrand.

If a sincere desire for Peace had been the inducement with Buonaparte thus to continue the correspondence, it is impossible that he should not have endeavoured to shew, that the obstacles, which Lord Grenville had represented as precluding all hope of real advantage from Negotiation, did not really exist—that the system of destruction by which the French Republic had excited so much alarm, was no longer pursued—that Europe had nothing to fear from the principles of the new Government of France—and that the authority of the First Consul was as compatible with the security of Great Britain and her Allies as that of the Line of Princes, the Restoration of which Lord Grenville had stated to be the most certain and speedy means of re-establishing general tranquillity.

But

But the reply of the Ex-Bishop is of a very different nature. It is, in fact, a complete and a laboured demonstration that all the impediments to Peace, which had been enumerated by Lord Grenville, continued in full force. In that reply, the new Government of France takes especial care to identify itself with all the factions which, during the whole Revolution, have tyrannized over France, and molested the rest of Europe. By attempting to justify, it avows its approbation of the conduct of those factions, and it adopts and repeats the various pretexts by which they had endeavoured to deceive other States—it even presumes to boast of the early Proclamation made by them, on the part of the Republic, of *a love of peace—of a disinclination for conquest—of a respect for the independence of all Governments*—and this at a time when every quarter of the Globe has been convinced, by direful experience, that perfidy alone dictated those declarations—nay, it dares to assert that France *was occupied entirely with her own affairs, and that she was disposed to avoid taking part in those of Europe*, in spite of the accumulated evidence by which it is demonstrated that it was the fundamental principle of her Revolution to propagate, over the whole Earth, her principles of licentiousness and anarchy, to excite the people of every country to revolt; and to subvert all established Authority, and all the Institutions of Society.

The repetition of such audacious falsehoods, after the events which have occurred, is marked, if possible, with still blacker characters of atrocity, than their first promulgation. Such a repetition is an insult to the understanding and feelings of mankind, and it denotes *that* confirmed and matured depravity, which can only be produced by the habitual perpetration of the grossest crimes. If Buonaparte had appeared, on this occasion, for the first time, on the Theatre of the French Republic—if he had been, till then, altogether unknown on the Stage of the French Revolution, it would be much more

than sufficient to preclude all doubt respecting his real character and designs, to find him insisting, in the year 1800, that the disposition of Republican France had been pacific, unambitious, orderly, respectful towards other States, and that her attention had been directed solely to her own affairs. The open and voluntary defenders of known criminals, must be considered, either as partakers of their guilt, or as wanting nothing but occasion, at least, to equal them in atrocity. In this point of view the reply of the Renegado Bishop may be considered as a valuable historical document; proving that no change has taken place in consequence of the last Revolution in the foreign politics of the French Republic, and containing an instructive warning to mankind, to be on their guard against those wiles, which have already been so injurious to the general repose and security.

But the French Consul displays, on this occasion, an extraordinary degree of anxiety to vindicate France from the charge, which had been brought against her by Lord Grenville, of being the author of the war. He will not suffer the Republic, to whose rights he has succeeded, and in whose criminality he seems determined to participate, to be accused of the crime of original aggression, without undertaking her defence. He might, indeed, without implicating himself, have passed over in silence the allusion made by Lord Grenville to the origin of the War; he might even have disavowed the conduct of France at a time, when he had no influence on her proceedings. But he was aware that the human mind, notwithstanding the corrupting influence of the French Revolution, still retained a *moral sense*, which rendered the *original* justice of a war, a consideration of inexpressible importance during the whole of its continuance, and of great influence upon its ultimate success. He felt, moreover, that the numerous acts of unexampled atrocity, which, on the part of France, had accompanied the progress of the War, would, in a great degree, be screened from the indignation of mankind, if

it could be made to appear that they were the consequences of the aggression of her enemies; and that, whatever cause those enemies might have to complain of her subsequent violence, cruelty and perfidy, their complaints would make but little impression, if the world could be induced to believe that they drew all their misfortunes upon themselves, by their own ambition or injustice. He therefore endeavours, by the pen of his Minister, to retort the charge of aggression, and to make it appear that the " evils which have afflicted Europe," are to be imputed " to the projects of subjection, dissolution and dismemberment, which were prepared against France."

This charge has been repeatedly repelled, and proved to have no other foundation than calumny. If ever there was a question so fully discussed, as to preclude all possibility of doubt, it is the question of aggression. That question has indeed been principally considered by English Writers, who naturally directed their chief attention to the interest which their own country had in it; and though they could not refrain from noticing the aggressive conduct of France towards other States, yet they were chiefly solicitous to expose her injurious designs against Great Britain. But it is equally demonstrable that France was the aggressor in the Continental War, which broke out almost a year before she commenced hostilities against this country: and considering that it is a common cause in which so many nations have been engaged—nay, that *all* nations, whether they think so or not, have a common interest in this War—it is of more importance to trace it from its origin, in order thence to follow it through its course, and thus to preserve its unity unbroken, than to examine separate and distinct parts of its progress. This, therefore, shall be done; and there is an additional reason for thus pursuing the enquiry, as, besides the natural and indissoluble connection which exists between all the parts of this strange and unprecedented contest, the desperate malice of Opposition has even gone the length of attributing the War on the

the Continent to this Country, although the French rulers, less desperately malicious, have declared that Great Britain observed a strict neutrality until a period long subsequent to the breaking out of that War. As the proposed discussion will necessarily be drawn into some length—and as it relates to a subject on which the generality of readers have completely made up their minds, though, at the same time of such importance, that nothing should be left undone to remove the doubts of those, who are not so fully satisfied respecting the justice of the cause of the Continental Powers as of that of Great Britain—for these reasons it shall be reserved for distinct notice, in the latter part of this publication, after a consideration of those topics which press more closely at the present moment.

The subject of aggression, as it particularly regards this country, has been exhausted by repeated discussions; and in a recent publication, entitled "The History of the Politics of Great Britain and France, by Herbert Marsh, Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge," that subject has been so fully, so minutely, and so methodically considered, and with so perfect an arrangement of facts, dates and documents, as not only to afford the most ample satisfaction to the impartial enquirer, but to furnish a masterly specimen of important history. The author of this truly valuable work, has judiciously availed himself of all the sources of information and elucidation, which have been augmenting down to the late period at which he wrote; and he has, thereby, as well as by confining his attention to the single question of aggression as it concerns this country, been enabled to present to the public a more perfect disquisition on that question than could have been produced at an earlier period. This history is highly deserving the perusal even of the best informed persons; but it more particularly merits the attention of those who have the misfortune (for a misfortune at least it must be considered), to think their country the aggressor in the most bloody war, in which it

it has ever been engaged. The gentlemen of Opposition declare, in spite of all the endeavours which have hitherto been made to open their eyes, that they still labour under this misfortune. If that be really the case, they may, by perusing the work in question, be freed from all the gloom and dejection which they have so long suffered on that account, and recover their natural serenity of mind. Such an expectation, at least, is warranted by the effect which the work has produced in Germany, where it was first published—and in the language of which country it was written, as the author says, under the impulse of a desire to rescue his native country “from the calumnies of some German Journalists, who contend, like some English writers, that the French rulers were solicitous for Peace, but that the Ministers of Great Britain, through mere hatred of the New Republic, had resolved at all events to commence hostilities.” These assertions, he says, were confidently repeated during several years, till, at length, they were received in almost every part of Germany as indisputable truths. But Mr. Marsh’s publication had not long appeared, “when” (he says) “the first literary Reviews in Germany pronounced that the British Government was completely rescued from the charges which had been laid to it, and that the origin as well as the continuance of the war must be wholly and solely ascribed to the mad ambition of the French rulers.”

It cannot be supposed that Britons are less open to conviction, in matters which involve the character of their native country, than foreigners; and of course the gentlemen of Opposition may be expected to enjoy, by the aid of this publication, the inexpressible satisfaction of thinking the cause in which Great Britain is engaged, just, and the exertions which she has, for years, been making, necessary for her security, against the attacks of an ambitious and unprincipled foe. But it behoves other persons, besides those who take an active or an offensive part in political questions, to weigh very deliberately and fully the evidence relating

to the origin of the war, before they pronounce their country guilty of the enormous crime of aggression. Although the British people at large are firmly convinced of the justice of their cause, (an indisputable proof, after so long and burdensome a contest, that it is most clearly and manifestly just) there are nevertheless considerable numbers, and among them individuals of great worth and respectability, who have taken up a different opinion, which they resolutely maintain, without thinking it incumbent upon them to investigate the documents that are adduced against it. If such persons were to examine their own hearts, they would find that they formed their sentiments upon this important subject, with an impression on their minds that it affected only the character of Administration—and having, whether justly or not, preconceived an unfavourable idea of his Majesty's Ministers, that they very willingly, and therefore hastily, adopted an opinion, which gratified the feelings they were disposed to indulge. They would also find that they have since listened with avidity to every assertion, however unsupported by proof, which tended to confirm the sentiments they had thus suffered to take possession of their minds—that on this account they have tolerated and even approved of publications, which teemed with sedition, treason and blasphemy*, and which, otherwise, they would never have suffered to appear in their families—that they have disdainfully spurned every publication which had an opposite tendency, believing, or choosing to believe, that it was under the bias of a corrupt influence†—until at length

* Such is the power of prejudice, that many persons, who abhor treason and detest blasphemy, have regularly submitted to peruse papers which, for years, have abounded in both, and which, though really *anti-constitutional, anti-social, and anti-religious*, they describe by the soft name of *anti-ministerial* papers, until both their loyalty and their religion have been laid so fast asleep, that they are, at length, able to peruse the most execrable paragraphs, with at least a stoical indifference.

† It is one of the main artifices employed by faction to represent all persons, who, by defending the cause in which Government is engaged, support, as far as they are able, Government itself, as acting solely under the impulse of Ministerial influence. This kind of sweeping

length they are not more firmly convinced of their own existence, than of the injustice of the present War, on part of Great Britain.

sweeping answer the Author of these pages has frequently received, in lieu of an examination of the truth of the facts, or the justness of the reasonings, which he had adduced. Such replies he should, however, think beneath his notice, if the respectable channel of parliamentary debate had not been employed to convey a suggestion of this nature, in respect of his last publication*, which was stated to be the production of a person *in the pay of Government*. It cannot surely be necessary to point out the unfairness of the conclusion, that to occupy a station of public trust and confidence, (and most persons who occupy such stations may be literally said to be in the pay of Government), implies dependence of mind or servility of sentiment—or that such a situation authorises the inference which the Gentleman in question deduced on the occasion alluded to, that a perfect coincidence of opinion, on a particular topic, might be presumed between Ministers and the Writer. But it is due to the public to take this opportunity of shewing the fallacy of such conclusions, by observing, that the publication which was thus brought forward, as a criterion of the views of Ministers, was written *without the smallest communication*, on the subject, with any Member or Agent of Administration; and a similar observation might, if circumstances required it, be applied on the present occasion.

If the persons who oppose Government (no particular allusion is here intended) do really believe that all who take a different side from them on the great political questions of the present day, are under the influence of sinister motives, they surely judge of others from themselves. It is true, Charity itself cannot suppose it possible for men to be impelled by virtuous, loyal, or patriotic feelings, to assist the cause of *Atheism* and *Anarchy*—but does it therefore follow, that no one can from pure, disinterested and honourable motives, support the cause of *Religion, regular Government, and social Order*? Because it happens that the stations of all who exercise lawful authority are involved in the fate of that cause, must its active adherents necessarily be the tools of men in power? Is it not possible for the soul to be so engrossed by the immense interests which depend on the issue of the present contest—is it not possible for the heart to be so penetrated with a sense of the dangers to which all civilized society is now exposed, and so inflamed with a desire of contributing towards its escape from the awful ruin with which it is menaced—as to make a man look down, with comparative indifference, on the favour of Ministers, and on the smiles of Princes? When the raging tempest exposes the labouring bark to the most imminent peril—when the boisterous deep yawns every moment to swallow it up in an unfathomable abyss—when the still more dangerous rock, surrounded by fragments of many a wreck, presents an awful warning of approaching destruction—how insignificant and contemptible must appear all the pursuits, which ordinarily engage the solicitude of mankind! What favour can those, who have the direction of the vessel, bestow on the meanest individual on board, comparable with that of bringing him safe into port?

* See Parliamentary Debates in the last Session by Debrett and Woodfall.

Admitting it to be true, that the character of Ministers is the only interest which is involved in the charge of aggression, surely it is incumbent upon every one, before he accuses them of having unjustly plunged their country in the horrors of war, to see that there are good grounds for the accusation. No one will dispute that it involves a very high degree of criminality to admit lightly, and to avow without due investigation, a belief, that a private individual is guilty of an atrocious crime; particularly when means of ascertaining the truth or falshood of the charge are within reach. Are Ministers, then, alone destitute of the right, common to all their fellow-creatures, to have their conduct examined before it is condemned? May their reputation be wantonly sported with, *because* they are in office, *because* they fill high departments in the State? Is it justifiable to slander them, *because* they are servants of the Crown? Is it meritorious to criminate them, *because* they enjoy the confidence of their Sovereign? That their conduct should be closely watched, and strictly scrutinized, is undoubtedly a great constitutional principle: though reason seems to require, that, while this principle is, as it is sure always to be, rigidly enforced against them, due allowance should be made in the public mind for the embarrassments which its exercise tends to create; and it should be remembered, that their constant accusers are their rivals, whose interest it is to render them unpopular, and, if possible, odious. No such considerations, however, are now urged in their behalf. Nothing is now claimed for them but a full and fair enquiry. They ask no other favour than that their fellow-subjects should judge for *themselves*, instead of taking up their opinion from the statements of party, and of course interested writers, respecting the real causes of the present contest, and that they may not be charged with so atrocious a crime as that of wantonly involving their country in the horrors of war, without a due investigation of *facts*. Who that has the smallest regard for justice—who that ever listens, in the most sacred place, to the solemn

solemn injunction, "thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbour," will venture, without a complete and impartial examination, to charge them with so foul an offence against God and Man?

But the merits of the question of aggression, far from being confined to Ministers, who have no claim but to our impartiality, affects the reputation of one who is inexpressibly dear to us all. They involve the Religious and moral, as well as the political character of our gracious Sovereign. Although, for the sake of freedom of debate, the acts of a King of England are considered in Parliament as the acts of his Ministers, and legal responsibility, for the wisest reasons, attaches only upon them, yet in the eye of reason, in the view of history, at the tribunal of conscience in this world, and at a still more dread tribunal in the next, he must, as well as every other *real* Monarch, be considered as responsible for the great measures of his Government. By the fundamental principles of the Constitution, he has the absolute and uncontrollable choice of his servants, and the indisputable right of dismissing them at pleasure. Besides, therefore, the presumed sanction which is implied in his selecting them as the objects of his confidence, their continuance in office denotes a *subsequent* approbation of their conduct, and amounts, indeed, to an express adoption of those measures, which, in the first instance, he permitted to pass under his name. Let then those persons, who, without examination, have suffered themselves to take up the opinion that the present war is unjust, consider how deeply that opinion affects the character of a Prince, whose virtues command the veneration of his People. Let them reflect that, whenever they avow such an opinion, they charge their beloved Sovereign with every drop of blood which has been shed in the contest! that, for every life which has been lost in it, they declare him guilty of a most atrocious murder! Be it remembered, however, that this statement, serious as it is, is not meant to bias the judgment of a single individual in favour of the war—that its object is not
to

to *create* but to *remove* prejudice, by promoting the investigation of a subject which many persons have neglected to examine, because they were not aware of the extent of its importance.

But still deeper interests are involved in the opinion of individuals, upon this important subject, than even the personal character of a beloved Monarch. The public is composed of individuals; and on the opinion of the British public, respecting the justice of the war, depends, according to all human calculation, *the issue of this great contest*. Unless the nation be convinced that its cause is equitable, how can it be expected to exert that vigour and energy, which are indispensably necessary in so arduous a conflict? How can it be expected to face danger with intrepidity, to support disaster, if disaster should be its lot, with fortitude, and resolutely to persevere in the struggle until its essential interests may be secured upon a solid and permanent basis? The nation, indeed, with which we are at war, besides having attained, by a long course of unexampled wickedness, that state of hardened profligacy, which is proof against the feelings of compunction, and the checks of remorse, is the blind and servile instrument of the most abandoned criminals—whose hearts are rendered so callous by guilt, as to be impenetrable to the stings of conscience. Such a people will be only inflamed with a more desperate fury by their sense of the extreme badness of their cause. But Britons, thank Heaven! have not yet lost their moral feelings. The energy of their exertions depends on the approbation of their own minds. With a consciousness of rectitude they are invincible. But their strength and their spirit would soon fail them in a contest, in which their hearts did not inform them that their motives were just, and their views upright. They are also a free people, and the vigour of their Government depends upon the support of its subjects. Their opinion, therefore, of the justice of the present war, involves the immense interests which are attached to the fate of their arms—interests of no less magnitude than the preservation of law-

lawful Government—the continuance of social Order—as well as their own existence as a Nation. Happily, a vast majority of them are firmly convinced that the sword was never drawn in a more righteous cause than that, in which they are now engaged; and that, from the moment they were compelled to enter upon hostilities, they have been fighting in defence of their Religion, their laws, their independence, and, indeed, of every thing that is valuable in society. These are truths for which they know that they can appeal not only to the great Searcher of hearts, but to evidence, as clear and as strong as the bright radiance of the vertical Sun.

If these truths were duly acknowledged and felt by *all* whom they concern, Great Britain might safely defy the utmost malice of her enemies. But, strange as it may appear, her bosom is torn with contentions, which constitute her principal danger, and which derive their chief force from a difference of opinion respecting the point of aggression. This point is the hinge upon which, at present, all her domestic disputes turn. As the war involves all the interests of the State, so the question of its merits swallows up all subordinate questions. Of this any one may be convinced, by considering how much, at this time, the effect of Opposition eloquence depends upon the assumption, on which it is invariably founded, that Ministers wantonly and unnecessarily plunged the country into the war. How vapid would be the severest attack upon Administration, if it were accompanied with an acknowledgment that the war was unavoidable! How harmless would the most furious Jacobinical Print become, if it were to place at the head of its inflammatory columns this single proposition —“the war is just*.” The universal admission of this truth would deprive faction of its sting, and would neutralize the venom of sedition it-

* It would tend much to lessen the mischief produced by these prints, if every person were to suppose the above indisputable truths to be prefixed to their political paragraphs.

self*. The unnatural Sons of Britain, who endeavour to accomplish her destruction, can only hope to effect their parricidal purpose by accusing her of the worst of crimes—an unjust and unnecessary war—and by stifling her exertions under a heavy load of conscious guilt: and though they cannot shake the opinion of the public at large respecting the goodness of its cause, they induce numbers by dint of repetition to give credit to the charge of unjust aggression; they embarrass by their cabals the measures of Government; and they relax the vigour of the country, by inspiring it with a well-founded alarm, lest, for want of unanimity, it may not continue equal to so arduous a conflict.

As an opinion that the war is unjust, even though it prevail only in a small portion of the Community, is fraught with incalculable mischief to the country and the world—and as the sentiments of every individual on that subject are of such importance—how deeply criminal is every one, who suffers that opinion to take possession of his mind, and to issue from his mouth, without the most deliberate and candid investigation! It is no exculpation in such a case to be able to plead sincerity of conviction, or confidence in the statements and assurances of others. Every one is personally answerable for his own conduct, and is bound to examine for himself. A Deist will be dreadfully disappointed, if he expect to be absolved, because he has been misled by a Voltaire or an Helvetius.

No one, who pays the least attention to public affairs, can deny that the injustice of the war forms the corner stone—nay, even the groundwork of all the declamation which is employed to embarrass the operations of Government. Whether a motion is made in Parliament to recommend a negotiation to ascertain the objects of the war, or to propose an enquiry into the State of the Nation—whether an inflammatory speech issues from the Whig Club, or a petition for peace is obtained from a Common Hall—the whole question resolves itself into the justice of the war, and all the topics which are insisted on derive their whole efficacy from the egregiously absurd supposition, which is invariably taken for granted, that the Minister, by his fondness for a war, which could not but materially interfere with those plans of finance, on which his reputation was staked, has brought the country to the brink of destruction.

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As little will the names of a Fox or an Erskine be able to afford refuge to those, whom they have persuaded to believe, in contradiction to the truth, that the British Government provoked the war. If, indeed, those Gentlemen, themselves the dupes of party zeal, have led others into an error on this question, they will, in that respect, have an account to render, which no one who believes in a future retribution would for thousands of worlds take off their hands. But all persons, who have suffered themselves to be thus misled, are, nevertheless, responsible on their own account, for an error, which it was in their power to avoid. Such persons, it is to be feared, have already much to answer for; but they are in great danger of being responsible for consequences, the very idea of which should make them shudder. It imports them much to weigh this matter very seriously and very speedily; that if, upon mature consideration, they find themselves to have been wrong, they may, by bearing testimony to the truth, make all possible atonement for the past, as well as preserve themselves from future guilt. It will doubtlessly be very grating to forego opinions which they have strenuously maintained, and on which, perhaps, their political character is committed. But this penance, however severe, is a duty to themselves, to their country, to the whole human race. For the purpose of ascertaining whether their opinion is true or false, no mode can be depended on but a candid examination of undoubted facts, evidenced by authentic documents; and a better help in such an undertaking it is not possible to obtain than Mr. Marsh's work; which contains a regular and methodical statement of every fact which has occurred, with a reference to original documents, most of which are taken from the registers of the enemy. No one has attempted to charge this author with a single misrepresentation, with an important omission, or with an unfair comment. Indeed, so satisfactory and convincing are his statements, that it would exceed even Mr. Fox's daring to stand up in

in Parliament, with this history in his hand, and declare the present war to be unjust*.

It has been already shewn, that the pacific overtures which were made at the commencement of the present year by the new Revolutionary Rulers of France to the British Government, contained, upon the face of them, conclusive evidence that they did not originate in a desire of Peace. But although the instant rejection of these overtures was for that, as well as for other reasons, prescribed by wisdom demanded by prudence, and approved by the nation†, still the party in opposition to Government thought it afforded them a fair opportunity of emerging from that retreat, technically denominated a secession; to which they had consigned

* In paying this tribute to Mr. Marsh's work, it is but justice to observe that in Rivington's Annual Register for the year 1791 the aggression of France has been most ably demonstrated; Mr. Marsh's History, however, from being confined to the investigation of a single question, derives an advantage, with regard to that question, which no work, embracing a great variety of topics, can possibly possess.

† Of this a stronger proof could not exist than the failure of the endeavours of Opposition to procure petitions for immediate negotiation. A fairer opportunity for procuring such petitions could never be expected to recur, than when an offer made by the enemy to treat had been instantly rejected, and the disposition of the Gentlemen who oppose Government, to improve such an opportunity to the utmost, cannot be doubted. Nor was the occasion neglected. The City of London, under the auspices of its present Lord Mayor, was destined to take the lead, and to give the pacific impulse to the rest of the Country. But alas! a Petition in favour of immediate Peace, which had been passed by a dubious majority at a Common Hall, where the clamours of faction drowned the voice of reason, and which the Livery were apprised by public advertisement should lie open at the office of the Town Clerk, to receive their signatures, was presented (not to the King, whose Prerogative alone it is to make War and Peace but) to the House of Commons, with the subscription of only 56 names; while a Counter Petition, expressive of an entire confidence in the Government, was at the same time presented; having the signatures of 1619 persons of the greatest wealth and respectability of the Livery of London; among whom many of the most eminent merchants of that City, (who, unfortunately for the public interests, are not of the Livery) could not appear. After such a discomfiture, the party in opposition have deemed it prudent to abandon their undoubted project of covering the table of the House of Commons with Petitions for Peace. Not another attempt of the kind have they made. And they thereby give their silent though most expressive testimony, that they found the people of this country fully convinced, that no secure and honourable peace could be expected from any treaty with Buonaparte, and that to ensure so desirable an object, alike the wish of Government and people, it was necessary to resolve on the vigorous prosecution of the War.

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themselves in contempt of their engagements to their constituents, and of their duty to their country:

The grounds on which these Gentlemen censured in Parliament the British Government for refusing to negotiate, are not subject to general controversy; but the reports of their speeches are certainly open to animadversion. For those reports, though connived at on condition of their being given with fidelity, are not, like the speeches themselves, within the protection of Parliamentary privilege, which extends only to what passes in Parliament. Every individual is, therefore, at full liberty to comment, with absolute freedom, (though certainly not without perfect fairness) not upon the *debates in Parliament*, but upon the unauthorised reports of those debates, whatever shape they may assume. And it is much to be desired, while these reports are permitted, that writers should exercise this right without scruple. For if, in future times, a wicked and desperate faction should find its way into Parliament, and knowing that whatever passes there will be instantly communicated, by a thousand channels, to the public, should make speeches, not with a view to any effect they may produce upon the audience to which they are apparently addressed, but in order to pervert the public mind—to damp the public spirit—to give currency to the grossest and most mischievous misrepresentations—to serve the cause of the enemies of the country—to excite the people to disaffection—to stimulate the disaffected to sedition, treason, and insurrection—the only way to defeat the design of such speeches, will be to attack and expose the reports of them without reserve: and this may unquestionably be done with perfect safety, unless the absurd and slavish doctrine be admitted, that the contents of a common newspaper may be entitled to privilege of Parliament.

It might easily be shewn that the reported speeches which were published on the above occasion, are a flimsy tissue of misrepresentation and sophistry. This, however, is unnecessary, on account of the complete refutation

which the speeches received at the time of their delivery, and which has since been made public. But there are some topics, forming a distinguished feature in the reasoning attributed to these gentlemen, and especially in that ascribed to Mr. Fox and Mr. Erskine, which deserve particular notice, not so much on account of their relation to the question of negotiation, as because they have a very close connection with the origin and nature of the present contest, and consequently with *the general politics of Europe, and the state of Society*, at this momentous juncture.

It must be in the recollection of every one, that both previously and subsequently to the commencement of the war, it was the uniform practice of the gentlemen above mentioned, and of all who acted with them, to contend strenuously, that we had nothing to apprehend from the events which were passing in a neighbouring country—that we had no interest in those events otherwise than as friends of freedom, and of the human race—that, in short, the French revolution instead of being in any degree a source of danger, was a subject for general exultation, as it tended to promote the social happiness and even the tranquillity of the world. The fallacy of such statements, which for a time had no small effect upon the public mind, has been so completely demonstrated by experience, that it would be considered as a proof of insanity to repeat them at this moment. Still, however, as they were made the occasion of abuse and even of ridicule against every one, who, though he could not foresee a thousandth part of the mischief which was then brooding over the earth, thought he saw enough to convince him that there was cause for the utmost alarm—and as, which is far worse, they have been converted into a most copious source of misrepresentation respecting the causes of the war—it is no small satisfaction to know, that they are, at length, formally disavowed by the persons who were most instrumental in their promulgation. This appears to have been done, in the most explicit manner, by Mr. Erskine, on the occasion above mentioned, when he is re-

reported to have fully confirmed the opinion of those who were contemptuously termed Alarmists, by acknowledging that "the French Revolution was undoubtedly in its beginning a great and awful event, which could not but extend its influence more or less to other nations. So mighty a fabric of despotism and superstition (as he is still pleased to call the ancient and lawful government of France) after having endured for ages, could not fall to the ground without a concussion which the whole world would feel *;" and again, "So mighty an event as the French Revolution could not but affect and agitate the human mind on the subject of government every where †." And with regard to our own situation, the same gentleman, in allusion to the close of the year 1795, is stated to have said, with an evident caution and reserve of language, but with an irresistible weight of testimony, that "the spirit of Democracy, which had been made the pretext of all our clamours, and of the incapacity of France as a social government, was yet at its height." He adds soon afterwards, "the nation too was stated to be full of plots"—this is as much, perhaps, as can be expected on the subject of *plots*, from the advocate of the plotters, and one of the sworn vouchers for O'Connor's loyalty—but the senator does not hesitate to allow that "Ireland was known to be on the brink of destruction."

Such testimony can require no corroboration. Yet it is due to the cause to observe that the dangers, to which all nations have been exposed by the French Revolution, are so notorious, that an admission both of their reality and magnitude, escapes sometimes from the mouth even of its Gallic friends. The Republicans of France have, from time to time, convicted themselves of the worst charges which have been advanced against them. They have confessed the atrocious motives which induced them to commence the war—motives no less

* See Debrett's Parliamentary Register, No. 98, p. 290.

† *Ib.* p. 296.

atrocious than *the destruction of Royalty first in France, and then all over the world**. They have acknowledged, that, to the commencement of the present year, the Republic was incapable of the relations of peace†. At length they admit, with Mr. Erskine, that the French Revolution convulsed and endangered the whole fabric of society, and afforded to other countries a reasonable pretext for war; no less than this was openly and explicitly avowed, in the *Tribunate* of Buonaparte, on the 7th of March in the present year, by Girardin, who said, "Yes, doubtless, *when anarchy from the bosom of France threatened the tranquillity of the universe*, the foreign governments had a plausible pretext for the continuance of war."

What a lively picture do such admissions exhibit of the arduous nature of the present contest—of the difficulties and dangers we have had to encounter at home, during a most severe and perilous conflict abroad! How do they establish, in the strongest manner, the necessity of those precautions, which had for their object the preservation of our internal tranquillity! And how severe a condemnation do they pass upon the persons who took occasion, from those precautions, to sound the trumpet of insurrection, and to declare openly that obedience was become a question, not of morality, but of prudence! *As the agitation which the French Revolution could not but produce every where*, on the subject of Government, was unavoidably much favoured by the freedom enjoyed in this country, we have more reason to wonder that our Government could be preserved by the suspension of the *Habeas Corpus* act, and by the new laws against treason and sedition, than to complain of the restrictions imposed by those salutary measures. Who will consider the imposition of such restraints as a hardship, when they were necessary to preserve us from the *Anarchy which, from the bosom of France, threatened*

* Brissot, Louvet and others.

† Boulay de la Meurthe.

*the tranquillity of the universe, and to enable us to contend with the most furious spirit that can be let loose upon the face of the earth: the spirit of democracy, which for years continued at its height, and which brought Ireland to the brink of destruction—at a time too when the entire fabric of society was convulsed by a great and awful revolution, which could not but extend its influence, more or less, to other nations; which could not but affect and agitate the human mind every where on the subject of government, and which produced a concussion which was necessarily felt by the whole earth.**

In order, however, to diminish the effect of such concessions, some persons resort to an absurdity so gross as fully to evince the weakness of the cause in which it is employed. They pretend that the turbulent character of the French Revolution is to be ascribed, not to its own natural disposition, but to the provocations which it received from foreign powers. As if the truly virtuous man could be provoked to become a robber, an

* The above admissions, however striking, are very far from conveying an adequate idea of the danger to which all countries were betimes exposed by the French Revolution; for they are silent respecting one great source of that danger, the system of universal subversion which was adopted by the French Revolutionists, and their unceasing endeavours, by public declarations and by private machinations, to excite every people under Heaven to revolt against their government. These attempts are now universally known; but it may not be amiss to quote, in illustration of the truth, which was betimes avowed by the Republicans of France—that they embraced the whole world in their system of Fraternity, a song with which they amused themselves in the year 1792—

“ Nuos irons voir dans la Turquie
 “ Le disciple de Mahomet;
 “ Il faut qu’il soit de la partie,
 “ Nous lui dirons notre secret:
 “ S’il preste son ferment civique,
 “ Et s’il renonce a l’Alcoran,
 “ Nous lui donnerons, au lieu d’un Turban,
 “ Le Bonnet de la Republique.”

After perusing these early effusions of French Republicanism, the surprize which has been excited by the exhibition of such characters as *Ali Buonaparte* and *Abdallah Menou*, must be considerably diminished.

assassin and an incendiary. But recent history most completely exposes this pitiful subterfuge, by shewing that, in point of fact, the French Revolution displayed from the first a disposition to intermeddle with the internal affairs of other countries, and to invade the peace of the whole world—that it actually, and indeed, as Mr. Erskine observes, *necessarily* produced an universal agitation of mind on the subject of government—that other countries, instead of being chargeable with an improper interference, were guilty of suffering this instrument of general molestation to become formidable, and even to disturb their repose, without taking any steps to check its progress; until, at length, they were attacked by open force, and obliged to draw the sword in their own defence. Their fault evidently lay on the side of forbearance. And it is a truth, of which dreadful experience now affords the most melancholy demonstration—not only that a timely and effectual interference, to repel a danger which assumed so threatening an aspect, would, on their part, have been fully justifiable—but that they were bound, by the all-paramount duty of self-preservation, to crush the cockatrice in the egg, rather than suffer it to be hatched, and even fostered into maturity.

In the course of the debate which produced such important and such candid concessions from Mr. Erskine, respecting the original character and tendency of the French Revolution, Mr. Fox is reported to have made concessions, no less important and candid, respecting the actual conduct of the French Republic. At length the moral sense seems to have gained a partial triumph, in Mr. Fox's mind, over the perverting influence of party zeal, and to have convinced him that the behaviour of the republican rulers of France has been flagitious in the extreme. In the speech attributed to him on the above occasion, he is reported to have said, in allusion to the tyrants who have in succession oppressed the French people, that “ they have been as bad and as “ execrable in various instances, as any of the most “ despotic and unprincipled Governments that the world

world ever saw *.” But the advocates of republican France, though incapable any longer of justifying her conduct, do not desert her cause. Unable to plead *not guilty* in her behalf to the charge of ambition, injustice, rapacity, perfidy, cruelty, and, indeed, of every crime which a state can commit against the peace, order, and security of the world, they bring forward a plea *in abatement*, for want of parties—they alledge that the charge should not be brought against France alone, because it is equally applicable to other powers—they endeavour to establish a set off in infamy, by contending that the atrocities of the new Republic do not exceed those of regular Governments and of lawful Sovereigns. Thus Mr. Fox insists on *the restless ambition, the insatiable spirit of conquest and aggrandizement of the House of Bourbon*, in order to counterbalance the iniquitous excesses of its usurping successor. According to him, if the Revolutionists of France have over-run countries and ravaged them, they have, in doing so, “acted upon Bourbon principles.” If they have ruined and dethroned Sovereigns, it is entirely “after the Bourbon manner.” If they have even fraternized with the people of foreign countries, and pretended to make their cause their own, they have only “faithfully followed the Bourbon example—They have constantly had *Louis the grand monarque* in their eye—Their seizure of Savoy was a most Bourbon like act—Their phrase of ‘*convenances physiques, et morales*,’ is a most “Bourbonlike phrase.” In short, their rapacity, their thirst for conquest, their perfidy, their restless spirit, are qualities which they acquired *in the school of the Bourbons*†.

What a testimony is here in favour of Revolutionary France! How different from that erst given by the same witness, when he represented her as exhibiting to the world “a glorious and stupendous edifice of wis-

* See Debrett's Parliamentary Register, 4th Sess. of 18th Parl. p. 354

† See Debrett's Parliamentary Register, ib. p. 354.

dom and integrity!" But such, in the course of a few years, have been her abominations—such her deeds of horror, that the very mouth which then dignified her with so enthusiastic an eulogy, can now find no better excuse for her conduct, than that it does not exceed, in atrocity, the most unjustifiable transactions which are imputable to the French monarchy—It must be acknowledged that all the accusations, which have been brought against the Republic of France, are vapid and feeble when compared with such a defence from such a mouth, What an instructive lesson does it afford, to see Mr. Fox thus pulling down, with his own hands, " that glorious " and stupendous edifice of wisdom and integrity," which he himself had reared in honour of the French Revolution! to hear him confess that the brilliant system of liberty, equality and the rights of man, which promised to ameliorate, beyond *all* powers of description, the condition of humanity, instead of leading to virtue and happiness, has produced crimes which its most sanguine admirer, its most zealous advocate, acknowledges to be equal, in moral turpitude, to what he considers the vilest transactions recorded in history!

This comparison, however, which affords the only remaining plea, even of a mitigatory kind, for the French Republic, leads to a conclusion very different from that which Mr. Fox is reported to have deduced from it. That Gentleman is made to infer, that " as " we never scrupled to treat with the Princes of the " House of Bourbon, so ought we not to refuse to treat " with their Republican imitators*." But if the French Republic has made so rapid a progress in vice and depravity—if, at the very commencement of her existence, she has attained such a maturity of wickedness—if, in the short space of ten years, she has committed crimes which are not surpassed by the recorded

* Ibid p. 356.

infamy of ages, what must be expected from her when her natural character shall be confirmed by time, habit and experience? Surely we ought to ponder before we admit such a Republic into the communion of civilized States.

But notwithstanding this attempt to divert the indignation of mankind from the crimes of Revolutionary France, by comparing them with those of former ages, no two things can be more dissimilar than the system which she endeavours to establish, under the name of a Republic which, under a variety of forms, has hitherto prevailed in civil society. So diametrically opposite are these systems, that light and darkness, good and evil, do not exhibit a greater contrast. The latter, which is properly termed the *Social* system, is founded upon Religion, Morality and Law. Its tendency is to restrain the passions and controul the vices of mankind, and to counteract the evil propensities of human nature. It endeavours to regulate the conduct of individuals by the rules of virtue. It prescribes to states, in their mutual intercourse, the observance of equity, good faith and moderation. Its objects, in short, are order, justice, peace, security, and the protection of all the blessings, which constitute the happiness of human life. On the other hand, the *Revolutionary* system tends to the subversion of Religion, Morality and Law, the ancient foundations of society. Instead of correcting or controuling, it gives a full scope to human depravity. It releases the passions from all restraint, and encourages both individuals and states to disregard every rule, which has been wont to keep them within the bounds of rectitude or moderation. It is incorporated with a new scheme of philosophy, of which the tendency is to corrupt the heart, and to dry up the very sources of virtue. Its object, in short, is to dissolve the bands of society, and to introduce discord, oppression, licentiousness and anarchy.

It is true, the Social system cannot prevent the commission of great crimes—it cannot entirely restrain, either individuals or states, from acting injuriously and

flagitiously. While man is an imperfect being, subject to passion, and exposed to temptation, he will, at times, be a disgrace to his species, and a just object of divine and human vengeance. But this system, though it cannot render him perfect, has hitherto confined his *depravity* within such bounds as are essential, not merely to the existence, but to the general well-being of society. It operates as a never-ceasing check upon human wickedness. It places Religion, Morality, Law, habit, opinion, disgrace, in short, the whole force of the Social machine in opposition to the violence of temptation and the influence of corruption. Every crime is an infringement of its rules. It is impossible to conceive an act, injurious either to a community or an individual, which is not a violation of its principles. Under such a system the most abandoned characters meet, on all sides, with obstacles to the gratification of their depraved propensities, and although it is impossible for it to suppress fraud, perfidy, ambition and injustice, still it takes precautions to guard against their effects, and to check the evils, which cannot be entirely prevented. In proportion to the strength of this system, and to the influence of the principles on which it is founded, virtue and happiness must prevail in the world; and it is from the decay of its authority, and the neglect of its rules, that flow those disorders, which embitter human life and disturb the general tranquillity.

If the monsters of the French Revolution had been under the controul of such a system, they could never have exhibited such shocking spectacles of unexampled depravity. They would, doubtless, have been pests to society; but they would have been destitute of those means of boundless mischief, by which they have been enabled infinitely to surpass all the monsters of former times. Buonaparte himself might perhaps have passed as an ordinary villain—or if, impelled by the matchless atrocity of his disposition, he had exceeded the usual bounds of wickedness, still he would have wanted an opportunity of shewing what dread-

dreadful and astonishing lengths of iniquity human nature can go, when released from those restraints, legal, moral and Religious, to which, in every preceding period of the world, mankind have, more or less, been subject.

The Revolutionary system, on the contrary, is a nursery of vice, a hot bed of corruption. The foulest and most destructive crimes grow out of its principles, and are in conformity with its rules. It dissolves every restraint upon human depravity. It presents every temptation to human infirmity. It makes crime the only road to success, the only path to exaltation. Its means of attaining power are tumult, sedition, treason, rebellion and regicide. Its means of preserving authority are oppression, tyranny, confiscation, judicial murder, war and universal excitement to revolt. It calls into action whatever is corrupt or evil-disposed in society. By perfidious but specious promises of liberty and happiness, it unsettles the minds of men, it disturbs their feelings and their habits, and it seduces their affections from institutions which they have been accustomed to love and revere. It diffuses a spirit of licentiousness, it poisons the fountains of virtue, it withdraws from passion its most powerful restraint, the prospect of a future state, and by thus corrupting the morals of mankind, it renders them an easy prey to its destructive fury. It gives a new, an indelible taint to the human heart, and a deeper dye to every species of guilt. It renders disaffection more extensive, faction more desperate, sedition more active, conspiracy more daring, treason more malignant, and impiety more blasphemous. In one word, this horrid system exhibits, in practice, the extraordinary and awful phenomenon of a set of men, invested, by the above means, with the powers of government, and exercising those powers for the destruction of all other governments—attacking the very foundations of all legitimate authority—and endeavouring to overturn the ancient edifice of society, in order to erect, upon its ruins, a far more extensive and oppressive des-

despotism, than has ever yet existed upon the face of the earth.

But can it be true that systems, which in principle exhibit so great a contrast, resemble each other in practice? Can the waters which flow from such different fountains be similar in quality? This would be strange, indeed! It would be contrary to the whole course of nature. It would, in effect, totally confound virtue and vice, and reduce the difference between them to a mere name. Such, however, is the paradox which the advocates of France would persuade us to admit. Obligated, at length, to give up the purity and perfectibility of the new system, and to acknowledge that, in spite of all their predictions in its favour, it has not only failed to produce any improvement in the state of society, but has equalled, in depravity, whatever has gone before it, they now, as their last resource, and in the hope of still prevailing on mankind to believe that its destruction would not be productive of any advantage, contend that it has only imitated the example of former times—that it has displayed nothing new in wickedness—and that it has been guilty of no atrocity, which is not to be matched in the records of history.

If this statement were true; if the deeds of Republican France did not exceed all example of iniquity; still the mode of reasoning here resorted to would be the most fallacious that was ever employed. That the history of the world abounds in crime, no person attempts to deny. That the perusal of that history often fills the soul with horror, it is impossible to dispute. That at the moment of such perusal the reader is apt, sometimes, to exclaim, can any thing worse have been done by Republican France! the experience of most readers will confirm. But these crimes, which so justly excite the utmost indignation, form only a part, though a very conspicuous one, of the picture which history presents to the view. That picture has its lights, as well as its shades—it has its bright and cheering

cheering parts, as well as those which are disgusting and shocking—it exhibits not only the horrors of war, but the blessings of peace—it displays the most splendid virtues, as well as the most atrocious vices—while it holds forth some characters which excite detestation, it preserves others which inspire love, and even command admiration—it will perpetuate the memory of an Antoninus Pius, and a George the Third, as well as of a Nero and a Caligula—of a Robespierre, a Marat, and a Buonaparte. How different the picture of Republican France! *There* nothing meets the eye but one uniform, unmixed scene of wickedness and crime—no light—but only “darkness visible,”—no interval of peace—no pause from the furious rage of desolating war—no virtue to relieve the horrid mass of impiety and vice—not a single action which can produce any sentiment but loathing—not a single character, amid the vast Revolutionary group, which can excite any feeling but abhorrence.

It should also be remembered that, while history records, for the instruction of mankind, the crimes of those who have been most conspicuous on the great theatre of the world, while it informs us of transactions, the recital of which makes us shudder, it necessarily casts a veil over the private condition of social life, the contemplation of which would relieve and even gratify the mind. It can do little more than preserve the memory of public characters and events, and give a general idea of the state and progress of Society. But it is, nevertheless, indisputably certain, that while the political world has been convulsed with storm, and deformed with crime, it has often been the felicity of domestic life to enjoy uninterrupted serenity. While the Throne has exhibited a spectacle of vice and infamy, the people, though essentially injured by such an example, have been blessed with quiet, order, and security, every man has sitted under his vine, or under his fig-tree, private repose has been undisturbed, and public prosperity has been progressively encreasing. Even those great and tremendous convulsions, which
have

have seemed to shake the edifice of Society, have been partial and temporary in their operation. Their ravages, like those of the raging elements, have been local; and, however dreadful for the moment, have been soon repaired when the storm came to subside.

On the contrary, the new Revolutionary System extends its ravages over the whole face of Society. Wherever its influence has prevailed, no rank, no condition, no retirement has been able to elude its fury. It has violated every right; it has invaded every comfort; it has wrung every honest and feeling heart with anguish. In France, where it first established its dominion, it made the whole land one scene of carnage, devastation and ruin. In every other country, to which it has extended its sway, it has not only heaped injuries, and brought destruction upon all, who exercised in any shape the powers of Government, but it has treated even the lowest classes with such insulting and ferocious barbarity, that they have displayed, wherever they had an opportunity of so doing, a more determined spirit of resistance, and a more eager thirst for revenge, than the higher orders.

Such is the system of unmixed evil, and of unlimited mischief, which Mr. Fox compares with that state of Society, of which, however chequered with crime and calamity, the main object has always been to protect the weak against the strong; and to build the fabric of human happiness upon the foundations of religion and virtue. But in spite of so insidious a comparison, these systems (allowing for the imperfection of human nature) display no less striking a difference in practice than in principle; and they thereby afford an incontrovertible proof that the moral Government of the world, like the physical, is subjected to fixed and established rules, the authority of which it is not in the power of man to supersede, for they cannot be violated with impunity.

It is generally understood, that Mr. Fox is employing his leisure in writing, that important part of modern history which commences at the Restoration

ration of the British Monarchy in the person of Charles the Second. Should it be the object of this work, or of any work in which the Honourable Member may be engaged, in conformity with the purport of his reported speech (above noticed), to set off the atrocities of former times against those of the French Republic, his publication will be a very dangerous present to the world. But it is to be hoped, that the good sense of the public will put them upon their guard against the false principle and the dangerous tendency of such a production, however attractive, interesting, and, in some subordinate respects, instructive, it may be rendered by the super-eminent talents of the Honourable Author.

If the blackest portions of history were to be selected, they would not bear any comparison with that which comprises the tremendous æra of the French Revolution. A Revolution which is altogether *sui generis*; a perfect anomaly in the history of mankind. But certainly periods might be found, which display a much nearer analogy to the present, than the one above mentioned. The Roman Empire, like the French Republic, was a monument of universal ambition, and a source of universal disturbance. It was founded, like that Republic, upon a principle of anarchy; for the Roman people, after the expulsion of their Kings, had no Government which was capable of preserving, by its intrinsic force, domestic order and quiet. They were therefore driven, as France must be so long as she remains destitute of settled Government, to foreign war, as their only possible relief from internal convulsions; and their wars, proceeding from such a cause, like those of Republican France, were, on their part, without a single exception, unjust and aggressive. But here the comparison ceases. For Rome, when she subverted her Monarchy, did not extend her Revolution to the whole frame of her social system. She did not expel her nobles and her priests—she did not pull down her orders—she did not confound all distinctions of rank—

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she did not abjure her Religion—she did not renounce her ancient laws, her usages, and her institutions.—On the contrary, all these things she carefully preserved, and continued even to cherish. She was not, happily for herself and the rest of the world, acquainted with the modern system of the rights of man, but acted upon principles diametrically opposite to those, upon which this disorganizing system is founded.

If the foreign conduct of Rome be compared with that of France, it would be found to display a difference scarcely less striking than that which distinguishes the domestic systems of the two Republics. She did not abroad, any more than at home, act upon a principle of social subversion. She exhibited, indeed, an awful and instructive example, proving to mankind that an independent Monarchical State, if it become a Republic, can neither itself maintain order and tranquillity, nor suffer other States to enjoy peace and security, even though it preserve every other part of its original organization. To compose her intestine commotions, Rome made war her constant and habitual occupation. She displayed a boundless ambition, an insatiable thirst for conquest and dominion: but she aimed at nothing further than conquest and dominion. She was satisfied with subjecting other nations to her authority. She did not wish to subvert their institutions—she suffered them to enjoy their Religion, their laws, their usages—she respected their customs and their prejudices—she did not approach them with promises of freedom, and then subject them to the most oppressive of all tyrannies—that of forcing them to change their habits of life, to renounce their principles, and to accommodate themselves to a new system of manners. She did not violate their temples, and profane their altars. The Jews, of all people on earth, the most attached, and the most justly so, to their Religion, performed all its rites without molestation, during the whole of their subjection to the Roman power. Their laws were allowed to be pleaded at the
bar

Bar of a Roman Governor*. Their sacred places were respected by a heathen conqueror. When Pompey took Jerusalem, though he entered the Temple, which he found to contain articles of great value and 2000 talents of sacred money, yet, according to the testimony of the Jewish historian, Josephus, "did he touch nothing of all this on account of his regard to religion.—And the next day he gave order to those who had charge of the Temple, to cleanse it, and to bring what offerings the law required to God†." Cicero makes this conduct a matter of national boast—"At Cn. Pompejus, captis Hierosolymis, victor ex illo fano nihil attigit‡." Nay, even when, in consequence of the seditious conduct of the Jews, their city was besieged and destroyed by the Romans, Titus, who conducted the siege, hearing, while he was reposing himself after a battle, that the Temple was in flames, "ran" (says the historian) "to the holy house, in order to have a stop put to the fire§." How different such scenes from those which have attended the triumphs of Republican France! How different, as conquerors, Pompey and Titus from Buonaparte, who, when in Italy, burned the town of Benasco, massacred 800 of its inhabitants, and gave orders to set fire to every village where the tocsin should be sounded, and to put the inhabitants to death! and this merely because the inhabitants of Pavia, incensed at the insults which the French troops had heaped upon every thing they formerly held most sacred, and particularly at seeing the tomb of St. Augustin, which they were accustomed to view with peculiar veneration, mutilated and defaced, flew to arms, took the French guards prisoners, without, however, injuring the person of a single soldier. But the portion of modern history, to which Mr. Fox is reported to have alluded in Parliament, and which

* Acts, chap. 24. v. 26.—Ib. c. 25. v. 8.

† Antiquities of the Jews, B. 14. c. 4. §. 4.

‡ Orat. pro. L. Flacco.

§ Hist. of the Jewish War, B. 6. c. 4. §. 7.

he is supposed to have selected for a more elaborate illustration, in order to establish a comparison in infamy with the French Republic, displays a still stronger dissimilitude to the conduct of that Republic, than is to be found in the Roman Annals. Scarcely can that period be said to have produced any great convulsion in the political relations of Europe; certainly it was not fraught with destruction to all social institutions. It neither exhibits, like the age of Imperial Rome, a scene of universal conquest; nor does it unfold, like the æra of Jacobin France, a scheme of total subversion. We find in it, indeed, as in many other periods, projects of overweening ambition, of flagrant injustice, of extensive conquest. But we see those projects defeated by vigilance, by wisdom, by timely and persevering exertion. We see, indeed, a restless State, already too powerful, endeavouring to extend its dominion at the expense of its neighbours; and we see it even successful in some attempts at unjustifiable encroachment—but we see it baffled in its great schemes of aggrandizement—we see the States of Europe, nay, its small States, maintain their independence; the balance of power successfully asserted, and rendered even more firm than before; and the general security, not only protected, but established upon a firmer basis than ever. How different such a period from that in which ambitious Rome made herself the mistress of the world! How much more different from that in which Revolutionary France has made herself the scourge of humanity!

It will not be in the power of Mr. Fox to conceal such glaring contrarieties, even though he exert the whole force of his abilities, in displaying the principles and conduct of the House of Bourbon in the most unfavourable light. The people of this country, in particular, will be ready to join with him in execrating the ambition, the cupidity, the injustice, which have long marked the foreign system of that House. But they can, at the same time, distinguish between a Bourbon and a French Director or Consul. With-

out selecting, for the purpose of such discrimination, the XVIth Louis, whose virtues were an ornament to the Throne, they can do justice to the Grand Monarque himself, who, with all his faults, possessed qualities which commanded the respect and admiration of his enemies; and they feel that this Prince, hostile as he was to Great Britain, was a totally different kind of being from the Jacobin rulers of France, not one of whom, down to Buonaparte inclusive, has displayed a single quality which can excite, in a virtuous breast, any feeling but detestation, and who, one and all, are a most foul disgrace to human nature. Great, indeed, was the political danger to which Europe was exposed by the love of false glory, which animated the breast of that Monarch; but the political mischief, already done by the French Republic, greatly exceeds in extent the utmost projects of ambition, which there is any reason to suspect him ever to have had in contemplation; while the social danger, to which the whole world is exposed by the subversive system of that Republic, is such as to render all political interest comparatively insignificant. Though the French Monarch endeavoured to gain a preponderance, which would have totally deranged the balance of power, he could not, without endangering his own Throne, attack the pillars by which all Thrones are supported—he could not, without exposing his own authority, inculcate the disorganizing principles of the Rights of Man, even had his mind been base enough to favour such principles—nor could he, with safety to his own Government, dispatch his missionaries into other countries, to propagate the levelling doctrines of liberty and equality, and to inspire the multitude with a spirit of insubordination, and with a blind jealousy of rank and property. The world had, therefore, the best security—that of personal interest and self-preservation, that he would not employ, even against his worst enemies, such dangerous weapons, nor seek to dissolve the ties which constitute the strength of regular Government,

and which are essential to the happiness of orderly Society.

But, on the other hand, the French Republic is so constituted, that her fundamental principles lead her to wish for the destruction of every Throne, and of every social institution, whether Religious, or political. By pursuing this object with a desperation, of which there is no example, she has gained a most alarming preponderance in Europe. And she is impelled, not merely by her original structure and natural disposition, but by the paramount interest of self-preservation, to persevere in endeavouring, by her arms and by her artifices, by war and by peace, to overthrow all regular Government, and to subvert the very foundations of all social order and security. Her characteristic is a spirit of destruction; her animating principle is a love of demolition. Her ambition, however inordinate, her lust of dominion, however insatiable, constitute the least formidable, and the least odious part of her character. Other States, have been actuated by a thirst for conquest, and all States have, at times, displayed a desire of aggrandizement. But this Republic fights less for aggrandizement than for subversion. She conquers not to govern, but to exhaust, to disorganize, to tear up by the roots all ancient establishments and institutions. The Monarchy of France obtained by force of arms, even within the last century, great accessions of territory. It did not, however, force its subjects by conquest, to bewail their change of Sovereigns. It not only protected their persons and property, but it held sacred their ancient usages, their accustomed rights, their local privileges, and it allowed prescription to prevail over the right of conquest, and the power of the Conqueror. How different the triumphs of Republican France! What is there that can stand before *her* devouring sword? With her besom of liberty she sweeps away every thing which a people has been accustomed to hold dear—she insults all their feel-

feelings and all their prejudices—and she reduces all her conquered subjects to a perfect equality of degradation, misery and ruin. Let her *mild* and *sympathetic* fraternity with the Belgians, the Italians, and the Swiss, be compared with the *despotic* sway of the House of Bourbon over the conquered inhabitants of Flanders, Lorraine, and Franche Comté; and then let Mr. Fox himself declare to which of the two conquerors he would choose to yield obedience.

Should Mr. Fox turn his attention from the House of Bourbon to that of Stuart, he will find our feelings in unison with his, when he represents the Second Charles as disgracing the Throne by his vices, and by his want of British spirit. The Hon. Author will do well to avail himself of the opportunity, which the reign of that Monarch affords him, of holding out to the abhorrence of mankind the detestable and pernicious character of a profligate King; and he may also, with great advantage, take this occasion to shew, that dissoluteness on the Throne is unspeakably more dangerous, to a free state, than a tyrannical disposition. For both these qualities were united in the above Monarch; but while, by his corrupt manners, he inflicted a deep wound on the morals of the country—a wound, the effects of which are still visible—he was so far from being able, arbitrary as he was, to injure the Constitution, or to endanger the Liberties of the subject, that an eminent Commentator, who describes his reign as “wicked, sanguinary, and turbulent,” fixes, nevertheless, upon this period as the æra in which “the Constitution of England had arrived to its full vigour, and the true balance between liberty and prerogative was happily established by law*.” As a relief, however, from the painful feelings which a review of the character of Charles the Second cannot fail to excite in every

* 4 Bl. Com. p. 439.

well formed mind, Mr. Fox may, by way of contrast, turn his attention to another Prince, who has, at once, displayed a most ardent and steady attachment to the Constitution, and exhibited a most exemplary pattern of Religious and moral excellence—a Prince whose piety, and whose virtues, combined with a manly firmness and consistency of character, have been for years the grand bulwark, not only of this country, but of the whole civilized world. If at such a time the British Throne had been deficient in any one of the qualities by which it has been so eminently distinguished, it is more than probable that every Religious and social establishment would, ere now, have been laid in the dust, and that an atheistical band of sanguinary anarchists, would, at this moment, have been triumphing upon the ruins of civil Society. How thankful should we be to Divine Providence for raising us up such a Prince at so awful a crisis! But to what a dreadful responsibility will those persons be subject, who counteract, by their profligate lives, the salutary effect of such an example; or who, by harassing his Government, labour to frustrate the efforts of such a Monarch, to avert destruction from his people, and from mankind!

The reign of the successor of Charles the Second, will afford Mr. Fox an opportunity of launching out into praises of the event, which he never mentions without rapture, and which is usually, though not very accurately, termed “the Revolution.” The best friends of lawful Government agree with Mr. Fox, in considering the preservation of their Religious and civil rights, against the attacks of a Monarch who was certainly hostile to both, and the additional securities which those rights have since attained, as inestimable blessings. But, at the same time, they reflect, with heartfelt concern, on the very high price which was paid for these blessings; and it even lessens, in their estimation, the value of the high privileges which were thus procured, to know that they were purchased by a violation of the

the most sacred of all temporal duties—the duty of Allegiance. They also most strenuously protest against every attempt to transform into a precedent an anomalous transaction, which was contrary to all law, and which nothing could even palliate, but the imperious and irresistible necessity of self-preservation—a necessity which, whenever it occurs, will, like an overwhelming torrent, burst over the ordinary barriers of defence and security. On the contrary, Mr. Fox is generally supposed (but may we not hope erroneously?) to rejoice as much in the irregularity of the Revolution as in its consequences; to make it a theme of constant exultation, *because* it amounted to a resistance of legal authority, and an interruption of legal succession; and to hold it forth as an example, to be contemplated with satisfaction and delight, in all times, and under all circumstances. Whether or no this statement of Mr. Fox's sentiments and conduct be just, at least it may be expected of him to warn his countrymen, against the insidious endeavour of some persons, to convert the Revolution into an authority for the Anarchial and Jacobinical doctrine, that the people have a right to choose and to change their Government, and to depose and elect their Governors:—a right, from the exercise of which Citizen Talleyrand, in his letter to Lord Grenville, has the audacity to assert, with an obvious reference to the Revolution, that “his Majesty holds his Crown.” This daring insult to the King and to the Constitution, every true Briton must resent with indignation and scorn. The Revolution, far from affording any sanction to such a doctrine, had for its avowed object the preservation of the entire Constitution in Church and State, the fundamental principle of which is *hereditary* Monarchy; and the persons who brought about that event, and who were—not the people at large—but characters of the highest rank and consequence in the country, far from laying claim to such a right, made the abdication and vacancy of the Throne the very basis of their proceed-

ings*: nay, the Legislature itself, by one of its first acts, solemnly declared, that the Personages who, on this occasion, became possessed of the Crown, were seated upon *the Throne of their Ancestors*†.

One of those Personages the Honourable Author may be expected to panegyrize with enthusiastic rapture. The generality of his readers will, indeed, be very far from viewing with equal admiration the *personal* character of William III., or from thinking that the word Revolution has such magic in the sound, as to render a man deserving of love, who was destitute of some of the best feelings of his nature. But, in one very important respect they will be ready to admit, that the character of this Prince cannot be estimated too highly. His Antigallican spirit—his inextinguishable jealousy of France—the incessant vigilance, the unconquerable ardour, the inflexible perseverance, with which he resisted the attempts of that Power to obtain an undue preponderance in Europe—his unceasing efforts to rouse other States to a sense of their common danger—his indefatigable exertions to form and keep together confederacies, for the preservation of the balance of power—in short, the zeal with which he devoted himself to the great cause of general security, the steadiness with which he maintained that cause to the end of his life, the dauntless intrepidity with which he encountered every difficulty, and faced every danger, and, above all, the unshaken firmness which he displayed in the midst of disasters that seemed to be insurmountable—these are qualities on which, in the estimation of the British people, Mr. Fox cannot be too lavish of his praise. The subject, too, derives great additional importance from the circumstances of the present moment, when the danger, inseparable at all times, from the inordinate ambition of France, infinitely ex-

* Bill of Rights, 1. W. and M. Ses. 2. c. 2. §. 1.

† Ib. §. 7.

ceeds that which it was the object of William III. to avert. It will be happy for Great Britain and for mankind, if Mr. Fox exert his great talents, in endeavouring to animate the Princes and Statesmen of this awful period with the soul of the Great Monarch, who, above a century ago, stood forward as the guardian of Europe and the defender of its liberties. He will here have full scope for all his powers, and he can never possess an opportunity of exerting them to greater advantage. He may at once display his eloquence and his wisdom, by invoking the shade of his illustrious Hero to raise that voice, which was once heard with such effect, to animate the Nations to one grand and determined effort against their ancient disturber and their common enemy; and after extolling this country for its magnanimous and persevering exertions in the present war, to conjure it never to be deterred by any reverse, or by any difficulty, from opposing, with all its force and all its influence, the attempts of France to obtain a preponderance incompatible with the political equilibrium, and with the independence of Europe.

In thus holding forth the example of William III. to the imitation of modern Princes and Statesmen, Mr. Fox will be but consistent with himself. He will only enforce the sentiments which he has frequently avowed in the course of his public life. He will act in strict conformity with the truly British principles which, in the year 1787, he manfully asserted in the House of Commons, when he honourably commended the Government of this country for interfering, to prevent the French Government from acquiring an ascendancy in the United Provinces. On that occasion he represented France as having adhered, *under all changes of administration, for more than a century, to one constant and regular idea, that of overweening pride and national aggrandizement; as having been anxious, by all the means in her power, to grasp at more than an undue influence over the other Powers of Europe—and particularly, as having been*

the inveterate and unalterable political enemy of Great Britain, which he described, with equal force and justice, as a great maritime power, to which the distressed should fly for assistance whenever unjustly attacked by France.

It cannot be supposed that the man, who uttered this manly and dignified language, has lost his Antigallican spirit, because France, from a Monarchy, has been transformed to a Jacobin Republic, or a pure military Despotism, submissive to the nod of a foreign usurper. It cannot be supposed, that on account of any internal changes whatever, he can view with complacency and confidence a country, which, under all changes of administration, has adhered to *one regular and constant idea, that of overweening pride and national aggrandizement*, or that he should be willing to gratify the pride and ambition of this *inveterate and unalterable political enemy of Great Britain*, because she has in a few years exceeded all example of national atrocity, by her judicial murders and legislative robberies—by the most extensive and savage massacres—by her sweeping confiscations and proscriptions—by her treasons, regicide, and blasphemies.—Still less, if possible, can it be believed that so enthusiastic a friend to liberty, and one who has been loud in his execrations of the despotism of the Bourbons, can be partial to that unqualified tyranny, by which France has been fast bound during the whole Revolution, and which is now centered in a single individual; a tyranny compared with which, the authority of Louis XIV. was a mild constitutional freedom. Unless these considerations should operate in Mr. Fox's mind, as so many recommendations to favour, he must, at least as much as ever, view France as an object of jealousy, distrust, and Argus-eyed vigilance; and he must see, with the utmost indignation and alarm, her approaches to universal dominion. It is easy to conceive with what an ardour of zeal he would have opposed such attempts on the part of the House of Bourbon—With what a glow of British patriotism

patriotism he would have devoted to the scaffold any Minister, who should have recognized by treaty, or even countenanced by negociation, the pretensions of that House—if it had ever dared to advance such pretensions—to extend its bounds to the Alps and the Rhine, and to hold in absolute subjection the whole coast which is opposite to the British shore, from the Northern Sea to the mouth of the Channel. Can he then be willing to have it recorded as his opinion, that the French Republic is entitled to terms, which should on no account be granted to the French Monarchy?—That the Robespierres, Syeyes and Buonapartes of the French Revolution, past, present, or to come, should be complimented with the destruction of the balance of power, which ought to be defended, to the last extremity, against the Capets?—That Great Britain should abjure her ancient politics in favour of a succession of Revolutionary Tyrants, who have disgraced human nature by their crimes, and have drenched the earth with blood? It has been his custom, and that of his friends, to protest against any allusion to the iniquities of Republican France, when her relation to other countries, and their conduct towards her, have been in contemplation. Well then; this protest, revolting as it is to the feelings of nature, and irreconcilable as it seems to be with the dictates of sound policy, shall, for once, be admitted—a veil shall be cast over deeds at which humainty stands aghast—nay, it shall even be admitted, for the sake of argument, that the question between France and the rest of Europe is merely political, and that her neighbours have nothing to apprehend from her revolutionary principles, from her disorganizing arts, from her decrees of fraternity, and from her endeavours to promote insurrection in other countries. In short, by the aid of these immense concessions, France shall be considered merely as France; such as she has ever been, and relieved of her overwhelming load of recent guilt. Then let Mr. Fox say on what conditions he would cultivate her friendship, and

and deprecate her further hostility. That Gentleman would be a miracle of inconsistency, if, instead of courting pacification with her on the footing of her present possessions and her actual claims, he did not require her recognition of the ancient balance of power, and of the treaties by which that balance has been protected, as a preliminary to all pacific intercourse; nay, if he did not consider it as a just and necessary cause of war, to compel her to return within such limits as might be compatible with the general security. Whatever, beyond these objects, he may be willing to grant her in her present state, must be considered as gratuitous concessions to revolutionary principles, to republican forms, and to the most insulting as well as the most cruel of all despotism—to despotism in the name, and under the guise of freedom.

Nothing can tend more to simplify the great question of Pacification, than thus to consider it with a reference to principles which have been consecrated by time and experience. Such a reference may be particularly useful to those politicians who, stunned by that tremendous shock, which has convulsed to its centre the whole social fabric, seem to have no knowledge of surrounding objects, and to have lost, for a time, even those feelings which Englishmen have long considered as innate and instinctive. It will materially assist such persons, in recovering the use of their senses, to remember, that it is still FRANCE with whom we are contending—Let them recollect their history for a little more than an hundred years, and then sit down and form their projects of pacification. Let them suppose the French Monarchy to stand precisely in the place of the French Republic, (a supposition surely not unfavourable to the tranquillity of the Globe,) and then consider what concessions they would make as the price of peace. The moment the subject is viewed in this light, it loses all its complication, and becomes intelligible to the meanest capacity. It is not susceptible of any material difference

difference of opinion. Let a Bourbon Prince be supposed to wield the Gallic sceptre, instead of a Director or a First Consul, or any other denomination of Republican Tyrant which may yet issue from the Chaotic womb of the French Revolution, and men of all parties will agree, that the indispensable condition of peace is the restoration of general security, and the re-establishment of that political equilibrium, which has been defended by so many wars, which has been guarded by so many treaties, and which is the vital principle of the public Code of Europe. It will then be out of the power of faction itself to forget, that the aggrandizement of France is incompatible with the safety of every other State. This being the case, do the name of Buonaparte, or the history of the French Republic, authorize us to renounce the wisdom of antiquity, and to consider its sage warnings as out of date? Has the French Revolution entirely drawn the sting of French ambition? Is the new political character which France has assumed, to say nothing of her new moral character of Jacobinism, calculated to dispel our fears and to inspire us with unlimited confidence? Or rather, do not these considerations call upon us most loudly to adhere, with inflexible perseverance, to the system under which we have become great and prosperous, and for which Mr. Fox was once so strenuous an advocate—that of watching the motions, suspecting the designs, and opposing, with all our strength and resources, the ambitious projects of our Gallic neighbour? If France, as a Monarchy, was enterprizing, crafty, and perfidious, is she not infinitely more so as a Republic? If, as a Monarchy, her yoke was grievous, is it not infinitely more so as a Republic? If, as a Monarchy, she chastized Europe with whips, has she not, as a Republic, chastized it with scorpions?

In favour, however, of the preposterous notion, that we should concede to France as a Republic, and particularly as such a Republic, terms of peace which not

a man

a man in the kingdom would consent to grant her as a Monarchy, it is often asked, with an air of triumph, whether it is in our power to deprive her of those acquisitions which render her so formidable? whether we can restore the balance of power? and whether we will continue the war for an object which evidently is not attainable? These questions are generally propounded by those persons who have invariably opposed every attempt to prevent her aggrandizement; and they must be allowed to come with a very bad grace from such persons. But the fallacy they contain exceed even their indecency: for they imply that war affords no other means of compelling an enemy to consent to reasonable and moderate conditions of peace, than by wresting from him, by main force, the possessions which it is unsafe to allow him to retain—that there can be no other way of making him relinquish a conquered territory, than that of re-conquering it in form—and that, while a state of hostility is grievous to us, whose views are just and equitable, it is attended with no inconvenience, no hardship, no danger to him, whose pretensions are arrogant and injurious in the extreme. But, surely, war must be considered as an inconvenience to both parties; and if one can resolve to endure that inconvenience rather than forego its ambition, the other must be despicable indeed to shrink from it, when it is the only preservative of honour and independence. Indeed, the power which one country possesses of inflicting upon another this awful calamity, in redress or prevention of injuries, is the grand bulwark of general order and security, and the principal instrument provided by Providence to restrain violence and injustice. It is a duty which every State owes to itself, to assert, whenever and as long as it may be necessary, by means of this dreadful expedient, not only its own undoubted rights, but those general interests which are the common bulwarks of the separate interests of each individual State: and although it may not be able to attack the enemy in that part which furnishes the ground of dispute, or the

cause

cause of danger, it may be wounding him in some other part, or by harassing and distressing him generally, compel him, at length, to renounce his hold of what may seem to be out of the reach of attack.

It is upon these principles, that Great Britain, though incapable herself of any great continental exertions, is the natural guardian of the balance of power in Europe, against France, the natural enemy of that balance. Her hostility, in consequence of her naval power, the main spring of her energy, the chief sinew of her strength, is formidable and distressing to her Gallic neighbour (who, fortunately in this respect, is also a naval power) beyond that of any other nation; and in the present war, an unprecedented succession of matchless victories has rendered it so in an unprecedented degree. During the continuance of the war, it is physically impossible for France to regain her commerce, her manufactures, and her navigation—while Heaven, smiling as it were on the justice of our cause, and the rectitude of our views, has blessed us, in the very midst of war, with a great increase of these main sources of national strength and prosperity. Can we be insensible of the value of this maritime superiority, which even the ancients considered as decisive of the fortune of war, and of the claims to dominion? It was their maxim, "*Zui mare teneat eum necesse rerum potiri.*" We do not, indeed, seek to convert our naval pre-eminence into an instrument of ambition; our only wish is to make it subservient to the general interest. But, with such purity, and, it may be said, such generosity of views, with such means of punishing, too, with some of the greatest hardships of war—hardships which, thank Heaven! we do not ourselves experience—the insolence, the injustice, the insatiable rapacity of our foe—are we to be told that we must, by a disgraceful peace, yield to his immoderate pretensions, and recognize his right to domineer over Europe, because, forsooth, we may not be able to make a triumphant entry into Holland, to march an army into the Austrian Netherlands,

lands, to lay siege to the fortress of Luxembourg, or to plant our victorious standard on the once free and happy mountains of Switzerland? Rather shall we not avail ourselves of that dreadful rod, which seems to be put into our hands for the kindest and wisest purposes—for the benefit of mankind—and say to him, that—if he would enjoy the blessings of peace, he must desist from those claims which are incompatible with the general welfare—he must recognize the right of other nations to independence, and suffer them to replace the ancient and necessary barriers of their security. And although the Republican despots who successively govern that miserable country may be indifferent to the sufferings of their subjects, so they can pursue their own ambitious and destructive projects, their people will view with abhorrence their rapacious rulers, who, in order to feed an empty ambition, deprive them of the enjoyment of their natural advantages, which nothing is wanting to restore, but a sacrifice of some useless, though splendid conquests. Even the subjects of Buonaparte will soon discover that something more is necessary for their happiness, than that boasted security from the guillotine, which makes them, for the moment, worship their tyrant; and they will be sensible of the folly of sacrificing, to the personal pride of a foreign usurper, the solid advantages of national prosperity, and the invaluable comforts of social life.

But although we had not such powerful means of obliging the enemy to forego, at length, his exorbitant and inadmissible pretensions, it would be incumbent upon us to maintain the contest, until peace might be obtained on such terms as would render it preferable to a state of hostility. That war is an evil of very great magnitude, that peace is a blessing of very high value, no one pretends to dispute. It does not, however, follow, that pacification must, under any circumstances, be a benefit. It is possible for peace to be attended with an increase of danger; to be destitute of the blessings which constitute its value; to be purchased at the inestimable price of honour and security.

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It may possibly be, not only a greater evil than war, but an evil of such a magnitude, that, in comparison, war would be a positive good, and, so far, a desirable blessing.

Whenever, therefore, pacification is in question, it becomes necessary to compare the situation in which it would place us, with that in which we already stand. The point for consideration is not so much the probability there may be of our obtaining this or that specific object by a continuance of the war, as whether, at the given period, peace, on such terms as it is in our power to command, would be decidedly preferable to war; otherwise it is necessary to persevere in hostilities, although we cannot distinctly foresee the period of their termination. To rush precipitately into an inglorious and insecure peace, because the prospect of one that is safe and honourable is not within the compass of our view, would be no less absurd than for a traveller to plunge into the darksome forest, there to repose among wolves and tygers, because he cannot as yet catch even a distant glimpse of any habitation, where he may securely rest his weary limbs.

This view of the subject excludes all doubts respecting the preferableness of peace or war, at the present juncture. For there is now no question of any peace which would not confirm to France such a degree of aggrandizement as would enable her to lord it over the rest of Europe. According to the articles which an Austrian officer, without any authority for that purpose, was lately prevailed upon to sign at Paris, there is now no hope of any other pacification than one which, in its most favourable construction, would leave our natural enemy in possession of all Germany to the Rhine, of a great part of Italy, with the probable means of acquiring the rest—of Savoy, Nice, Piedmont, Switzerland, and, what is still more interesting to us, of the Austrian Netherlands, and the whole Dutch coast. Is there an Englishman who can consider such a peace as a desirable exchange even for a disastrous war? But that it would be advantageous for this country to conclude, on such terms, a triumphant

naval war, is a proposition which no man in his senses will venture seriously to advance.

This, however, is not all. We are not sure of obtaining peace even on such humiliating and ruinous conditions. In order to be permitted to negotiate, we must give up every advantage which, in consequence of so many victories, distinguishes our present situation; we must allow the enemy to equip his fleets, to furnish his arsenals, to relieve his blockaded places, and enable him again to meet us on our element, or (which he would probably prefer) to renew, with better prospect of success, his attempts to invade Great Britain or Ireland—and all this, before we can know whether he will, on any terms, admit us into his insidious and perilous amity. A Naval Armistice, in short, is the condition which he dares to propose to Britons, as the indispensable preliminary to negotiation. Here, at least, he has touched upon a string which vibrates in every British heart.—It remains to be seen, whether the malicious ingenuity of Opposition can discover any ground of censure against Government for rejecting the audacious proposal. It is more probable that the party will rather chuse to renew their attack upon the rejection of the overtures for negotiation at the commencement of the present year, because the merits of that case depend upon a complication of circumstances. But upon the question of a Naval Armistice, the spontaneous feelings and intuitive judgment of every man who is at all solicitous for the welfare of Britain, pronounce so decidedly for a rejection, that the papers in the service of Opposition, nay even those in the pay of the enemy, have not dared to assert that the demand ought to have been granted. Can a stronger proof be required of the determination of the First Consul against peace, than his insisting on a preliminary even to negotiation, for the acceptance of which not a man in this country ventures openly to declare.

In addition to the many cogent motives which call upon us to persevere in the contest, rather than consent to terms of peace with the French Republic, which every man in this kingdom would reject with disdain,
if

if they were proposed by the French Monarchy, the present state of France affords the greatest encouragement to try, still further, the chances of war. The internal condition of that country is as precarious as its external power is formidable. The Colossus which threatens to bestride Europe, and which terrifies the world, is, like the image in Nebuchadnezzar's dream, supported by a frail compound of base and heterogeneous materials; and it may in an instant be broken in pieces, "and become like the chaff of the summer threshing-floors."—The French Republic is incessantly changing her tyrants and her constitution; she is not possessed of "*any permanence either as to persons or things.*" The Consular Government, like its predecessors, is liable to be "blown down by a breath of wind, and to make way for other men who have different views, or may be slaves of an opposite interests."

The reign of Buonaparte, like that of his predecessors, must have its term, of which, to judge from experience, a large proportion is already expired; and the period of its termination will probably be more favourable to the cause of lawful government than any of the preceding revolutions could be *. For such is the joy

* Since the above was written, the Author has seen a copy of an excellent tract, not yet published, on Buonaparte's proposals for opening a negotiation for peace, entitled "A Letter to ****", by the Rev. John Brand, M. A. of which the following passage will not be here inapplicable:—

"A few months continuance has not yet, in any case, given stability to those who have usurped power in France; and if there be some circumstances which seem to promise it to the present usurpation, which were wanted to the former, they are more than over-balanced by the Consul being an effective alien. The spirit of Revolution often seems dormant, *when it is secretly exerting itself with great efficacy*; and may be really dormant, but not dead. Revolution in France resembles a certain insect, which the researches of modern naturalists have discovered, and which, from its incessant gyration, or rotatory motion, has obtained with us the name of the *wheel animalculum*. It follows from what Dr. Pulteney, in his view of the writings of Linnæus, tells us, that this great legislator of natural history includes this species among the *chaotic animalcula*; which immediately follow the Furæ. When dried, it will remain as dust for long periods of time, but revives, in full vigour, by barely putting a single drop of water upon it, and instantly resumes its revolutionary movements. Now, according to the average

joy which has been inspired by the consolidation of power in the hands of a *single* tyrant, that its revulsion to *many* would, even in idea, excite a degree of horror which would render such an event almost impossible; and among the numerous probable competitors for the succession to this modern Alexander, there is no one whose superiority in wickedness and success would give him a decided ascendancy over the rest. A civil war would, therefore, probably take place, which would naturally lead to a joyful *Restoration*. At all events, the demonstration would be then complete, that nothing but the re-establishment of lawful authority can afford the French people a reasonable hope for the enjoyment of that repose in which all their desires begin at length to centre. The First Consul seems, indeed, to be fully aware, that he has no other chance of establishing his government, even for a time, than by a successful revolutionary war, or, which would be in effect the same thing, a peace which would leave Europe at his mercy. But while Great Britain refuses to be a party to such a peace, the door will continue open to improve any vicissitudes which may take place in France. There will even be a chance for a new combination of power to crush the efforts of Gallic malice and presumption. So long as the British standard is unfurled in the cause of society, there will be a rallying point for other nations, when they witness, as no doubt they soon will, the attempts of the Republic at further encroachments, and her continued advances towards the accomplishment of that plan of universal subjugation, of which, hitherto, she has not for a moment lost sight, which she knows how to pro-

" duration of a French Constitution, the present Consular Government seems already to have survived almost a third of its term *."
 " The time may be a little more, or a little less; for, without a diligent enquiry, which I have not time to enter upon, an error may be easily fallen into, in reckoning the periods of power enjoyed by their several sets of rulers, before they have been sent to Cayenne, or the Guillotine."

* This tract contains internal evidence of having been written some months ago.

mote by peace as well as by war, and which her successes are not very likely to induce her to abandon. Unless Europe be in that state of dementation which is an awful symptom of approaching ruin, it will surely discover, at length, the necessity of confederating upon the wise principle, unfolded in the famous declaration of the Emperor of all the Russias; namely, *to destroy the monster who threatens to crush all legal authorities*. But, although the expectation of another Confederacy should not be realized—although the French Republic, with Buonaparte at its head, should, incredible as the supposition may appear, cease for a time to be offensive to its neighbours, and the rest of Europe should, upon mature deliberation, suffer France to retain a power so preponderant, as to reduce the whole Continent to a state of dependence—although, in short, all sense of right, interest, honour, duty, and danger, together with every feeling of resentment for the past, and of solicitude for the future, should be extinguished in a stupid desire of precarious repose, and short-lived tranquillity, still an inexhaustible source of vicissitude will remain open in the heart of Republican France, and a new explosion of the revolutionary volcano may, provided the British thunder continue to be heard, revive the hopes and re-animate the exertions of the civilized world.

It may be said, perhaps, that prudence requires us to calculate the risks, as well as the chances of war. This, it must be owned, is a very unusual species of calculation with us, when peace cannot be obtained without a sacrifice of honour and security. But if (to view the subject in its most unfavourable light) any of us should be appalled at the idea of our being, once more, left alone in the contest, to bear the whole brunt of French Republican wrath, and to face the implacable resentment—the insatiate malice of Buonaparte himself—If we shudder at the idea of a new army of England, assembled, like the former one, under this redoubted champion, for the invasion of our island, and again filling the air with blustering menaces “ to

“ destroy for ever the British Government,” and “ to punish Albion for its long catalogue of crimes against humanity.”—If the apprehension of such scenes inspire any of us with dismay, let us, for Heaven’s sake, suppress our fears, and *assume a virtue if we have it not*, lest the heroes of Agincourt, Cressy, and Poitiers—of Blenheim, Ramillies, and La Hogue, issue from their graves, to load with reproaches their degenerate descendants—or lest the no less illustrious heroes of Camperdown, St. Vincent, the Nile, and St. Jean d’Acre, with many others, whose achievements in the present war not only surpass all precedent, but almost exceed belief, think that they have fought and conquered for a pusillanimous race, who tremble at the threats of France while a British Navy rides triumphantly, the mistress of the seas, and imprisons the dispirited and broken remains of the hostile fleets within their very innermost harbours. Or if, deriving a just confidence from such reflections, we still contemplate, with chilling dread, the possibility that, favoured by the darkness of night, or the direction of winds, some of the Gallic hordes may be able to elude our naval guardians, and to effect a landing on British ground—still let us beware lest, by appearing to dread such an event, we insult those gallant and patriotic legions, who, like the Cadmean troop, sprang forth in an instant, in martial array, when Buonaparte prepared to lead on the first army of England, and on whose appearance, the mighty hero preferred the mad Egyptian expedition to an enterprize against Britons, whom he saw determined to defend their King, their Altars, and their homes. Before such an enterprize can succeed, it is necessary, not only that those legions should be false to the engagements, which they have plighted with the solemnities of Religion, but that our regular troops should want that valour, to encounter an invading enemy, which they uniformly display in foreign countries—nay, that the whole body of British people should be disposed to surrender, without a struggle, whatever is dear and valuable,

valuable, to the mercy of their ancient foe. A Prelate* of the Anglican church has too good an opinion of his countrymen, to believe such things possible; nay, he is willing to confide in their patriotic energy, even though a bridge were placed across the British Channel, at its narrowest part, to favour an invading enemy. Every nation which has been overcome by France has been instrumental to its own destruction, either by its internal divisions, or by indulging the preposterous hope, favoured by Gallic artifice, that, by neglecting to avail itself of its means of defence, it might appease the wrath, or conciliate the clemency of the foe. But, happily for us, that foe has given us so many and such unequivocal proofs of inveterate malice and insatiable resentment—he has demonstrated so fully, that all his outrageous and vindictive passions centre in a fixed desire to accomplish our ruin—and so distinct are the ideas which we have formed of the objects of a Gallic invasion—that whenever an attempt of that nature is at all likely to be made, the most furious opponent of Government chooses rather to fly to the ranks, than to trust to the forbearance of an adversary, whose generosity he has been wont to extol, and whose cause he has been accustomed to plead, within the walls of Parliament.

Some of the Gentlemen in Opposition have had an opportunity, in the present war, of giving a formal opinion upon the subject of invasion. Being consulted by an agent of France†, who was directed to procure the best information respecting the probable success of such an attempt, they declared in the most positive terms, that it would serve only to unite, in the closest manner, the people of this country, and that it must inevitably fail. If those among us, who are accustomed to view every thing in the most gloomy light, are thus confident upon a question of such im-

* The Bishop of Landaff, in a pamphlet published in 1798, and entitled "An Address to the People of Great Britain."

† Mr. Stowe, afterwards tried for High Treason.

portance, shall we resign ourselves to despondency? Shall we, from our impregnable Isle, look with terror on any efforts which the enemy can make against us, and which, unless we be false to ourselves, must be as ineffectual as the angry billows, which foam against the craggy sides of the solid rock? Shall we, with a naval superiority which we never before possessed, be intimidated into a sacrifice of all the interests for which we have been so long contending, and confirm to our adversary a degree of power and aggrandizement, which would render him the dictator of Europe? Surely the descendants of ancient Britons are not arrived at such a state of degeneracy. Our ancestors, with half our comparative advantages, would have contemptuously hurled defiance at France, until they made that haughty rival sue for peace, on terms compatible with *their* honour and safety. Animated by the justice of their cause, and fired with indignation at the insolent pretensions of the foe, they would have replied to all his menaces,

“ This England never did, and never shall
Lie at the proud foot of a conqueror;
Come the three corners of the world in arms,
And we shall shock them.”

But it is possible that some persons, who in the field would be bold as lions, may, when they turn their eyes towards the Bank of England, find their spirit and patriotism absorbed in calculations of the different effects of peace and war upon their funded property; or, extending their views still further, they indulge themselves, perhaps, in avaricious dreams of the commercial advantages, which they expect to derive from a general pacification. But if, on such grounds, we decide upon the great question of peace or war, we shall, indeed, deserve the invidious appellation, bestowed upon us by our insulting enemies, and prove ourselves to be a mere “ nation of shopkeepers.” The result, however, will convince us, that
such

such a low and sordid policy is injurious even to those interests, which it is most studious to promote. Although the fascinating sound of the word peace is sure always to produce an advance in the *nominal* value of funded property, the *real* value of that property would be dreadfully diminished, and even its current price would be speedily and greatly depressed, by a disgraceful and unsubstantial peace.

During the present most expensive and desperate contest, our commerce and our credit, in spite of numberless predictions of bankruptcy and ruin, have been in a progressive state of prosperity. To what is this wonderful phenomenon to be attributed? Certainly it is in a great measure owing to the salutary influence of a wise system of finance. But its grand operating cause has been that manly, noble, and resolute spirit, with which we have defended not merely our own honour and our own rights, but the general welfare and security. It is this which has procured us the confidence of other nations, and has taught us to confide in ourselves. It is this which has constituted us the guardians of society. It is this, in short, which has made the riches of every clime to flow into our ports, invigorated those resources which have been employed for the general benefit, and furnished the means, which, upon principles of the most politic wisdom, we devoted to the defence of Religion, order, law, and justice, against the attacks of atheism, anarchy, and rapine. Shall we depart from a line of conduct, which, besides being so judicious and so honourable, has led to such happy consequences? Shall we renounce that system of liberal and enlightened policy, which promotes our own safety and happiness, by consulting the safety and happiness of all with whom we have a common interest, and, retiring within ourselves, lose all concern for the rest of mankind, in the gratification of the most sordid and mercenary feelings? If we do this, we shall soon find that our boasted wealth, by debasing our spirit, is in reality our greatest misfortune. We shall soon feel
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that national honour is essential to national prosperity—that it is a necessary support of public credit and private commerce—that it is the main pillar of the Bank of England.—We shall have the mortification of seeing the resources of the country swallowed up, in the same gulph, with its character—its dignity—its consequence in the eyes of other Powers—and its resolution to defend the rest of Europe, as well as itself, against the restless and encroaching ambition of France*.

To countervail, however, the many forcible considerations, which call upon us for a strenuous perseverance in the war, until it can be terminated by a peace on which we may reflect, without a blush, and without a fear, an artifice is often resorted to which has a considerable effect on minds, that do not entertain a constant and lively sense of the nature of the present contest. It is said that the war is pursued by us without any specific or determinate object ; that no

* That the prosperity of this country, in the midst of a most expensive warfare, is to be attributed, in a great measure, to the influence of a wise system of finance, is a truth too obvious to require any illustration. Still, however, in so long and so arduous a contest, the credit and resources of the country might at length have given way but for the adoption of a measure, as novel and extraordinary in its nature (at least in modern times) as it is beneficial in its tendency—a measure which at once embraces the great objects of enabling us to support the war, while the enemy shall oblige us to continue it, without any augmentation of the public debt—and of apportioning the additional burthens which it may, in consequence, be necessary to impose, according to the abilities of proprietors ; while it exempts from its operation all persons who have not an income of £50. per annum, and provides for the relief of those whose income exceeds that amount, as far as is compatible with the efficacy of the measure. It also secures the inestimable advantage—highly important to all classes of the community, and particularly so to the trading interest—that of preserving articles of general and necessary consumption from the enormous weight of taxes to which they must otherwise be subjected. On the productiveness of this tax depends, in all human probability, the great question, Whether Great Britain will continue equal to those exertions which may still be necessary on her part to bring the war to a safe and honourable termination—a question involving the issue of the contest ; and, consequently, the existence of the country, and of all civilized society. With what an astonishing insatiation are they chargeable ! to what an awful responsibility will they be subject, who, by a factious opposition, or a dishonest evasion, counteract the effect of this most salutary measure !

precise event or state of things is held forth as the period of its duration. And occasion is thence taken pathetically to ask, Whether we will obstinately persist in indefinite hostility? Whether we will go, on, year after year, wasting our blood and treasure, without being able to say for what it is that we are contending? Without having any distinct object in view, with the attainment of which we should be satisfied? To hear such language, any one would suppose that *we* had been the assailants—that we had actually commenced the war, to gratify our ambition, or to glut our malice—and that nothing were now wanting to bring it to a termination, and to restore general tranquillity; but for us to desist from the attack, and to relinquish our unjustifiable pursuit; unless, indeed, our adversary should insist on a compensation for the injury which he had sustained, in consequence of our aggression—a claim which the Gentlemen of Opposition would, doubtless, be ready to support.

But it happens that the very reverse of all this is the case. We were most unjustifiably attacked; we have had no option but either to defend ourselves, or to surrender at discretion to the enemy; and it has been as much out of our power to terminate, as it was to prevent the contest. This would be a more than sufficient answer to the enquiry, what is the object of the war? It is not, however, by a great deal, the whole of our answer to that enquiry. Our object in the war is not merely to repel an actual attack, but to prevent the enemy from attaining his object in attacking us; and in proportion as *his* object is mischievous, it must be admitted that *ours* is important. Now the object of the attack, as appears from indisputable evidence, was no less than the overthrow of our Government, and the subversion of our Constitution: and, in defending, hitherto, these high and invaluable interests, it must be allowed that the war could not have had a more necessary object, or a more happy effect. As it is the subtle policy of the foe to vary his language

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according to circumstances, the full extent of his designs is not, at all times, equally apparent ; and the uncertainty which thus arises respecting his views is, in the genuine stile of Jacobinical sophistry, applied to us, who are under the necessity of opposing his object, whatever it may be, and though it were altogether unknown to us. But, without having any reason to flatter ourselves, that he has abandoned the original design of involving us in the horrors of Revolution, his avowed designs are more than sufficient to provoke our most determined and persevering resistance, and to give to our object a most distinct specification. For with whatever hypocrisy he may, at times, conceal or disguise his ultimate views, it is notorious that he seeks to secure for himself an accession of territory and power, which would be incompatible with the safety of all Europe, and in an especial degree with that of Great Britain, whose destruction is evidently the predominant wish of his heart. The question, therefore, is brought to a very simple issue. It is reduced to the single point whether, with every thing to apprehend from the malice of our adversary, we shall suffer him to attain the means of gratifying that malice to its utmost extent ? Whether we shall permit him to secure an avowed object, which would encourage him to pursue, and enable him to accomplish his concealed objects, be they never so destructive. In refusing to be thus accessary to our own ruin, we act still on the defensive, and fight for objects of no less importance than our own honour and security, and the liberties and independence of Europe. And, although these terms be not found in the vocabulary of a Frenchified opposition, they are indelibly engraven on the heart of every True Briton.

But if it were not in our power to answer, in so satisfactory a manner, the insidious question, what is the object of the war? there would yet be another question of far greater importance, particularly in such a war as the present; What would be the effects of peace?

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With our arms in our hands, and while we retain a posture of defence, we know, tolerably well, to what we have to trust. But if we lay down those arms, and resign ourselves to sleep, who can tell in that sleep of peace "what dreams may come?" Who can foresee what may befall us, if we venture to indulge our longing for repose, without those safeguards and sentinels, by which our repose has always, hitherto, been protected? Who would choose to undergo the toils of war, to bear its burdens, and to endure its anxieties,

"But that the dread of something after peace,
That undiscovered country, from whose bourn
No traveller returns, puzzles the will,
And makes us rather bear the ills we have,
Than fly to others that we know not of?"

The advocates for an accommodation with the French Republic, endeavour to persuade us that no material difference can exist between the ordinary effects of peace, and those which, at this time, it would produce; and in order to favour the analogy, they expatiate much upon the usual instability of pacific engagements. A more dangerous error can hardly exist than to conceive the two cases similar. It is true that humanity, justice, and good faith, have always had too little influence in producing and enforcing the amicable conventions of different States; and that the efficacy of such stipulations was seldom proof against a concurrence of interest and power to infringe them. It should not, however, be forgotten, either that treaties which, like that of Westphalia, were considered as the bulwarks of the public law of Europe, have been looked upon as sacred from age to age; or that it was usual, in subsequent treaties, to enumerate and confirm preceding ones, for a very considerable time backwards. But a peace with the French Republic would open a scene entirely new

new to the political world. Such a peace would imply, in the very meaning of the term, a dissolution of all previous treaties, and more particularly of those, which are most essential to the general security and independence. Besides that, in point of stability it would not vie with the most precarious of all former pacifications, it would be destitute of the usual and most common effects of peace—and it would be fraught with consequences unknown to past experience. Formerly the termination of hostilities enabled us to disband our war establishments, to reduce our expences to the ratio of a peace expenditure, to restore (with the single exception of that prudent vigilance, which ought ever to subsist where there is a diversity of interest) a respectful, and an amicable communication with the Government with which we had been at enmity, and to enjoy, without fear or danger, an unlimited intercourse with the subjects of that Government. Will any man say that these effects could attend a peace with Republican France? Is there a Statesman, even in the ranks of Opposition, who upon such a peace would dare to pronounce the word *disarm*? Is there one who would venture to lay up our navy in ordinary, to reduce our land forces to a peace establishment, to disband our militia, or to dissolve the volunteer corps, which were formed upon the impulse of unprecedented danger, to defeat projects which had for their avowed object our utter extinction as a nation? If peace could not authorize such reductions, it would not be attended with any great diminution of expence. It would be accompanied with the burthens of war; but it would be destitute of the important advantages which, during the war, compensate those burthens, and dispose us to bear them with cheerfulness. Our commerce would lose the great advantages it now derives from the restrictions, imposed by a naval war on that of the enemy. Our ports would no longer be crowded with captures, which afford some recompense to the prowess of our gallant tars, whose prodigies of valour excite the astonishment of the world, and fill

fill every British heart with exultation. The inextinguishable ardour of these intrepid champions, deprived of its natural vent, and restrained from displaying itself against the enemy, might burst forth in eruptions infinitely more dreadful than the shock of war, or the thunder of contending fleets. And thus a navy, which is at once our Pride and our Palladium, would become a just object of jealousy and terror*.

This absence of the blessings of peace and of the advantages of war would not, however, constitute the principal objection to an accommodation with the French Republic. The communication which such an event would restore between the two countries, would prove to this a source of new and inexpressible danger. The national intercourse, which served formerly for the reciprocation of commercial benefits, of improvements in manufactures, of discoveries in science, of advancements in literature, would be converted into a vehicle of the most fatal contagion. What numbers of our countrymen, and particularly of our youth, would be attracted to the capital of triumphant guilt, there to see the grandeur of the victorious Republic, and, in that sink of vice and impiety, utterly to extinguish their Religious and moral principles! How many, too, would resort thither to be instructed in the revolutionary art, and to conspire, with its foreign enemies, against their native country! And although they would not be able to attend the public sittings of a Jacobin Club, nor be welcomed by the fraternal embrace of the President of a National Convention, (such forms being incompatible with the consular authority), they would experience no want of private tutors in the science of "organizing Revolutions;" a science in which every man in office, power, or public station, is a distinguished professor! The mischief, however result-

* It should not be forgotten that a danger of this kind would be inseparable from a Naval Armistice.

ing from such excursions of baneful curiosity or perverse design, though great, may be conceived. But who can estimate the danger arising to our internal tranquillity, and to our constitution itself, from the "Apostles of Rebellion"—the Missionaries of the *Propagande*, who would, in shoals, visit this country to infuse discontent and to excite revolt? Who can even calculate the effect of the appearance among us of a Republican Ambassador and his Jacobin suite? How would our demagogues exult at the exhibition of the tri-coloured cockade at St. James's! With what rapture would they chaunt their *Io Pæans*, when they beheld the sacred presence of British Majesty polluted by a train of Gallic regicides*! With what confidence would they consider such a spectacle as the triumph of the French revolution, and as the prelude to a revolution in this country! What energy would such scenes give to desperate faction! How rapidly would they light up the ill-covered embers of sedition! How would they animate our agitators and anarchists! How would they quicken the "imperishable seed" which the propagators of the Rights of Man have most copiously sown†! Can it be supposed that a

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* This idea is so transporting to them, that they sometimes chaunt their *Io Pæans* by anticipation: thus Mr. Wakefield—"For myself, who have exulted in the success of the French, and the disgrace of their insolent and odious foes, with a keenness of transport not to be described, I have been long prepared to hail the triumphant entry of a Republican Representative; and shall exclaim, with equal sincerity and rapture,

"Dicite *Io Pæan* et *Io bis dicite Pæan*."

"Oh! may I live to hail that glorious day,

"And sing loud *Pæans* through the crowded way."

The same writer thus bears testimony to the deleterious influence which the neighbourhood of the French Republic would have on the British character and manners—

"The neighbouring influence of the French Republic; not her arms, but the silent and tranquil operation of her principles, on our character, our manners, and our policy; an imperceptible, efficacious energy! which nothing can preclude, nothing can counteract, and nothing eventually resist."—See a reply to the letter of Edmund Burke, Esq. by Gilbert Wakefield, B. A.

† "Imperishable seed." The modern philosophers do not despair because the success of their labours is postponed, or because the most

zeal-

Consular Ambassador would neglect so fair an opportunity of promoting the exercise of the holy right of insurrection? Is it likely that a Jacobin Plenipotentiary should be deficient in powers to treat with the Sovereign People, to recognize their majestic prerogatives, and to negotiate with them a fraternal alliance? Would he not, like Chauvelin, be authorized to make "a solemn appeal to the nation?" Would his employers neglect, in conformity with the commentary on the famous decree of the 15th of December 1792, which was framed by the Executive Council, for the use of their Revolutionary Commissaries, to "associate with him a sufficient number of agents more particularly destined for *instructive communication* with the inhabitants of the country," or to furnish him (according to the promise then made) with "lists of those citizens who are known for their patriotic sentiments?" Le Brun, who was Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Member of the Executive Council when these revolutionary arrangements were formed, is now a *puiss* Consul; and Talleyrand, who is now Foreign Secretary of State, was then an associate with Chauvelin. These men have scarcely destroyed the lists of "patriotic citizens," made out at that time; and the Corresponding Society would, doubtless, be very ready to co-operate in the friendly task of "instructive communication."

Should it be thought that these dangers might be obviated by extraordinary precautions, let it be considered what kind of peace that would be which

zealous patrons of their cause frequently become its martyrs. Of this we are assured, by Mr. Southey, in the following lines:

"The damning guilt

"Of Brissot murdered, and the blameless wife

"Of Roland! martyred patriots! spirits pure,

"Wept by the good ye fell! yet still survives,

"Sown by your toil, and by your blood manured,

"Th' imperishable seed; and now its roots

"Spread and strike deep, and soon shall it become

"That tree beneath whose shade the sons of men

"Shall pitch their tents in peace."

JOAN OF ARC.

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should require *extraordinary precautions*, to protect our internal tranquillity against the very envoys of the Power, with which we should profess to be at amity, and to prevent those envoys, and their subordinate agents, from plotting, in conjunction with domestic traitors, the overthrow of our Government. Besides, might not any such precautions, however necessary, furnish ground for offence, and tend to disturb the good understanding which, as friends of peace, we should be solicitous to preserve? The French Revolutionists are known to be the most irascible politicians who have ever appeared on the public stage of Europe. Though they allow themselves an unbounded license to insult others, who do not entirely fall in with their views, they cannot brook even the smallest contradiction. Of this we had the fullest proof before the war, when, although they made no scruple to avow the vast design of overturning every ancient and established Government, and of entirely changing the face of society, they would not allow us the privilege even of being alarmed, much less of adopting any measures for the prevention of so awful a change. Although they received, with open arms, traitors from this country, who announced the dissolution of the British Government, and the establishment, in its stead, of a National Convention, every expedient which we adopted, to avert such events, was considered by them, and their advocates here, as indications of a hostile disposition. Although they had very considerably augmented their navy, when, at the close of the year 1792, they openly avowed projects for our destruction, and when they publicly intimated a design of making a descent in this country with 50,000 caps of liberty, yet when we, in consequence of such indications of approaching hostility, made a comparatively small addition to our maritime force, they took umbrage, and threatened that if we did not discontinue our naval preparations, they would prepare for war. If they displayed such a character in the modesty of youth, what may not be expected from them in

in the confidence of maturity, and in the exultation of success? How could peace be preserved with such rulers, unless we should determine to submit, in all things, to their pleasure, and to have no other law than their will?

It appears, then, that the relations of peace and amity, which some of us are so eager to form with the French Republic, would be incapable of duration—that, instead of restoring that friendly, confidential, and mutually beneficial intercourse, which such relations were wont to produce, they would consist in a cold, constrained, and distrustful civility, an hypocritical use of forms, thinly covering, but by no means concealing, a mutual and irreconcilable hostility; and, which is worst of all, that they would furnish to the enemy means of mischief far more dreadful than any which can be supplied by war. We should tremble much more at his symbols of friendship than we had even done at his tokens of hostility. We should find it more difficult to guard against an Ambassador and his train, than a General at the head of his army. We should be convinced that there may be more harm in diplomatic arrangements than in military operations. In the most favourable view of the subject, we should enjoy nothing more than an armed truce—"a warlike peace." We should only rest upon our arms; and fatal would be the night in which we discontinued our watch. Our sword, instead of reposing quietly in the scabbard, must continue, at least, half drawn, that it might be ready, at a moment's notice, to prevent surprise, or defeat treachery. But the danger would be that no vigilance and no energy would be able to counteract the Jacobinical arts which, under the mask of friendship, the enemy would employ for our destruction.

Some persons, indeed, have dismissed from their minds all apprehension of danger from Jacobinical arts, since the moment when the last revolution in France vested the supreme authority in Buonaparte. They consider the First Consul as a determined foe

to the Jacobins, over whom he triumphed when he concentrated all power in himself, and whom he is obliged incessantly to watch, lest they disturb his reign. But though he may dread their machinations against himself, does it follow that he would scruple to practice their arts, in which he has shewn himself so great an adept, against others? Because he does not suffer them to cabal against his own Government, is it a necessary consequence that he ties their hands from molesting other Governments, which he is solicitous to subvert? Can it be doubted that he would be glad of their assistance in his revolutionary plans? or that he would, in compensation for the restrictions he imposes on them in France and its affiliated territories, grant them full liberty to plot against the tranquillity and order of the rest of the world? Or is it likely that he would reject the services of those swarms of Jacobins which the French Revolution has hatched in every country, and which, upon the sunshine of Peace, would issue from the lurking-places where they have been obliged to take shelter from the storm of war?

To the domestic dangers, inseparable from a pacification with the French Republic, must be added the universal danger that must attend a Peace, by which Buonaparte, as ruler of that Republic, would acquire, not merely a preponderating influence, but a decided ascendancy over the rest of Europe. Is it possible to conceive a more certain and speedy instrument of general ruin, than such an ascendancy would prove in such hands? Can a doubt exist that he would avail himself of it to pursue that system of general subversion, to which all his past labours have been directed? With what facility it would enable him to accomplish, by sap or by storm, the destruction of the remains of lawful authority, it is not difficult to judge, if we consider, for a moment, the state of the public mind throughout the continent of Europe, and the very weak resistance which has hitherto been opposed
to

to the progress of French arms and French principles. Nay, although new revolutions should swallow up his authority, and again convulse the bosom of France, yet such events, which, if this country were still at war, might be improved to the greatest advantage, would avail nothing if the British lion were laid ingloriously asleep: on the contrary, they would serve only to inspire the continental nations with additional terror, and to render them more willing victims to their insatiable foe. It might, perhaps, be the privilege of Great Britain, if a privilege it can be called, to be the last victim. It would even be judicious in the enemy to lull her, if possible, into a state of false confidence and ideal security, as the work of death should be advancing upon the continent; while she, having set the seal to her own infamy, would find, like Sampson when his locks were shorn, that her spirit and her strength had deserted her. No consideration of foreign interest, or of distant danger, would rouse her to fresh exertions. She would see state after state swallowed up in the revolutionary vortex, without one effort to avert her own approaching ruin—without possessing a minister so bold, or a patriot so honest, as to pronounce so unpopular a word as—WAR. At length, when she beheld the whole continent of Europe converted into a battery against herself, and its entire force, under the direction of a single hand, employed for her destruction, she would, in dismay and despair, shrink from the unequal contest—and, like Switzerland, by base compromise and temporising policy, (such as Opposition recommended to her before the war) surrender herself, by degrees, into the hands of her ancient enemy; or, by a late, desperate, and unavailing struggle, conclude the illustrious history of Britain, and thereby extinguish the last hope of the civilized world.

Such would be the natural operation of a general peace, which should sacrifice, in favour of Buonaparte, the balance of power; unless, indeed, according to the

romantically generous speculations of some persons, this scourge of mankind has undergone a miraculous change—unless he has not only renounced Jacobinism, but learned moderation, justice, and self-denial from successes, which would have turned the brain of any other man. For, incredible as it may seem, there are politicians, whose faith in such extravagant reveries would induce them to leave this ambitious tyrant, this consummate hypocrite, in possession of almost one half of Europe, rather than continue a war which, from its commencement, has been attended with a progressive increase of national security:—and though he has hitherto disappointed the hopes they entertained of seeing him, like Monk, the champion of royalty, still they are unwilling to doubt of his conversion; or thinking, perhaps, that when he played the Jacobin, he played the hypocrite, they now expect him to blaze out in the character of a great and beneficent Potentate, and, instead of abusing his immense power, to cultivate the arts of peace, to maintain the general tranquillity, and to seek only to make his subjects happy, and his empire flourishing. Thus an honourable Senator, in the excess of transport with which the victory of Marengo inspired him, is reported to have “put it to the feelings of every member of the house,” (which he addressed) “whether every one action of Buonaparte, since the overtures which he made in the present year, had not tended to raise him in the estimation of every candid man.” And the same Senator is further reported to have expressed a hope that “this magnanimous person, though a kind of self-appointed Dictator, would exercise his power in bringing about the liberty of France.”

Whether the Jacobinism of Buonaparte be real or pretended, it is pure, genuine Jacobinism, which is here attributed to a British Senator. For what else is it to promote the cause of anarchy and oppression, by a prostitution of the name of liberty? But who, that had not lived in these
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degenerate days, could believe it possible for such base adulation to be offered, in the presence of a British Parliament, to the most detestable miscreant, by whom the vengeance of Heaven has ever punished the sins of mankind? Who could believe it possible for a British Opposition to be so lost to every feeling of virtue, patriotism and decency, as to kiss the feet of such a wretch, in veneration for his triumphs over the Allies of their country? But although it is now demonstrated by experience, that faction is capable of degrading even Britons to such astonishing depths of infamy, still every one who is not factious will rather expect the Ethiopian to change his skin, and the Leopard his spots, than Buonaparte ever to be any thing else than a scourge to humanity. Although a Member of Opposition may consider the battle of Marengo, because it seems to fix an Usurper in his seat, and to preserve his Republic from the dangers which before impended over it, as a full atonement for his crimes, both in Italy and Egypt, for his numberless murders, for his wanton massacres, and for his matchless impieties, still every heart, in which the moral sense is not quite extinct, will but abhor the more such a prodigy of guilt, such a monster of cruelty, perfidy and blasphemy, on account of every success he may obtain in that cause, in which all his past atrocities have been perpetrated. The very persons who now idolize this military buccaneer on account of the splendour and importance of his victories, have been accustomed to exclaim against those conquerors who are renowned in history for having, to gratify their ambition, invaded the peace of countries which had done them no injury, seized upon territories to which they had no right, and deluged the earth with blood. The censure of such exploits is certainly just; and it is fraught with an useful admonition. Mankind have always been too apt to be dazzled by success, and, in admiration of the triumphs, to forget the crimes, of the Alexanders and the Cæsars, who have disturbed the peace of the world. But how comes it to pass that

the moral philosophers who judge so rightly of former times, and who see in the heroes of antiquity but so many robbers and murderers, are lost in admiration of Buonaparte, because they think (with Mr. Sheridan) that "he has distanced every military exploit " in modern times, and achieved what never has " been attempted from the days of Hannibal to the " present period."

This inconsistency is the more striking, because, admitting, for the sake of argument, that there is no exaggeration in the above statement, although in the judgment of military men the person therein described is but a rash and desperate adventurer;—admitting that a General, shamefully driven, with his best troops, from a place "not defensible according to the rules of art*," by a naval officer, at the head of a few seamen, and of a garrison of undisciplined Turks—that such a General may vie with a Marlborough or a Suwarrow;—admitting that Buonaparte was raised to the highest pitch of military fame by the battle of Marengo, in which battle, however, *he* was certainly defeated, and the entire honour of the victory remained with D'Essaix;—still, in every other respect, connected with the character of a hero, he is a just object of extreme detestation. The illustrious Chieftains, the brilliancy of whose exploits has rendered them famous in history, possessed qualities, independently of bravery and conduct, which justly ennobled them in the estimation of mankind. They had a greatness and generosity of soul, a loftiness and dignity of mind, which not only rendered them incapable of any thing mean and base, but which sometimes impelled them to actions so grand and sublime, as to command the applause even of those persons who are most indignant at their insatiable ambition. They had also a sense of humanity, a compassionate tenderness of heart, which

* See Sir Sidney Smith's Letter to Evan Nepean, Esq. dated the Tigre, off Jaffa, June 19, 1799.

made them ever ready to fly to the relief of a vanquished foe, and to alleviate, by kindness and sympathy, his misfortune and his sufferings. Until this day, such qualities have always been considered as essential to true heroism; and no person who was destitute of them, however brave, enterprising and successful, has been dignified with the title of great. Borgia was, perhaps, as bold and undaunted in the field as Julius Cæsar; but if he had gained as many triumphs as that renowned commander, he would still have been detested as a monster, instead of being admired as a hero. Who, then, will dare to prostitute the name of Greatness, by uniting it with that of Buonaparte—*Monstrum nullâ virtute redemptum*—of whom no one trait of generosity is recorded—who has, in no one instance, used success with moderation—the baseness of whose actions infinitely exceeds the splendour of his victories—who is still more distinguished by craft, perfidy, cruelty, and oppression, than by military achievements—who, besides having shewn himself, on various occasions, as prodigal of human blood as Robespierre, is, in other respects, an object of still greater detestation to every virtuous and considerate mind, than even that unfeeling monster—who crowded into a single expedition, treacherously undertaken against a country, enjoying, without suspicion of danger, a profound peace, and whose Government was in perfect amity with France, more baseness and atrocity than can be found in the life of any other man—who commenced that expedition with openly blaspheming his God, abjuring the Saviour of the world, renouncing the faith which he had till then professed, and, to facilitate the success of his enterprise, hypocritically assuming the Religion of the people whom he came to enslave—who then unnecessarily assaulted a defenceless place, which he might have obtained by summons, and, that he might strike a *salutary* terror, wantonly and indiscriminately massacred men, women, and children at the breast—who, after causing, by the orders which he issued, the French Admiral

to lose his life with his fleet, calumniated his memory by attributing his disaster to his own fault*—who at Jaffa murdered his Turkish prisoners in cold blood, three days after their capture—who, at Acre, suddenly and treacherously assaulted the place, when, by proposing a cessation of arms, for the purpose of burying the dead, he hoped he had put the garrison off its guard—who, having in vain attempted to assassinate, traduced Sir Sidney Smith, by falsely and maliciously charging him with intentionally exposing his prisoners to the infection of the plague—and, finally, who basely deserted his own army, and secretly stole away to France when he found his expedition desperate†. Shall such a man be named

* These facts, with numberless subordinate instances of rapine and barbarity, are substantiated by the best of all possible evidence, the confession of the guilty parties, published to the world in letters from the Commander and officers engaged in the expedition, to their connections in France, which were intercepted in their passage by British cruizers. Attempts have been obliquely made to discredit these letters; but no one has yet dared openly to challenge their authenticity; and they are already incorporated with the imperishable records of history.

† The eulogists of Buonaparte will probably condemn the freedom with which his character is discussed in these pages. Unable to deny the justness of the description which is here given of him, their nice discernment, their accurate taste will discover both impolicy and indecency in holding forth, without reserve, the vices of a man who governs a mighty Empire, and with whom the British Government may think it proper to negotiate, and perhaps to conclude a treaty of peace. It is, however, but very lately that the Gentlemen in question have been so fastidious upon these subjects. It cannot be forgotten with what freedom, during the whole war, they have suffered themselves to speak of foreign Powers—it cannot be forgotten what harsh—what very harsh terms they have used respecting Sovereigns, with whom the Government of their country was in perfect friendship, and even in close alliance. This was, indeed, impolitic and indecent in a very high degree. It was even insulting to their own Sovereign, whom it obliquely reproached for connections, by which he sought to maintain the independence of Europe, as well as that safety of his own State. But it seems that these conscientious Gentlemen consider a Revolutionary—a Jacobinical Usurper—though endeavouring to bring destruction upon their native land, as a more sacred character than a lawful Monarch, who is connected with their own King by ties of the closest amity. The Author does not scruple to say that his opinion is the very reverse of this. He is desirous, however, that it may be remembered that no one is in the least responsible for any of his opinions but himself. On this subject he refers the reader to the note contained in page 25. ante.

named with a Cyrus, or even with an Alexander ; with a Vth Henry of England, or a IVth Henry of France ;
unless

It is, moreover, of such paramount importance to the cause of virtue that mankind should keep alive the indignation which such a character as Buonaparte is calculated to excite—that they should, in his elevation, as well as in that of his predecessors, see the invariable tendency of Revolutionary principles to subject them to the galling yoke of the most unprincipled and profligate characters ; and there is so remarkable a disposition to forgetfulness upon these subjects, that it becomes a kind of moral duty to preserve, by repetition, disgusting as the task may appear, the remembrance of deeds, the atrocity of which is, for the moment, concealed behind the lustre of subsequent success. The interesting narrative given by Sir Sidney Smith, of the siege of Acre, should, for the above reasons, be deeply imprinted on every mind. As no description can produce such an effect as the original language of that narrative, a few extracts, which are more particularly characteristic of Buonaparte, shall be here subjoined.

“ The providence of Almighty God has been wonderfully manifest in the defeat and precipitate retreat of the French army, the means we had of opposing its gigantic efforts against us being totally inadequate, of themselves, to the production of such a result. The measure of their iniquities seems to have been filled by the massacre of the Turkish prisoners at Jaffa, in cool blood, three days after their capture.”

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The measure of their iniquities seems to have been filled by the massacre of the Turkish prisoners at Jaffa, in cool blood, three days after their capture ; and the plain of Nazareth has been the boundary of Buonaparte's extraordinary career.

He raised the siege of Acre on the 20th of May, leaving all his heavy artillery behind him, either buried or thrown into the sea, where, however, it is visible and can be easily weighed.

“ The French grenadiers absolutely refused to mount the breach any more over the putrid bodies of their unburied companions, sacrificed in former attacks by Buonaparte's impatience and precipitation, which led him to commit such palpable errors *as even seamen could take advantage of*. He seemed to have no principle of action but that of pressing forward, and appeared to stick at nothing to obtain the object of his ambition.”—“ Two attempts to assassinate me in the town having failed, recourse was had to a most flagrant breach of every law of honour and of war. A flag of truce was sent into the town, by the hand of an Arab Dervise, with a letter to the Pacha, proposing a cessation of arms, for the purpose of burying the dead bodies, the stench from which became intolerable. It was natural that we should gladly listen to this proposition, and that we should consequently be off our guard during the conference. While the answer was under consideration, a volley of shot and shells on a sudden announced an assault, which, however, the garrison was ready to receive, and the assailants only contributed to encrease the number of the dead bodies in question, to the eternal disgrace of the General who thus disloyally sacrificed them. Subordination was now at an end, and all hopes of success having vanished, the enemy had no alternative left but a precipitate retreat. The howitzers and me-

unless it be to heighten, by a dark and disgusting contrast, the lustre of their characters? If Mr. Sheridan were desirous of exhibiting human nature in the most odious light in which it has ever appeared, could he do this more effectually than by presenting on the stage, without any exaggeration of the fact, his admired hero, at once cajoling and insulting the unfortunate Egyptians, by that miserable farce of *Liberty and Free Government*, which his own General Boyer thus describes:—"I went yesterday to see the installation of the Divan, which Buonaparte has formed. It consists of nine persons; and such a sight! I was introduced to nine bearded automatons, dressed in long robes and turbans; but whose mien and appearance altogether put me strongly in mind of the figures of the twelve apostles in my grandfather's little cabinet."—Should Mr. Sheridan then be desirous of placing human nature in a more favourable light, he might change the scene to the tent of Darius, and there exhibit the *true* hero, who, after the battle of Issus, displayed a greatness of soul, a moderation in success, and an humanity towards the vanquished, which eclipsed the lustre of his victory, and which furnished one of those models, by which our youth are still taught to cultivate a taste for the sublime and beautiful in human actions. But how, alas! will the taste of our youth be corrupted, if, deducing their models from Opposition elo-

medium twelve-pounders were embarked in the country vessels at Jaffa, together with the worst among the two thousand wounded. The vessels being hurried to sea without seamen to navigate them, and the wounded being in want of every necessary, even water and provisions, they steered straight to his Majesty's ships, in full confidence of receiving the succours of humanity, in which they were not disappointed. Their expressions of gratitude to us were mingled with execrations on the name of their General, who had, *as they said*, thus exposed them to peril, rather than fairly and honourably renew the intercourse with the English, which he had broken off by a false and malicious assertion that I had intentionally exposed the former prisoners to the infection of the plague. To the honour of the French army, be it said, this assertion was not believed by them, and it thus recoiled on its author. He cannot plead misinformation as his excuse, his aid-du-camp, M. Lallemand, having had free intercourse with these prisoners on board the Tigre, when he came to treat about them."

quence,

quence, they cease to discriminate between moral qualities, confound the very extremes of virtue and vice, and, making success their only standard of perfection, lose their relish for true glory, and their abhorrence of whatever is sordid and detestable !

Still, however, the difficulty remains to be solved, how it happens that the senatorial patriots of this day, most of whom have enjoyed all the advantages which education can bestow, and who have been taught to condemn the unjust conqueror, though adorned by the most brilliant virtues, can offer their incense of adulation to Buonaparte, whose unjust conquests, far from being relieved by the display of any virtue, exhibit only scenes of fraud, rapine, and remorseless barbarity, which would disgrace a den of banditti. The truth is, that this man has the transcendent merit of warring against the Government to which these gentlemen are in opposition—that he partakes with them of a most rancorous hatred to the Administration, whose zeal and exertions have been alike unfavourable to the views of both ; and that he sympathizes with their impatience to see that Administration removed, and the King, whose free choice it is, obliged to trust his affairs in the hands of men in whom he has no confidence. The First Consul also has been, and continues to be, the grand support of that cause of infidelity, licentiousness, and anarchy, to which these his advocates and admirers, have sacrificed whatever remained to them of reputation and consequence in the country ; not, indeed, like him, from real attachment to that cause, but because their rivals, whom they wished to supplant, were bound, by the most sacred ties of duty, to oppose its success. These are the qualifications which entitle Buonaparte to their admiration and their praise, and without which he would appear to them, as he does to every man who is not the slave of faction, a foul disgrace to the sword, as well as a bitter curse to the age which has the misfortune to witness his triumphant crimes.

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It is true these Gentlemen, passing over his former history with general, though high-wrought encomiums upon the glory of his arms, and studiously preserving a profound silence respecting his Egyptian expedition, endeavour to convince the world that, by his conduct since his usurpation of the supreme, or rather of the whole power in France, his conduct has been such as to entitle him to universal confidence. They dwell with rapture on his humanity in abstaining from human sacrifices, while, by the aid of the memory of Robespierre, he can, at least for the present, reign more securely without steeping his sceptre in blood. They frequently remind us of his moderation in admitting to favour men of all parties, in receiving the emigrants, and in caressing the clergy, and of the numerous other marks of justice, forbearance, and conciliation, by which he has at once converted Jacobin France into the paradise of fools. Leaving his Gallic dupes, if any such there really be, to be convinced of their error by fatal experience, is it possible that such profound observers, such experienced judges of human nature, as the members of the British Opposition, can believe in the justice and moderation of Buonaparte? Have they not, with all their penetration, been able to discover that he resembles rather the crafty tyger, who lies in ambush, till he can spring upon his unsuspecting prey, than the generous lion, whose distant roarings warn the affrighted traveller to provide for his safety? Do they not know that he is the most consummate hypocrite that has appeared on the theatre of the French Revolution—a perfect Proteus, who can assume any shape, Religious or political, which may best promote his designs of fraud and deception? That, while several of his coadjutors have far surpassed him in military skill, he has, by his unrivalled excellence in imposture of every kind, rendered the Republic more service than any other individual, and reduced both his equals and his masters to the most abject dependence on his will. Or, are they still ignorant that, by his
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very last act in a subordinate station, when he probably had in contemplation that change by which he has been since advanced to the dictatorial rank of First Consul, he displayed his perfidious character in a new and most striking light, and gave a remarkable specimen of his talents for dissimulation in the character of a *peace-maker*? Should they still be uninformed upon this subject, let them learn that when, after his flight from Acre, he disgracefully abandoned his army in Egypt, though he did not dare to apprize his successor of his intended departure, he bequeathed to him a lesson in the art of treacherous negotiation—that he left behind him a letter, which he took care should not be delivered till he was out of reach, and in which he ordered Kleber to consent, in case of necessity, (a case which he clearly foresaw would happen) to the evacuation of Egypt; but at the same time to postpone the execution of that article—*till the period of a General Peace*, and, indeed, to delay the performance of any treaty which he might *conclude—till it should be ratified at home*. That he directed the General to enter upon the expected negotiation with a gross lie in his mouth respecting the past, as well as with the most perfidious intentions in regard to the future. “*Enter then*” (says he) “*upon negotiation—adhere strenuously and constantly to the assertion which I have advanced, that France never had the least idea of taking Egypt from the Grand Signior.*” That, in the same letter, he openly displayed his perfidious soul, in all its deformity, and unblushingly acknowledged the falsehood of the above assertion, by insisting, with great emphasis, on the importance of Egypt to France, “*while the Turkish empire, menaced with ruin on every side, was crumbling to pieces;*”—by giving directions to send five or six hundred Mamelukes to France, in the hope that “*when they should have contemplated, for a year or two, the grandeur of that nation, they might return to Egypt, and prove so many parti-*”

“*zans;*”—

"zans;" and by concluding with a pathetic declaration, that he "*abandoned Egypt with the deepest regret,*" and with expressions of the most anxious solicitude for "*the consolidation of the magnificent establishment,*" "*the foundation of which had been so recently laid.*" That, lastly, in the same stile of gross duplicity and absolute falsehood, he himself assured the Grand Vizier, in a letter to that minister, that France had "never entertained an idea of taking Egypt out of the hands of the Sublime Porte."

But all this was previous to his regeneration. He had not yet received the reward of all his crimes—the Crown of Republican France, which, though little calculated to inspire repentance, has, it seems, wrought in him a thorough reformation; which has even brought back to the bosom of the Roman Church this bitter enemy of all Religion, who has sought alike the destruction of the Tiara and the Turban, of the Cross and the Crescent. Still, however, until his amendment can be evidenced by time, until it can be established by better proofs than have hitherto appeared, it may be prudent not to trust him too far, but rather to suppose it possible that he may return again to his former courses, and even that, in his new character of justice, moderation, and humanity, he may be acting with his accustomed simulation. This caution may be the more proper, because in the most essential points—in the extent of his ambition, in his conduct towards other states, and in the terms on which, with all his impatience for peace, he is willing to put an end to the calamities of war, nothing like justice or moderation is to be found. He shews no inclination to restore the spoils which the Republic, partly by his aid, has taken from other countries, to redress any of the numerous wrongs which she has committed, to reinstate the Governments which she has subverted in their lawful rights, or to remember that her conquests exhibit only so many violations of the principle, to which she has pledged herself in the most solemn manner—a renunciation of all conquest.

quest. In these respects, his justice is altogether a "blank chapter." Nor is his moderation more conspicuous. The crown and territories of ancient France, immense as such an acquisition would be for such an upstart, are not nearly sufficient to gratify his ambition. It is not enough for him to rank, on equal terms, with the lawful sovereigns of Europe, and to vie with monarchs, who derive their title from the most ancient and venerable stocks of royal lineage. It would not satisfy this mushroom tyrant to wield the sceptre of Henry IVth; to see the representatives of all the crowned heads in Christendom, bowing before his Jacobin Majesty, upon the sacred ashes of the murdered Louis; and to send his Regicide Ambassadors to Foreign Courts, their hands still reeking with the royal blood of France. All this is vastly inadequate to the views of his aspiring soul. His throne must be erected on the ruins, not merely of the House of Bourbon, but of half the lawful Governments of Europe. His dominions must exceed in extent those of every Sovereign since the reign of Charlemagne. He must be complimented, at his inauguration, with the sacrifice of the balance of power. Other monarchs, if not, like the King of Spain, reduced to a proconsular station, must reign only by his sufferance. He must, in short, be Lord of the Destinies of Europe. Such are the least pretensions of a man, who, if his crimes had not been rewarded with unheard of success, would have been the scorn even of those persons, who are ready to prostrate themselves before his infamous greatness.

It may sometimes seem difficult to form a just judgment of the professions, by which Belligerent Powers endeavour to obtain credit for a pacific disposition. The following rule, however, may be considered as affording an infallible criterion of the sincerity of such professions, viz. that no Power can be sincerely

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desirous of Peace who insists on terms to which his adversary cannot accede without danger or disgrace. If this rule be applied to Buonaparte, what becomes of his pacific professions? Were ever terms so insolent, humiliating and injurious, as those which he makes his *sine qua non* of peace with the Emperor of Germany? How degraded must that monarch appear, how perilous would be his situation, and that of the German Empire, if he accepted of such terms? And yet the man whose demands are so exorbitant, whose pretensions are so unjust, who obstinately refuses to make Peace, except on terms which would involve the certain ruin of the German Empire, and of the Italian States, affects an inexpressible impatience for Peace, and presents himself to the world as the High Priest of the Temple of Concord. The truth is, that he is well acquainted with human nature. He knows that when a much desired good is placed in view, the characteristic of man is credulity. This is, indeed, the grand secret of all successful imposture. The French Revolutionists first lulled mankind into confidence and ideal security, they even obtained advocates and partisans, by proclaiming a love of peace, and a renunciation of conquest. Nay, when by their conduct they gave the lie to their professions—while they were covering the earth with carnage, they still found their account in making a constant boast of their pacific disposition. This, too, is the grand artifice of the First Consul, who, by the Syren sound of the word Peace, finds it possible to make numbers forget how often that word, in his mouth, has been fatal to the very existence of nations! Still, however, he finds the charm unbroken. And although he does not, either by his words or his actions, shew that he is disposed to suffer Europe to return to such a balanced State, as would favour a hope of secure or lasting peace, he never utters the fascinating word but it is re-echoed by thousands of mouths, and caught again by ten thousands of ears, with as much

much avidity as if it had never been used for the purpose of deception. Thus multitudes, notwithstanding the manifest absurdity, and the frequent detection of his artifices, are disposed to form their opinion of his real character and views, from the superficial professions with which he endeavours to gloss over his unbounded ambition, or from his artful conduct in those subordinate respects, which involve no sacrifice of power, no renunciation of principle. It may be well for such persons to consider that, supposing him still to pursue the same destructive projects, as he undoubtedly had in view before his advancement to the seat of empire, the most ordinary policy would prescribe those very measures, which are most relied on in proof of his pacific and orderly disposition: for it is thus alone that he can hope to stifle the alarm which he has so long inspired, and to prevail on Europe, for the sake of a nominal peace, to release to him, in full sovereignty, the conquests of the Republic. Therefore it is that he finds it expedient to assume the title of Grand Pacificator, and to affect an extraordinary solicitude for peace, though he is not willing to make a single sacrifice to obtain this object of his most *ardent* wishes. Therefore it is that he prudently endeavours, by an occasional display of humanity, to blunt the horror which his previous conduct has inspired. Therefore it is that he seeks to obliterate the remembrance of his shocking impieties, by sometimes invoking "the Eternal," whom he has so grossly blasphemed; and by even affecting such a zeal for that Religion, which he endeavoured to overthrow in Italy, and which he openly renounced in Egypt, as to issue his anathemas against the "heretical English." The effect of such artifices upon many persons who a little time since beheld him with terror, is an unequivocal proof of the depth of his policy, and exhibits, it may justly be feared, an awful symptom of approaching ruin.

But notwithstanding all his skill in the art of dissimulation, his conduct still affords direct evidence of

the unchanged and unchangeable malignity of his views—that evidence by which Providence has put it into the power of vigilance and discernment to detect fraud and hypocrisy, by decreeing that uniform consistency should be the exclusive attribute of sincerity and truth. For, much as it is his interest to lull suspicion, and to calm apprehension, it is out of his power entirely to conceal the cloven foot. The force of occurrences, co-operating with that of inveterate habit and implacable malice, compels him occasionally to drop the mask, and to display his well-known Jacobinical features. Through the veil which he has assumed, his native character is sometimes manifest. Since the period from which his advocates date his wonderful transformation, from the most zealous patron of anarchy to a sincere friend of social order, he has exhibited strong symptoms of persevering enmity to regular government, and of undiminished attachment to the revolutionary system. Considering, indeed, the situation in which he is placed, and the necessity he is under of disguising his real sentiments and views, the most trifling symptoms of the above kind would be “confirmation strong” that his heart is as full of mischief and malignity as ever. What then must be the effect, on every mind that is not absolutely shut against conviction, of that Proclamation which he addressed to the citizens of St. Domingo, immediately upon his assumption of the reins of Government, and in which, after declaring that *the sacred principles of the liberty and equality of the blacks should never experience any attack or modification*, he thus exclaims on the benefits which they had derived from the French Revolution:—“Brave negroes, remember that the French people have alone acknowledged your liberty, and the equality of your right.” Who does not perceive, in such an address, the genuine strains of Jacobin eloquence? Who does not see that the man who could use such language, is ready, whenever it may suit his purpose, to be still more explicit, and to cry, Brave Negroes, murder the Whites—Poor, mur-

murder the rich—People, murder your Tyrant!—Who, in short, does not see, from this single specimen, that Buonaparte has undergone no other change than that of a Jacobin General transformed into a Jacobin Consul? If further proof could be wanting of the preservation of Jacobin identity, through all the forms of revolutionary transmigration, the British people may find one which comes nearer to themselves; when, in alluding to the scarcity which, at the commencement of the present year, existed in this country, the First Consul, in his official journal, thus pointed out to them how they might obtain relief:—"Let the English "people" (says this respecter of lawful authority) "rise "against their oppressive Government, and they will "find in the French deliverers and friends."

But as prosperity is the truest test of the real characters of men, the actual disposition of Buonaparte may be best known from his conduct as a successful warrior. For, unfortunately for mankind, he has had an opportunity, since his elevation, of displaying himself in that character. He has again subdued the North of Italy, and recovered extensive territories which had been wrested from the Republican grasp. His armies have penetrated in the heart of Germany, and again threatened the hereditary dominions of the House of Austria. But no sooner does success attend his arms, than he resumes his former character of Revolutionary Hero. He transports us back in an instant to the times of Robespierre and the Directory, or, which is in effect the same thing, to the period of his own career as a Revolutionary Chieftain. His armies maintain their pristine character of free-booters, their course is marked by depredation and ravage; and they suck the hearts blood of every country in which they can once gain a footing. His conquests, instead of being treated according to the laws of war, are revolutionized, disorganized and re-affiliated—his sword is still a revolutionary wand, and at its touch the Cisalpine Republic rises once more to view, as it

were by enchantment, and all Lombardy is, in a moment, again fast bound by those spells, from which it had been liberated by the invincible arm of Suwarrow. The Tree of Liberty is still his standard, and no sooner was he again triumphant in the North of Italy, than it was again planted at Milan. Even his proclamations are formed upon the Jacobin model. He comes, as formerly, to subject and enslave, with liberty and independence in his mouth. He announces his approach, not as an enemy and a conqueror, but as a friend, as a deliverer from oppression, as a restorer to freedom. He re-echoes those hacknied promises to respect both Religious and civil rights, which were heretofore the precursors of his most outrageous acts of pillage and cruelty; and he violates them in the same manner as formerly! Who that reads the following proclamations, which were issued during his short but successful expedition into Italy, can distinguish between a First Consul and the Generalissimo of a Jacobin Republic?

Proclamation of General Moncey to the inhabitants of the Cantons of Lugano and Bellinzona.

“ Head-quarters, Althorff, May 24, 1800

“ The victorious troops of the French Republic are now entering into your territory, not for the purpose of diffusing the horrors and desolation of war, but to restore you to your Government, to yourselves, and to expel the troops of the House of Austria, which by its constant refusal to make peace, prolongs both your misfortunes and your want of independence.

“ Property, persons, morality, customs, and religion shall be respected.

“ I repeat it, inhabitants of the Helvetic Italian Cantons, we enter your country only as friends, as your allies and defenders.”

Signed MONCEY.

Proclamation of General Buonaparte.

"Soldiers, Milan, June 6,
 "One of our departments was in the power of the enemy, and the whole of the South was in a state of consternation. The greatest part of the Ligurian people, one of the steadiest allies of the Republic, was invaded.

"The Cisalpine Republic, annihilated in the last campaign, was become the sport of *the ridiculous Feudal System*." (What a fund for reflection is contained in this single expression! How significant is it of a decided and unalterable preference of the Revolutionary over the ancient system of Government and Society!) "You will restore to the people of Genoa their liberty and independence; and they shall be forever released from their eternal enemies."

"Millions of men, *as you are daily witnesses*, offer you their thanks."

The remaining passage in this proclamation will be of peculiar utility to Mr. Sheridan. That Gentleman is reported to have boasted in Parliament of the generosity of his Hero, in admitting, after the battle of Marengo, the Austrian army to a convention, and, indeed, in suffering it to escape. A perusal of the following extract from the General's Proclamation, only eight days before the battle, will perhaps convince Mr. S. that the Austrian army was not indebted for its safety to the generosity of Buonaparte, but that, if its destruction had depended upon him, it would never have gained the line of the Mincio. The public too will have an opportunity of judging how far the opinions of the Gentlemen of Opposition, respecting men and things, are founded upon the evidence of facts.

"But shall it be said that the territory of France has been violated with impunity? Will you allow

the army, which has carried consternation into your families—to *return to its home*? You fly to arms; well then, advance upon the foe, *oppose his retreat*, tear from his brow those laurels with which he has adorned it, and thus prove to mankind that *the curse of destiny* hangs over the dotards, who have dared to pollute the territory of the Great Nation. The result of our efforts shall be glory without stain, and a lasting peace.”

Signed BUONAPARTE, First Consul.

Who can peruse these proclamations without exclaiming

“ *Naturam expelles furcâ, tamen usque recurret* ?* ”

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* If it were possible for any one still to doubt that Buonaparte, the First Consul, is the same man as Buonaparte the Revolutionary General, or that Republican France is as destitute of honour, justice, and good faith, under his Government, as she was under that of the Directory, such doubts will surely be removed by the late most flagrant, perfidious, and flagitious infraction of the armistice in Italy, by the invasion of Tuscany, the neutrality of which they had expressly guaranteed, and the plunder of Florence and Leghorn. To expatiate upon these acts would be useless, because, unless a sense of right and wrong be totally extinguished in the human breast, the bare recital of the facts must excite sentiments of horror and indignation, which no words can express. But, in order to form a just estimate of the recent claims of the First Consul to universal confidence, it is worth while to compare this most atrocious outrage on the Law of Nations, and on the rights of neutrality, this glaring violation of a solemn and express convention, with the pretended conscientiousness of the present ruler of France, when a little while since, in his official paper, the *Moniteur*, he made a boast that a body of French troops, marching to Lucca, had made a circuit of 60 miles, because they should not violate the armistice, by setting their feet on Tuscan ground! About the time that this atrocious outrage was perpetrating in Italy, Germany was the witness of one not less abominable in the demolition of its three great bulwarks, Ulm, Philippsburg and Ingolstadt, which had been delivered into the hands of the First Consul on the express condition that they should be restored at a peace, and which, pending the armistice, and in direct violation of his engagement, he ordered to be so completely dismantled that they may not hereafter be re-constructed as fortresses!!! Will any man now venture to stand up as the advocate of Buonaparte, or presume to say that any confidence whatever can be placed in his engagement? If, when he is endeavouring to gain credit for a pacific dis-

It will easily be conceived that the Revolutionary agents, the tools of Jacobinism, which abound in all countries, are not more backward than heretofore, in seconding the benevolent efforts of the French Military Chiefs to restore freedom and independence to the countries which are so unfortunate as to be the sport of the *ridiculous Feudal System*. Even before the victory of Marengo had inspired full confidence in the result of the campaign, some of these base and servile miscreants, under the well known title of a Provisional Government, anticipated, at Milan, the Jacobin jargon of their new Master, which they denominated "the generous sentiments of the First Consul of the First Nation"—"the invincible Nation"—and proclaimed "The Cisalpine Republic" to be "recognized as a free independent Nation"—adding the usual cant of "the free exercise of Religion and respect to persons and property"—and referring to their "preliminary dispositions," in proof that "the French Armies and the Hero who led them had no other object than to bring back freedom and independence to their country." Forgetting, however, that the only way to bring back freedom and independence to that country would be to restore it to that lawful Sovereign, from whom it had been violently and unjustly torn, and to whom its inhabitants are attached by indissoluble ties of affection and duty.

Can further proof be wanting, that (whatever measures the First Consul may think proper to adopt, in order to strengthen his popularity at home, and to

position, he violates so grossly the terms of a truce, what regard can he be expected to pay to the conditions of a treaty of peace; particularly if that treaty, by ratifying his exorbitant pretensions, should leave the independence of Europe no other security than his honour and fidelity?

The great scene of perfidy which he has recently displayed in Tuscany, contains an underplot, which is perfectly congenial, both with the stile and character of the piece, and with the general system of French Revolutionary invasion. On entering, by his armies, this unfortunate country, he promised, as usual, security of property. This promise he has performed by imposing heavy contributions on Florence and Leghorn. His plunder of British property, in the latter city, was so perfectly of course, as scarcely to require notice.

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promote a belief, both at home and abroad, that he has renounced Jacobinism,) his foreign system is altogether Revolutionary and Jacobinical? Can further evidence be wanted to convince even the most incredulous, that he will adhere to this system in the teeth of any engagements which he may contract, in the name of peace? Nay, that the immense power which he would consolidate in his own person by a peace, which should sacrifice to him the equilibrium of Europe, would but afford him fresh inducements to pursue, as well as ample means to realize his projects of general subversion? If a doubt can still remain on these questions, let it be remembered that necessity would impel him to act in such a manner. It requires but little sagacity to discover that nothing can be so dangerous to him as a state of inactive tranquillity. As France is still destitute of those ties which can alone hold society together in a state of tranquillity, he will find, like his Revolutionary predecessors, that external hostilities can afford the only possible relief from intestine commotions. Besides, whenever his subjects have no foreign war, or, which is equally interesting to them, no schemes of Revolutionary acquisition to fix their restless minds, they will be disposed impertinently to pry into his title, which would

“ Hang loose about him, like a giant’s robe

“ Upon a dwarfish thief.”

They will be apt to ponder upon so strange a phenomenon as that of a native of Corsica, pretending to exercise over them a far more despotic authority, than was ever claimed by their natural and lawful Sovereigns.—The very force, which is necessary to convince them of his right to rule over them, would be dangerous to himself, if not provided with some foreign occupation—nay, his armies would, in case of a general peace, prove his most formidable enemy, because they would be then entitled to the long promised reward of a
milliard

milliard of livres* ; a reward which his coffers are far from enabling him to bestow, and which he would not dare to refuse. If, therefore, it were as true as it has been demonstrated to be false, that he has undergone a miraculous change in his disposition, and that he really pants for repose, he would be impelled by indispensable necessity, and by the imperious motive of self-preservation, to maintain the character in which alone he has hitherto appeared—that of a restless and unwearied disturber of the peace, order, and happiness of the world. Indeed, at the very moment that he is dictating a Continental peace, he is preparing for its violation, and paving the way for his future incursions into the heart of Italy and of Germany, by demolishing the fortresses which form their chief bulwarks against an invading enemy.

But if all other motives were insufficient to induce the First Consul still to pursue his favourite object, the subversion of all lawful authority, he would be left without a choice by the commanding influence of the French Revolution, of which, though the tyrant of France, he is but the servile instrument, and which will continue to be, as it has hitherto been, more powerful than its agents. To check the force of this tremendous machine, exceeds the strength of his arm, and the extent of his courage. By following its impulse he has attained his present greatness. As its intrepid director he may still be irresistible. But the moment he attempts to stop, or even to controul its movements, he will be hurled into that abyss, in which so many of his predecessors lie buried. Of the magnitude of the danger to which this dread engine of destruction, under such guidance, must expose the whole civilized world, some idea may be formed, if we consider how large a portion of the social fabric it has already laid in ruins, and how instantaneously it convulsed the whole edifice to its deepest foundations.

* Upwards of forty millions sterling.

Those

Those Powers who hope to restrain its fury, and to shackle its force, by the silken bands of peace, will rue their error like the affrighted Philistines, when Sampson brake the cords with which he had been bound, "as a thread of tow is broken when it toucheth the fire."

Without insisting, however, on the great and extraordinary perils which are to be apprehended from the overwhelming influence of the Revolution, or from the personal character of Buonaparte, the danger inseparable from the present aggrandizement of France, under any system of Government, must be sufficiently obvious to fill with alarm every breast, which feels the smallest solicitude for the liberties and independence of Europe. Can it be necessary to enquire into the internal condition of that most ambitious country, when she not only has extended her dominions to the Alps and the Rhine, which she asserts to be her natural boundaries, but also holds in absolute subjection, under the hypocritical title of independent Republics, immense territories, which are not comprised even within those limits? It is obvious that the Balance of Power would be destroyed if any one State, and more particularly so potent and ambitious a one, should become so formidable, that no other Continental State would be able to encounter her singly. But if France, whether Monarchical or Republican, were to acquire, by a general Peace, a legal title to her present acquisitions, or even to one half of them, what Continental Power would dare to look her in the face? What Power would venture, by giving her offence, to incur the risk, (which seems to be already the great object of general dread,) of becoming her first victim? Who, particularly after the experience of the last few years, would have any confidence in alliances or confederacies, to preserve the remaining liberties of mankind? If the Statesmen of former times, if the Heroes who, during so many centuries, have fought and bled in defence of the Balance of Power, were able to take a view of what is now passing on the great Theatre,

tre on which they acted such brilliant parts, with what astonishment and indignation would they see the Powers of Europe, instead of uniting, with a fixed determination to restore the ancient and tried basis of general security, haggling and truckling to obtain some abatement of the exorbitant pretensions of their common foe! How eagerly would the venerable shades return from such a scene to their enviable state of insensibility and oblivion! Read, O infatuated Powers! the history of the Wars which have been waged to prevent *any* extension of the limits of France—to restrain her from acquiring even a preponderance in the scale of Europe. See the deliberate wisdom of ages establishing it as an immutable principle of European policy, that the Gallic Power, in its most circumscribed state, is highly dangerous to the general safety, and that unceasing vigilance is indispensably necessary to guard against the encroaching spirit of Gallic ambition. Say then, will you suffer France, by the very terms of a general Peace, to become the Dictator of Europe? Will you formally surrender into her hands the sceptre of universal Dominion? Is your love of Peace so ardent, and your impatience for it so eager, as to induce you to purchase it at the price of your independence? Or if your spirit be so debased, as to submit to any conditions for the sake of repose, are you so besotted; has fear so totally bereaved you of understanding, that you can expect repose to be the fruit of dastardly concession; at least, so long as you have any left to concede? If you hope, by the magnitude of your sacrifices, to satiate the ambition of your aspiring neighbour, “who enlargeth her desire as hell, and as death cannot be satisfied, but gathereth unto her all nations, and heapeth unto her all people”—if you expect by submission to inspire her with a desire for the tranquil enjoyment of her vast possessions—if you think by a compliance with her utmost demands to take from her even the shadow of a pretext for further molestation—suffer yourselves to be instructed by De Witt, whose maxim it was, that “no independent
“ Ge-

" Government should yield to another *any* evident point of reason or equity, and that all such concessions, *far from preventing War, serve to no other purpose than to provoke fresh claims and insults.*" If there be any truth in this maxim, the sacrifices which you may be disposed to make, in order to obtain peace, will be only the causes of a new War; unless by their enormous extent they should put it out of your power to engage in another contest, and should induce you to submit, without a struggle, to be formally enslaved, and, like the Spanish Monarchy, to kiss the chains which your pusillanimity had forged.

But whatever other Powers may do, shall Great Britain crouch at last to the overweening pride and insatiable ambition of France? Shall she renounce the sage and venerable councils to which she is indebted for her greatness, and consent to the destruction of that Balance of Power which she has so long, so honourably, and so successfully defended? Shall she do this while in the zenith of her glory? When not a foe dares to meet her triumphant Flag? When she has completely humbled the Naval power of her haughty rival? When she has enchained the Jacobinical Monster which reared his audacious crest against her matchless Constitution? When she has made the most distant nations witnesses of her triumphs? When she has crushed the perfidious tyrant of the East, who lent himself as the base instrument of Gallic vengeance against her Indian territories? And when, finally, by a close and well connected Union with her Sister Kingdom, she has, at length, consolidated her before divided strength into one harmonious and mighty Empire? Shall she descend from so high and commanding a station, to lay the independence of Europe, as well as her own honour and safety, at the feet of her ancient and implacable enemy, and to seek for inglorious repose in the lap of insecure and treacherous peace? Before she can be brought thus to blast her laurels and ensure her ruin, the Jacobins, whom she harbours
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in her bosom, must triumph over the laws by which they are fast bound, and obtain a complete ascendancy. They must (like the Jacobins in France; who prepared and accomplished the ruin of the Gallic Monarchy) overawe her Senate and compose her Councils. They must surround her Throne and administer its affairs. Except among these agents of anarchy and destruction, where could a Minister be found to sign a treaty which should revoke all ancient treaties, annul the law of Nations, renounce the political equilibrium, and recognize the right of France to universal dominion? Can it be thought that a son of the Great Chatham would be a party to this deed of infamy? Or would Mr. Fox himself suffer his name to appear in so foul a transaction? In the desperation of hopeless party, the latter may, indeed, endeavour to drive Ministers to the adoption of measures which would ensure the speedy downfall of any Minister, and in the disgrace of a rival he may find consolation for the ruin of his country. But he would cut off his right-hand rather than suffer it to be subscribed to such a Peace as that which, in the name of his indignant country, he presumes to demand from his Majesty's present Ministers*. Nay, is there a man in whose veins one drop

* Although it must be admitted that Mr. Fox would not, in any case, as Minister, conclude a Peace on such terms as he seems desirous of imposing on the present Administration, yet a little reflection will shew that he, of all men, would be the least likely to obtain better conditions. While the Gentlemen of Opposition are endeavouring to persuade the public that their nomination to office is a necessary step to put an end to the calamities of War, it seems to escape their recollection, (but it will not escape that of any other persons,) that they would labour under peculiar disadvantages in negotiating with the French Republic. What kind of pacification could be hoped for from men, who consider the country for which they would have to treat, as the aggressor in the War? Who have constantly represented that country, (falsely, indeed, but that circumstance would not avail them), as acting in the most injurious manner towards France, as having, during the whole contest, been heaping upon her provocations and insults so outrageous as to produce all her animosity and injustice against other States? What terms of Peace could such persons expect to procure, or even have the conscience to demand? It would not boot them to say that it was their opponents who had offended, or to urge their own services in favour of the enemy. He would reply that, according to their own admissions, the British Government had provoked the War, and thereby occasioned the

drop of British blood, uncontaminated by the *virus* of Jacobinism, continues still to flow, who would give his consent to such a Peace? Is there one who would suffer the venerable Genius of Britain to be yoked to the triumphal Car of Gallic Atheism and Anarchy? No, in spite of all the threats of an enraged enemy—in spite of all the clamour of factious demagogues—the people of this country will never submit to the sacrifice of that honour, which they have so long and so gallantly maintained; they will never consent to feed the pride and ambition of their “*inveterate and unalterable political enemy*,” they will never agree to give up that general security, without which they know that no security can any where exist. Confiding in the justice of their cause, in the firmness and magnanimity of their Sovereign, and, above all, in the favour of Providence, which has hitherto been their *sure rock of defence*, they will still stand in the breach, and contend manfully for the preservation of that Great European Commonwealth, of which they form a part, and the dissolution of which it is impossible they should long survive. Such are their pretensions—such their objects in the War—such the terms on which alone they will treat for Peace.

In the mean time it should be remembered, that a contest like the present requires prudence and circum-

the immense losses he had sustained in men, in ships, and in money—that the British Government had loaded him with injuries for which he must have ample reparation—and he would be entitled to quote against themselves their own frequent and numerous declarations, to prove, not only the justice of his claim, but that they were fully and irrevocably pledged to admit it, to whatever extent it might be carried. To this charge against the British Government, which it would be out of *their* power to repel, or even to meet, he would add that the British people had also incurred his just indignation by strenuously supporting their Government; a charge which would also be supported out of the mouth of the Gentlemen in Opposition. And as to the services rendered him by those Gentlemen, he would urge, not only that they had not been effectual, but that they were to be considered as the mere operations of a party, actuated by no principle, labouring in their vocation, and employing the means which seemed to them best calculated to produce the removal of an administration, whose place they were desirous to fill.

spection,

speculation, as well as courage and firmness. The subtle foe is always endeavouring to circumvent by fraud those whom he cannot hope to subject by force. If he find it impossible to compel his adversaries to sacrifice, in his favour, all political equilibrium, he will tempt them, at least, to abandon that just, natural and well-tryed Balance of Power, by which the independence of Europe has been so long preserved, and to join with him in the establishment of some other system, founded upon the principle of a new arrangement of territory. To recommend this dangerous experiment, he will offer to gratify their cupidity at the expence, not of his own ambition, but of those States which are too weak to remonstrate against injustice. He will flatter the leading Powers, that they may thus equiponderate with him; and if they happen to cast a longing eye on some nook or corner which may be wanting to complete the ring-fence of their dominions—some Naboth's vineyard, which has hitherto been protected by the wise and ancient system of public law, and of mutual jealousy—doubtless he will indulge them in so reasonable a wish, provided it do not interfere with his great and magnificent designs. To judge from appearances, there is considerable danger of their being drawn into this snare of experimental equipoise. An idea is gone forth and too generally prevails, that a total, or at least a very great change must necessarily take place in the system of Europe. And the Statesmen of the day, if Statesmen they can be called, instead of endeavouring to prevent a misfortune, the extent and effects of which are infinitely beyond their powers of calculation, think it wisdom to yield to what their indolence terms necessity, and they busily employ themselves, not in defence of the old, but in speculations upon the new order of things. Perhaps, too, they are captivated by the idea of novelty, (ever fascinating to the human mind,) and seduced by the vanity of being concerned in the erection of, what they may think, a grand edifice of Political Power. If they yield to these

impulses, they will discover their folly when it shall be past remedy. They will be convinced that there could be no safety in departing from the principles, on which experience had formed that nice and delicate, yet strong and durable system, called the Balance of Power—that no new fangled scheme of barriers and counterpoises can have that solidity, which the ancient one possessed, and chiefly, perhaps, because it was ancient—that while, on the one hand, their antagonist knows how to retain with a firm and tenacious grasp, a grasp which crushes all power of resistance, whatever he can once seize, they will be united by a very feeble and precarious tie to their new possessions—that while the weight of Republican despotism is scarcely to be thrown off by any effort, authority can only, by slow degrees, strike its roots into a strange soil.—In short, they will find that all plans of fresh partition and distribution are favourable solely to the Revolutionary system, and that the bright meteor, which they mistook for a well-poised balance in the political heavens, was only a *ignis fatuus*, by which the great enemy of social order endeavoured to lead all civilized States, into the bottomless gulph of anarchy and perdition.

Another artifice employed by the Rulers of France, to divert the attention of Foreign Powers from their own ambition and aggrandizement, is to hold out Great Britain as an object of jealousy and dread, on account of her Commercial greatness, her Colonial acquisitions during the present War, and her Naval superiority. A moment's consideration will surely suffice to place, in its proper light, this insidious attempt to divide those whom a perfect identity of interests ought to unite by the closest ties.

Other States must have very imperfect notions of the nature of commerce, if they view with jealousy the Commercial prosperity of Great Britain. Such prosperity, instead of being prejudicial, is beneficial to them, as it tends to excite their emulation, as it sets them an example of successful industry, and as it stimulates them to improve their natural advantages,
that

that they may have commodities to give in exchange for those, which the activity, ingenuity and enterprize of their neighbour enable her to export. Moreover, as the great and extensive commerce of Great Britain is the fair and honest reward of her industry and good faith, it operates as a general benefit, by holding forth the strongest inducement to the cultivation of qualities, so essential to the individual welfare and the common security of Nations. As to her Colonial acquisitions, it might easily be shewn that they would afford no just cause for alarm to other Powers, even if she were to insist, as in justice she might, on retaining them all, in satisfaction for the unjust attack which has been made on her, and for the immense debt which she has incurred, in the defence of all Europe. For they would not, like the continental acquisitions of France, destroy, nor even endanger the Balance of Power—they would not enable her to invade the territories of other States—they would only put it in her power to furnish those States with a larger proportion of the articles, of which they stand in need, and to pay for which they must, as has been already observed, exert their industry, and improve their natural advantages. But she has shewn herself disposed to consider these valuable acquisitions, with an exception only of such of them as are necessary for the security of her own trade and possessions, as a sacrifice in the general cause, and as a compensation for the re-establishment of the Balance of Power on the Continent. What better proof can she give of her disinterested and inviolable attachment to the welfare and security of Europe?

In regard to the Naval superiority of Great Britain, instead of affording cause to other nations for jealousy, or for dread, it is, at this time particularly, a just subject for exultation to the whole civilized world. It should be remembered, indeed, that Naval Power is not, like territorial dominion, susceptible of an equilibrium. At all times some one State has possessed a decided superiority at Sea. But this is not, *in itself,*

injurious to other Powers. It does not enable the State possessing it to destroy the independence of other States. It does not furnish armies to march from one end of the Continent to the other. Neither is it prejudicial to the general freedom of commerce. For the resources and prosperity of a great Naval Power depend upon the security of the rights of commerce, as defined by the laws of Nations, and upon a general confidence in its inviolable respect to those rights. It is, therefore, its interest to afford them protection; and if it were to abuse its power by endeavouring to sacrifice them to an apparent or momentary interest, the spell of its prosperity would be broken, and the whole edifice of its grandeur would crumble into dust*.

But though the Naval superiority of an insular State, like Great Britain, be fraught with no danger to the Balance of Power, or to the general independence of Nations, nothing can be more dangerous than such a superiority, when united to a Continental preponderance. If France were at any time to become mistress of the seas, the liberties of Europe would instantly vanish. Where, indeed, would now have been those liberties, if, in the present War, the Navy of Great Britain had not acquired a degree of pre-eminence, which it never before possessed? Where would even have been the commerce of those very nations, which are called upon to view with jealousy the British Fleets, if it had not been protected by those Fleets against the Gallic Freebooter, who has violated the rights of every Neutral Nation, who has endeavoured to tram-

* At this moment Great Britain is affording an essential protection to the rights of commercial States by asserting the general principle that a Belligerent Power is entitled to search the vessels of Neutral Powers, that they may not furnish the enemy with the means of prolonging the War—a principle, without which neither the rights of neutrality, nor the laws of War would be of much value; and the dereliction of which would annihilate the public law of Europe, and prove fatal, not only to the existence of this country as a Maritime Power, but to the essential and permanent interests of those very States, which are so short-sighted as to be disposed to sacrifice it for the sake of a momentary advantage.

ple upon all law, who has totally disregarded the obligation of treaties, and who has sought to subvert the foundations of commercial, as well as of political security? Nay, what greater general calamity can be conceived, than for the navy of Revolutionary France to be freed from the restraints, which are imposed on it by that of Great Britain? What hope would remain for Europe, if French Republican insolence, by being released from the chastisement of the British flag, were to domineer by sea as it does by land?

Of such importance, to the whole civilized world, is the Naval superiority of Great Britain. To that superiority it is owing that there is yet an independent country in Europe—that there is yet any security for persons and property: and upon that superiority it still depends, whether, what is yet left of lawful Government and social order, shall be preserved from the insatiable rapacity and destructive ambition of France*.

It is true, the situation of Great Britain is still inexpressibly arduous; the difficulties with which she has still to cope are many and great; but she is able to face, and, with the blessing of Providence, to surmount them all, provided she be true to herself—provided she continue to exhibit the glorious spectacle of a loyal and dutiful people, adhering stedfastly to their Sovereign in a moment of trial and danger, and, by strengthening the hands of his Government, assisting him to maintain the contest, with undiminished energy, until he may be able to bring it to a safe and honourable conclusion. But if, on the contrary, they were to listen to the advice of those persons, who, fearing neither God nor man, labour incessantly to produce divisions

* It is but justice to Mr. Sheridan to observe, that upon all questions in which the British Navy is concerned, he generally gives vent to British feelings. On other subjects, as appears in a former part of this work, his feelings seem at times to be French. This inconsistency cannot be otherwise accounted for than by supposing that in the former case the feelings he expresses are his own, but that in the latter they are borrowed from his associates.

among them, when their union is so necessary—who seek, by popular clamour and commotion, to drive their Sovereign to part with Ministers in whom, after long experience, both he and his Parliament and his people repose their confidence—then, indeed, would they soon find their last hope to vanish—then would the sun of Britain soon sink into the shades of universal night. How could the most skilful pilot be expected to preserve the vessel through the severest storm, ever produced by conflicting elements, if the crew, instead of aiding him to the utmost of their power—instead of co-operating, in their respective stations, and in due subordination, were to give way to their impatience at the duration of the tempest—if they were to rise against their officers, because the hurricane does not abate, because the horizon does not brighten—if, laying aside their accustomed discipline, they were to divide into parties and cabals respecting the management of the vessel? Instead of ever reaching the desired port, the ship would be inevitably lost, and the infatuated mariners would find, in a watery grave, the recompense of their folly and their crime.

The British people are daily exhorted to act a part no less foolish and criminal. They are advised to slacken their vigour, and to relax in their duty, because the storm still rages with undiminished fury—because they cannot yet get sight of port. They are advised to desert their Sovereign, because he cannot yet procure for them the constant object of all his endeavours, a safe and honourable Peace. They are advised to abandon and betray their Government, which has hitherto conducted them, with safety and honour, through the most arduous contest in which they have ever been engaged;—a contest, in which they have had to struggle with every species of difficulty, foreign and domestic—with the fickleness, pusillanimity, and, in some instances, the treachery of Allies—with oc-
casion

casual scarcity, arising from inclement seasons*—with an enemy who has set at nought every principle of honour and good faith, and every rule which was either prescribed by morality, or established by the universal consent of civilized nations—and with a new and most dangerous spirit of insurrection denominated Jacobinism, which the French Revolution has excited in every country, and which, in this country, incredible as it may seem, has been encouraged and fostered by a *strange, uncouth, and unnatural alliance* with political party—a contest, in short, in which dangers of an unprecedented kind have assailed every existing Government, and exposed all civilized society to destruction—in the very beginning of which “the spirit of democracy was” every where “at its height”—in which “an agitation” on the subject of Government” was “every where” produced by “a great and mighty event”—by the overthrow of “a mighty fabric,” which “could not fall to the ground without a concussion which the whole world would feel†”—and in which “anarchy” from the bosom of France threatened” (and, indeed, disturbed) “the tranquillity of the universe‡.”

Such is the contest which Great Britain has sustained for nearly eight years, with a degree of glory that eclipses the brightest portions of her annals. In such

* One of the main artifices of Jacobinical faction, is to render the war unpopular and odious, and thereby to deprive it of patriotic support, by representing it as the cause of the present scarcity, and of the consequent high price of provisions. This statement has been so completely refuted * as to render any further exposure of its fallacy unnecessary. But if it were strictly true, what effect ought it to produce on the public mind? Should it not rouse our indignation to a higher pitch against the adversary, who, for the worst of purposes, and with a view to our destruction, compelled us, by an actual attack, to engage in the war? Every hardship which we suffer in such a war is only an additional consequence of the unjust aggression of France; and instead of being made a pretext for clamour or cavil against our Government, should only add fuel to our rage, and energy to our exertions, against our injurious and malignant foe, who is the primary cause of every hardship and every calamity which the war has been, or can be the means of producing.

* See Mr. Brand's publication on this subject.

† Mr. Erskine—see ante, page 25.—‡ Guerdon—see ante, p. 26

a contest has she stood foremost among the nations, seeking every where the hottest of the battle, and inspiring others to keep the field. And still, amid unnumbered difficulties, she displays the same glorious example. Should her efforts succeed, posterity will look upon her exploits with astonishment, admiration, and gratitude; and the name of Briton will be held in veneration to the end of time. Should she fail, she would still enjoy the consciousness of having done her duty—I had almost said, if that were possible in such a cause, more than her duty:—and while she found, from lamentable experience, that mortals cannot “command success,” she would possess the invaluable consolation of knowing—that SHE HAD DESERVED IT.

THE inexpressibly awful scenes which are now passing on the great theatre of political society, derive much additional solemnity from the consideration, that they distinguish the approach of one of those grand divisions of time, by which the Christian world computes its progress from the commencement to the completion of its best hopes. It is for irrational animals to pass from day to day, and from year to year, without reflection; but man, unless by an unpardonable abuse of his high privileges, he reduce himself below the brute creation, will find times and seasons, at which to make a solemn pause—to review attentively his past course—to examine, seriously and fully, his present situation—and to prepare, with all the advantages which such a survey can produce, for his future progress through the arduous and intricate path of life. To ensure the recurrence of these salutary investigations, he will consider certain periods as imposing upon him the duty of employing them in such a manner. The anniversary of his birth will

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remind him of the irretrievable loss of much inestimable time, and of many valuable opportunities; and it will suggest to him the necessity of improving, to a better purpose, the fleeting and uncertain remainder of his temporal existence. The commencement of a new year, according to general computation, in addition to those reflections which peculiarly regard each individual, will bring within his view the comprehensive concerns of society, the common, but most important interests of all, who are united by that dear and sacred connection, which is expressed by the emphatical and venerable term—one's country; a connection which combines, in one great tie, all the bands that unite man to man, and which, by the guardian and unceasing superintendence of Government, protects, and can alone secure, the invaluable blessings of social intercourse, in its most endearing as well as in its most distant forms. But a change of century is calculated to fill every considerate and feeling mind with emotions, which it is impossible to describe. Such a change scarcely an individual in existence has before witnessed, and scarcely an individual now alive will again behold. Such a change brings together, in one point of view, objects so vast, that the concerns which ordinarily engage our most anxious solicitude, dwindle, upon comparison, into almost total insignificance. Contemplating the lapse of centuries, the imagination views, at a single glance, the rise and fall of empires—the whirl, the violence, and ravages of Revolutions—the great and astonishing vicissitudes which mankind experience in their Religious, moral, and political state; it beholds, at one view, the succession of ages; it surveys the still higher, though less regular arrangement of æras; and it measures the duration of the world with as much familiarity as the span of human life. But it cannot stop here; it enters the obscure and boundless regions of space and eternity, and is compelled to confess, that objects which, just before, had reduced to comparative nothingness the most

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interesting scenes of human existence, are themselves but as dust in the balance, in comparison with what is still beyond. Then rushes into the mind the idea of HIM, who is the Author, the Governor, the Sovereign Disposer of all. But totally lost in the immensity of such a conception, to the formation of which, the meridian genius of a Newton is scarcely more adequate than the dawning reason of a child, the soul is inspired with that humility, which is the fostering nurse of every virtue—with that reverence and devotion, which become a state of absolute dependence on the Great Creator—and with the liveliest gratitude for the hopes, which it has been authorized to form, of a future extension of its intelligence, which shall enable it to contemplate, with understanding and delight, those sublime scenes that now infinitely exceed its powers of comprehension.

As the near approach of a new century has so powerful a tendency to excite the mind to reflection, it ought to be a season of great Religious and moral improvement. It might, indeed, be justly considered as a general calamity, if such a period were to pass unnoticed, except as a mere chronological occurrence. But never did a secular revolution call so loudly upon mankind to pause and reflect, as that which is now at hand. Never did a period of that denomination, or of any denomination, find the human race in such need of being roused and warned, as at this awful juncture. Never was the world in so calamitous or so perilous a state as at this moment. It is true, former ages have witnessed the fall of ancient and mighty empires. They have seen vast regions laid waste by the sword of ferocious conquerors, and nations, far remote from, and totally unknown to each other, reduced to one common yoke of debasing servitude. They have also beheld the ravaging fury of ruthless barbarians, who trampled upon the productions of art, extinguished the light of science, and replunged the world in the cheerless gloom of profound ignorance. But what was all this in comparison with the dan-

gers which now threaten—with the ruin which now impends? We have to deplore a convulsion, which has already laid low ancient and mighty empires, and which exposes all empires to subversion; but, what is infinitely worse, that convulsion has given birth to the fell monster Anarchy, who has already established his chaotic empire over one half of Europe, and who labours with, alas! a dreadful prospect [of success, to involve the human race in universal contention and endless disorders. We see the most sanguinary conquerors, spreading desolation far and wide, and reducing the most populous and extensive regions under their despotic yoke. But what a yoke! Not one which merely excludes the most distant hope of liberty, but which, while it enslaves, protects.—No: *their* dominion is that of the vulture, who preys upon the vitals of every victim in which he can once fix his merciless talons. They do not even exhaust their rage upon the physical existence of man; they endeavour to extirpate from his breast every Religious and moral principle, and to deprive him of the consolations of virtue, and of the hope of Heaven. It must be acknowledged, indeed, that these fiends in human shape do not declare war against the arts and sciences; on the contrary, they strain every faculty of the human mind to its greatest degree of practical exertion; they explore, with indefatigable research, all the secrets of nature, and carry every invention of ingenuity, and every refinement of civilization, to the utmost pitch of improvement. But these attainments serve only to render them a more grievous scourge to humanity. The cultivation of their talents, the extent of their knowledge, their advancements in science, only enable them the better to pursue their projects of destruction, more effectually to attack Religion, Government, and Social Order, and to establish more firmly their horrid sway of impiety and vice. If the rude tribes, whom we have been accustomed to denominate barbarians, had not, in their state of uncorrupted simplicity, possessed some virtues, the want of which is
justly

justly lamented in the most polished society; if they had been distinguished only by that fierce and ferocious resentment of injuries, which rendered them so dreadful to their enemies; still their undisguised and unappeasable vengeance would have been as much less terrible, than the refined malice of the philosophical and revolutionary barbarians of France, as it is less horrid to be delivered over at once to a violent death, than to be subjected to every torture which ingenuity can invent, and to be cruelly kept alive, by the skill of surgery, and the art of medicine, in order to be reserved for an endless repetition of torments.

But language is unable to afford an adequate description of the monsters, who have already proved the greatest curse which mankind has ever experienced, and still less of the tremendous consequences, which would inevitably attend the complete success of their diabolical plans. On these subjects exaggeration is, for the first time, impossible; and the most literal description is sure to be the most strong and impressive. The spontaneous feelings of every individual must suggest to him, that the present situation of Europe is precisely that of a large community, divided into a great number of families, in one of the most numerous and powerful of which, some desperately wicked servants have risen against their lord, a most kind and affectionate master—murdered him and his wife, with his nearest relatives and best friends—taken possession of his inheritance—and openly invited, with a promise of their fraternity and assistance, the servants of all other families to follow their example. Not content, however, with this, they have sallied out with force and arms, seized upon many neighbouring estates, and driven the lawful proprietors into exile. And when, by this accumulation of guilt, they have rendered themselves so formidable as to defy all law, and to defeat all opposition, they call upon every proprietor who has hitherto succeeded in preserving his possessions, to sanction their robberies, to guarantee their unjust acquisitions, to accord them indemnity for their crimes,

crimes, and to leave them in full possession of a degree of force, which would enable them, at leisure, to proceed in their career of depredation, until whatever remains of right, order and authority, shall be buried in one common heap of anarchy and ruin.

The subject, however, forces itself upon the reflecting mind in another and a more awful light. The distressful situation, and the truly alarming prospects of the social world, must not be considered as the mere result of political causes. Such causes would have been totally inadequate to the production of such effects, if they had not found society in a state of dreadful depravation, with regard to Religion and Morals. This is the principal source of the great and tremendous evils, with which we are now visited. And it is the more necessary to remount to that source, because it is there alone, that any effectual remedy can be applied. The present age has been distinguished by the most deep, daring, and extensive conspiracy against the Majesty of Heaven, which has ever been conceived by the human heart. A sect of Infidels, who to the honour of all past times, are known by the denomination of *modern*, have openly proclaimed War "against the Throne and Monarchy of God." The founders and partisans of this sect have, for upwards of half a century, been straining their faculties, to eradicate all sense of Religion from the mind of man—and to accomplish their infernal purpose they have pursued a mode, at once the most impious, and the most artful, that could be imagined. The existence of a Deity is so obvious a deduction of reason from the works of creation, that a direct attempt to propagate Atheism, as a system, must defeat itself by its own absurdity. But the end which is unattainable by direct, may be accomplished by circuitous means. Therefore these impious men directed their attacks against revealed Religion, the truth of which, instead of being absolutely demonstrable by reason, depends upon a more remote, though when complete, as it is in the present instance, an equally convincing

vincing species of proof—historical testimony. They knew that if they could banish from Christendom the particular form, in which Religion had been there inculcated, and in which, alone, it had obtained belief and excited veneration, they would, in effect, destroy its substance, and leave the mind a total void of dark and hopeless Atheism. They also felt and indulged a peculiar and insatiable animosity against the Christian Religion*, on account of its immaculate purity; which, though admirably calculated to promote the happiness of man in this life, was at direct variance with the vices, in the indulgence of which they had determined that their happiness should consist; and they were fully aware that the same corrupt propensities by which they were enslaved, would facilitate their success in endeavouring to weaken a restraint, so unwelcome to a very large portion of mankind. With these views, and advantages they set themselves to work; and having a perfect knowledge of the nature of man (except, indeed, as an immortal being), and of the machine of Society—having also a perfect acquaintance with the channels, by which literature afforded an access to the human mind—they laboured with indefatigable industry, but, for a great number of years, with concealed efforts†, not only to make proselytes to their system, and to establish secret societies of infidels, but to destroy, by subtle and sceptical disquisitions, and particularly by the most powerful of all weapons, raillery and ridicule, all sense of Religion in mankind.

In the mean time, the Disciples of this sect, in furtherance of their original plan, framed and propa-

* The founders of this infernal sect, or rather the framer of this Infidel Conspiracy, Voltaire, displayed, in a most horrid manner, his rage against Christianity, by the frequent use of the most blasphemous expression—*écrasez l'infame*—which, shocking to relate, he dared to apply to the Author of our Holy Religion.

† It was the deep maxim of Voltaire, "Strike, but conceal the hand."

gated an entire new system of morals; to which has been given the name of Modern Philosophy. A Philosophy which attacks the foundations, while the infidel scheme aims its blows at the main pillar of Civil Society—a Philosophy which tends to extinguish all the feelings of nature, by teaching its votaries to sacrifice their first, their strongest affections, at the shrine of general humanity—A Philosophy which holds up gratitude to contempt, and which despises the sacred impulses of paternal love and filial piety—a Philosophy which exposes to scorn every ancient usage, every established institution, every local attachment, and which would sacrifice, in one rash moment, the collective wisdom of past ages—a Philosophy which undermines the very foundations of virtue by making vice appear amiable, by adorning guilt with attractive qualities, and rendering it an object of pity and of love, and by adorning even those crimes which strike at the very existence of society, so as to make them not only to lose all their deformity, but to call forth the tenderest sympathy of mankind—a Philosophy which inculcates to every individual that his own casual and capricious notions of right and wrong are to supersede those ancient rules, which are taught by divine wisdom, or established on the basis of human experience, and which have hitherto been regarded with reverence, and considered as the tests and the bulwarks of morality—a Philosophy which maintains the most criminal and destructive actions to be justifiable, provided their perpetrator have so depraved a judgment, and so vitiated a heart, as *sincerely* to think them meritorious*.

* The fallacy and the baneful tendency of this scheme of Philosophy, have been most ably exposed in a course of Lectures on the Law of Nature and Nations, lately delivered in Lincoln's Inn Hall, by a Gentleman, who, having changed his original views of the French Revolution, has not only had the manliness openly to avow that change, but has also laboured with great industry, and, there is reason to hope, with much success, to counteract the pernicious principles on which that Revolution is founded. The publication of the above Lectures is much to be desired by every friend to Social Order, as well as by every admirer of sound learning, profound research, and of eloquent illustration.

Can Hell's vast magazine of mischief contain a more potent engine of destruction than this horrid system, which tends to effect a complete subversion of every existing establishment—a total Revolution in the political and moral world?

These two systems of Modern Infidelity and Modern Philosophy, have for many years been corrupting the heart of Europe, and thence diffusing their poison to every part of the civilized world. Unfortunately they found Society in a state extremely favourable to their operation. The European establishments in the Eastern and Western Worlds, by opening new and most copious sources of wealth and prosperity, had contributed, in conjunction with the discovery of the art of printing, to produce a great and a sudden Revolution in the minds and the manners of civilized Nations. The treasures, which, by means of those establishments were poured into Europe, by giving a new stimulus to industry, obtained a speedy and general circulation, and all classes were thereby enabled to enlarge their sphere of gratification. Desire encreased with enjoyment, and mankind no longer confined their wishes as formerly to a mode of life suitable to their condition. The upper ranks began to descend from their dignified and, comparatively, cheap magnificence, that they might with less restraint participate in voluptuous indulgencies. They quitted their rural sports, and even their festive board for the more expensive and enervating pleasures of a capital. The old and venerable family Mansion was, at length, deserted even at the season, when it was wont to be the seat of hospitality, and to diffuse, to all around, a cheering warmth amid the rigours of winter: and the once dignified owner, who had shone as a star of the first magnitude in his natural sphere, was lost in the confused galaxy of a dissipated metropolis. The middle classes turned their minds from the attainment of competence to the acquisition of wealth. They began to consider the possession of great abundance, not only as the supreme good, but as essential to happiness. Their covet-

vetuosity was excited by a view of the numerous avenues to opulence, which opened on every side, and inflamed by the instances of great and unprecedented accumulation which occurred among their equals. They did not, however, in general seek to acquire that they might accumulate, but that they might enjoy. They employed their riches as means of gratification. Their thirst of gain*, and their love of pleasure, acted and re-acted upon each other. In every indulgence, and even in ostentation, they began to vie with their superiors. And the principle of respect, that necessary bulwark of Social Order, became weakened in a most alarming degree. Even the lower orders experienced the effect of the general change. Their labour procured them a more comfortable subsistence, and they both experienced wants and enjoyed luxuries, to which, till then, they had been utter strangers. They also began to entertain notions of independence, alike injurious to themselves and to society at large. These causes have continued to operate, without interruption, for a long space of time, but within the compass of a few years in a greatly accelerated ratio. Every person, who has attained only a middle age, can testify how much habits of luxury, dissipation, and, their natural consequence, a spirit of insubordination, have increased within the period of his recollection—until, at length, they are become the distinguishing characteristics of the age, and their dominion seems to be fully established in the human breast. The destructive tendency of luxury, (which, while it is generally produced by riches, increases in its turn a desire for gain), has been the frequent theme of Moralists; and history brings ample confirmation that their description of its baneful conse-

* To provide the means of luxury, traders, of every description, sought for exorbitant profits, and those whose desires were moderate and reasonable were carried away by the stream, and obliged to comply with a practice which they could not, with any effect, resist. The consequence has been an excessively high price of the necessaries of life, and unfortunately, in times of scarcity the evil falls with great severity on the labouring poor, particularly in the agricultural line, whose wages have not, like those of other labourers, kept pace with the dearness of subsistence.

quences are not, and, indeed, cannot be over-charged. It would, though indisputably just, be considered as common place declamation, to represent it as having, in a course of time, spread its ravages over the whole face of the Globe—swallowed up the most powerful Monarchies, and the most extensive Empires, and carried desolation where the sword had not been able to penetrate, or where its fury had been appeased.

Sæviior armis,
Luxuria incubuit, victumq; ulciscitur orbem.

But though such descriptions are unnecessary, it can never be useless to consider that luxury is an inexhaustible source of private misery and public disorder—that it is the most dangerous foe to human happiness, because it is the most injurious enemy to virtue, without which, by the ordinance of Heaven, happiness is not to be enjoyed. Other passions, indeed, when carried to an extreme, wage open War with virtue, and often subject it to their yoke; from which, however, it frequently delivers itself by its native energy. But this, like a subtle and lurking poison, gradually weakens, and, at length, destroys it altogether. Its effect is to excite insatiable desires, which being incapable of gratification, produce disappointment, and end in total dissatisfaction and disgust. Every thing is then seen through a false medium, nothing is estimated according to its real value; and the mind is incessantly disturbed by a restless desire of change. The soul, instead of enjoying that undisturbed serenity, that calm sunshine, in which true happiness consists, is constantly vexed by “troublous storms.” The social affections are overwhelmed by inordinate and boundless craving; and, at length, the worst possible state is produced—the state of selfishness; which is, in effect, the utter extinction of man as a social being—which bursts all the ties by which he is united in various

relations, to the rest of the world, and which brings on the dissolution of expiring virtue*.

If luxury alone be so pernicious and destructive, what must be its effects, when favoured by an extraordinary relaxation of Religious and Moral principles? Nothing but the vigorous and salutary influence of those principles can, in any degree, arrest its progress. What ravages then must it not produce, when, instead of meeting with such checks, it finds them removed out of its way, or, at least, dreadfully enfeebled by the operation of other causes, besides its own encreasing ascendancy? When it is aided by regularly digested and widely diffused systems, which tend to eradicate Religion and morality from the heart of man? When it is assisted by such auxiliaries as that modern Philosophy, which tends entirely to destroy the social affections, the only germ of virtuous principles and habits—and that modern infidelity which has succeeded so far, as to produce in one of the populous states of Europe a formal and national profession of atheism†, and to efface from

* No two things can possess a greater antipathy than selfishness and virtue. According to the Constitution of our nature, virtuous sentiments can only be formed by means of the social affections. For a sense that virtue is necessary to the happiness of mankind, and that vice must be productive of their misery, is the main source of a love of virtue and of a hatred of vice. But an indifference to the happiness of others must render us indifferent to the means of their happiness. Therefore, without the social affections, virtuous sentiments could not possibly be formed; and by the extinction of those affections, which is the natural effect, and, indeed, the very definition of selfishness, virtue must be eradicated from the mind. Their total extinction, as a general case, is beyond the limits of experience, and we may hope of possibility. But in proportion as they are enfeebled, the dominion of virtue must be diminished, and that of vice confirmed.

† The following sketch of the progress of Revolutionary France towards atheism, which the author has met with, may not be found undeserving of notice:

They began with decreeing the liberty of all religious worship—they then stripped the clergy of all their possessions, “to bring them nearer to the state of the apostles.”—They prohibited the ecclesiastical dress (April 2, 1790)—They exacted from the priests an oath to maintain all the Decrees of the Assembly (Nov. 20, 1790)—persecuted

from the minds of multitudes, in all classes, throughout Christendom, the belief of a Deity, and of a state of future retribution—a belief which, in all ages, has been considered as the main pillar of society, and which is the only effectual restraint upon vice!

Thus, three great and powerful causes of corruption, either of which would, singly, be more than sufficient to make the moral and social world one scene of ruin, have been long operating, with combined force,

cuted those who refused that oath, and practised the grossest indecencies on women who attended the ministration of such conscientious priests.—In 1791 they greatly diminished the number of churches.—In 1792 they decreed the transportation of Priests whose conscience would not suffer them to take the oaths.—In 1793 they abolished one Sunday in a month.—They forbade that the shops should be shut on a Sunday.—They afterwards changed the calendar, established decades, and got rid of Sunday altogether.—They decreed that every church-yard should exhibit the inscription, "Death is an eternal sleep." They encouraged, invited, and entered publicly in a register the apostasy of Priests, and rewarded it with a pension.—They applauded the Declaration of the *Commune de Séve*, that "men should be no longer the victims of an imaginary God."—One of the sections of Paris declared, in the Assembly, that "they would no longer have Altars, or Priests, or other God than Nature;"—and the Assembly thereupon decreed, that the people of Paris had merited well of their country.—At length one of the Convention, at a sitting of that body, not only made a public profession of infidelity, but openly declared that he gloried in being an atheist.

Although modern infidelity has made France its principal abode, it has extended itself to every country in Europe. Nay, the following extract from a valuable pamphlet, which was lately published on the other side of the Atlantic, proves that America, though comparatively a young country, with a scanty population, has experienced this dreadful curse in a most alarming degree. "Add to this consideration, that infidelity has awfully increased. The time was, and that within your own recollection, when the term infidelity was almost a stranger to our ears, and an open infidel an object of abhorrence. But now the term has become familiar, and infidels hardly disgust. Our youth, our hope, and our pride are poisoned with the accursed leaven. The vain title of "Philosophy" has turned their giddy heads, and, what is worse, has corrupted their untutored hearts. It is now a mark of sense, the proof of an enlarged and liberal mind, to scoff at all the truths of inspiration, and to cover with ridicule the hope of a christian; those truths and that hope which are the richest boon of divine benignity, which calm the perturbed conscience, and heal the wounded spirit; which sweeten every comfort, and soothe every sorrow; which gives strong consolation in the arrest of death, and shed the light of immortality over the gloom of the grave. All are become the sneer of the buffoon, and the song of the drunkard."—*The Voice of Warning to Christians, &c.* Printed at New York.

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and with reciprocal re-action. Their effect has been various in different countries. Germany has been the principal school of the new Philosophy, and its *literati* have laboured indefatigably to deluge Europe with works of all descriptions, and chiefly with plays and novels, which most artfully inculcate their pernicious system*.—In France, luxury and infidelity have established a joint dominion, and have not only reduced the people of that country to a state of degradation, depravity, and misery, of which no example is to be found in history, but have rendered them the scourge of the whole earth. The British nation, favoured by their “quiet good sense,” by their admirable sobriety of character, by their detached situation, and by their Religious and moral habits, have been less injured by the impious and disorganizing schemes of modern infidels, than their continental neighbours: but their unrivalled prosperity has exposed them, in a most dreadful degree, to the moral ravages of luxury; while the new Philosophy has not only made a considerable progress among them, but even infected the sources, from which the principles of the rising generation are derived. They have seen among them associations, formed for the promotion of scepticism and atheism—public harangues, under the pretence of discussion, have been delivered, for the same purpose, in the heart of their metropolis—and the press has been employed to circulate the poison throughout the humblest walks of life, and to corrupt the mind of the peasant and the artisan.

Still, however, this favoured country, happily for itself, and the world, possesses more Religion and virtue than can be found throughout the rest of Christendom. It is in this respect the very reverse of France, the most corrupt of all modern nations; and the Supreme Being seems to have preserved, with the most

* The author has been assured, by very respectable authority, that nearly 10,000 writers are supposed to be thus employed in Germany.

striking justice, a difference between the fate of the two countries, which remarkably corresponds with their respective merits. The one seems, according to the usual course of Providence, to be selected as the scourge of those which are less wicked than itself—while the other is made the bulwark of the social world, to preserve it from total destruction.

But though, while the great causes of human depravity have had a very different operation in different countries, their effect is every where visible, in a most dreadful corruption of principle and degeneracy of practice—in an extreme licentiousness of manners—in a prodigious and still progressive encrease of the most pernicious vices, and particularly of the most pernicious and destructive of all vices, that of adultery—a vice hostile to an institution which is the parent of every other institution, the source of every social affection, and which is raised to the highest degree of sanctity, and guarded with the most distinguished care, from even the remotest danger of violation, by that Holy Religion, which consults both the present and future happiness of mankind. It cannot excite surprise that the decay of that Religion should be accompanied with a great encrease of a vice, the very approaches to which it is studious to prevent, and which, at the same time, takes its origin from the strongest impulse of our nature. But when it is also considered, that the modern enemies of that Religion, that the infidels and philosophers (as they call themselves) of the day, have, with an infernal depth of policy, employed their main effort to render the marriage tie contemptible in the eyes of mankind*;—and when it is further considered, that the dissipated habits of life which have obtained, in a most extraordinary degree, are peculiarly fraught with temptations to a criminal indulgence of the passions, (which is in

* One of these Philosophers in this Country, felt it due to his principles to apologize for having entered into the marriage state, which he had before termed an "odious monopoly!"

fact their great recommendation to the votaries of unlawful pleasure);—when these considerations are taken into the account, it would only appear surprising if the vice of adultery had not encreased to a very great extent.

The most unerring test of the morals of society, at any given period, is the degree of respect and attention which is paid to the nuptial engagement. In proportion as that engagement is viewed with reverence, and observed with fidelity, an age may, with certainty, be denominated virtuous. But it is impossible to find a more apt description of a corrupt, profligate, and vicious age, than to say, it is distinguished by a disregard to the marriage vows. Such a description is unfortunately applicable to the present times; and a stronger proof cannot exist of extreme and general depravity.

In a Religious point of view the times are distinguished by a most dangerous and extensive apostacy from a Religion, which is the only preservative of the civilized world from absolute Atheism, and which is inseparably interwoven with all the civil institutions of Christendom; and by a still more alarming lukewarmness in those, who still profess that Holy Religion. That apostacy, however favoured by the system of modern infidelity, could not have prevailed to such an extent, without this lukewarmness. It is impossible, either in a community or an individual, for a Religion, so calculated, as Christianity, to warm as well as to purify the heart, to be exchanged for infidelity, without first degenerating into a cold, formal, and nominal profession*.

* So long ago as the year 1776, the Rev. Mr. Jones of Nayland, a most intelligent and accurate observer of the signs of the times, published the following reflections on the growth of Heathenism among modern Christians:—"The Reader may be shocked when he is told that there is a disposition to Heathenism in our age of so much improvement, and pronounce the accusation improbable and visionary; but he is requested to weigh, impartially, the facts here offered, and then to form his judgment." The tokens of this Pagan infection are very observable. Where at last (says he) will this taste for Heathen learning, which hath been prevailing and
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But there is one circumstance still to be noticed, which distinguishes the present state of Society, and which is perhaps the most alarming symptom of this awful crisis. The causes which have been long operating so banefully on manners and morals, have essentially injured the constitution of the human mind. The disease has not only contaminated the system, but it has weakened, and almost over-powered those energies, which could alone struggle with it—which could alone afford a hope that it might ultimately be vanquished.

The moral sense has been enfeebled to a degree, which threatens its total extinction. Conscience has not only lost its power to restrain men from the commission of the most heinous crimes, but it ceases to excite indignation against the crimes of others. That moral anger, the fear of which, though incapable of preventing human wickedness, has always hitherto kept it within some bounds, has ceased to exist, and crimes, which, in any former period, would not have been tolerated, if they could have been conceived, now are beheld without horror by the generality of mankind, and even meet with advocates in persons, who

“ increasing for so many years, from the days of Lord Herbert to the present time? Whither can it lead us but to indifference and Atheism? A Christian corrupted with Heathen affections degenerates into something worse than the original Heathens of antiquity.” And as if he had before his eyes (in 1776) that “beginning of sorrows” to Europe, the French Revolution and Apostacy, the introduction of the old abominable Pagan idolatry, and revival of Pagan rites in the dedication of Altars to Liberty and Reason, he observes, “Should any person ask me how Christianity is to be banished out of Christendom, as the predictions of the Gospel gives us reason to expect it will, I should make no scruple to answer, that it will certainly be brought to pass by this growing affection to Heathenism: therefore it is devoutly to be wished, that some Censor would arise with the zeal and spirit of Martin Luther to remonstrate effectually against this indulgence of Paganism, which is more fatal to the interests of Christianity, than all the abuses purged away at the Reformation. This is now the grand abuse, against which the zeal of a *Luther*, and the wit of *Erasmus* ought to be directed: it is the abomination of desolation, standing where it ought not, even in the Sanctuary of Christianity, and is a worse offence than all the profanations that ever happened to the Jewish nation.”

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lay claim to Religious and virtuous characters. That shocking Conspiracy against Religion, order, and government, the French Revolution, distinguished as it has been by atrocities which surpass all example of human turpitude, has been openly defended, even in this country, not merely by men whose lives exhibit one uniform series of vice and profligacy, (that were not so strange,) but by men who appear to live in the regular and habitual performance of their private duties to God and man. To what is this wonderful inconsistency to be attributed? Certainly not to a desire of promoting the success of the detestable cause they thus defend, but to a want of moral feeling, which, if it existed in any considerable degree, would render them incapable of suppressing their horror at such crimes and at such criminals. Their moral disapprobation is so weak as to be overpowered by motives of ambition and views of party; and hence it is that they have for years been endeavouring to justify, and that they are still endeavouring to palliate transactions, the blackness of which has never been equalled, and the faithful description of which will appear to posterity, a most gross and injurious libel on human nature. This astonishing insensibility to crime, by producing in the vicious a consciousness of security against the indignation of mankind, relieves vice of its last restraint, a sense of shame. The most abandoned characters, if they were sure to excite abhorrence, would shun the face of day; but *now*, confident of being received, at least with stupid indifference, they stalk abroad and glory in their flagitiousness. Odious as hypocrisy undoubtedly is, it is a recognition of the supremacy of conscience—it has been justly and beautifully described as a homage paid by Vice to Virtue; but when guilt lays aside this mask, the proof of human degeneracy can be carried no further*.

In
* The author of the letter signed Cato, in the valuable collection of papers, published under the title of the Anti-jacobin, observes, that the loose and indecent attire in which our females present themselves

In the room, however, of that moral sense, that salutary indignation against vice, which constitutes the grand bulwark of virtue, the present age has substituted other qualities, which, by casting a mantle over guilt, seem intended to afford some apology for the indulgence with which it is treated. These qualities have assumed the specious names of Candour, Liberality and Moderation. But what a vile counterfeit do they display of those amiable principles of feeling and judging, to which such appellations really belong. Instead of consisting in a disposition to make due allowances for the imperfections of human nature—to incline to a favourable judgment of actions, whenever they can bear a favourable construction—to allow every man credit for good motives, when there are not sufficient grounds to suppose him actuated by bad ones—and, even in case of delinquency, to exercise lenity whenever, without injury to the public interest, it may reasonably be expected to promote reformation—instead of operating in such a manner, modern Candour, Liberality and Moderation, consist in a sacrifice of all principle; in a disposition, not merely to regard undoubted guilt with complacency, but even to consider it as meritorious, and in a readiness to palliate the greatest crimes, and to invent excuses for the greatest

selves to the public eye, warrants an apprehension that shame is taking its leave even of that part of the sex who would scorn any imputation on their character. It must be acknowledged, that there is too much ground for this apprehension. But still it may be hoped, that in this country, the indecent attire of our females, like the levelling garb of our youth, has been merely the consequence of inconsiderate imitation. Accustomed to adopt the fopperies of our Gallic neighbours in better times, we have deigned to consider them too much as objects of imitation, since they have become objects of just detestation to all mankind. Our youth have received from France the Revolutionary fashions, which were invented, and actually ordained, for the purpose of confounding all distinction of rank. And our females have not scrupled to display the shameless modes of Parisian prostitutes, who aided the cause of anarchy by endeavouring to banish modesty from the female breast. A little reflection will, it is hoped, set all this right again. The British youth will abhor fashions which they adopted, without considering that they were of Jacobin extraction. And the native and invincible modesty of the British fair will triumph over all the arts of Gallic corruption.

criminals.

criminals. These qualities, in short, seem to be the conditions of a convention between virtue and vice, by which it is agreed that all hostilities shall cease between these, hitherto, irreconcilable enemies, and that moral feeling shall no longer take offence at moral turpitude. A convention which, like the pacific treaties of the French Republic, tends to deprive Religion, Virtue, and Social Order, of whatever security they still possess*.

Besides this apparent extinction of the moral sense, the present age has also to lament the decay of those subordinate, but most beneficial feelings, which constitute, as it were, the out-works of virtue.

Where now are to be found any vestiges of that Humility, which like the principle of gravitation in the physical world, tends, in the moral, to keep every thing in its due place; which is indispensable to the existence of a sense of duty, and of a disposition to render justice to others; and which, in the youthful mind, is the fostering nurse of every excellence, and the necessary preparation for future usefulness. To this benign and decorous grace has succeeded a self estimation, which makes every one over-rate his claims on others, and to under value his obligations to them—which weakens the attachment of individuals to one another, and to the community of which they form a part—and which, by degenerating into pride and arrogance, disposes men to consider themselves as the natural enemies of each other, and gives a boundless scope to the furious passions, which disturb the happiness and the order of the world. To the extinction of humility in the human mind, may, in a great degree, be attributed the suppression of gratitude in the human heart. The acts of kindness, which ought to call up the liveliest emotions of thankfulness, and which were apt to

* On this subject the reader is again referred to the letter signed Cato, (already noticed), which letter is founded upon some compliments paid by Mr. Sheridan, to the *increased amiability and conciliating feelings of the age*;—and also to the admirable poem in the same collection, entitled "New Morality."

do so in former times, are now considered only as a right, and often as very inadequate to the extent of just and unalienable claims. The effect is to dry up the very sources of tenderness and benevolence—for to confer benefits, without a hope that they will be gratefully received, is beyond the ordinary degree of perfection which the human character can be expected to attain. And if it were not for ostentation, or, at best, a fear of attracting censure, by the omission of the most pressing duties of humanity, it is to be feared that, not only many of the acts of beneficence, which are recorded to the honour of the age, would be omitted, but that the world would exhibit a shocking spectacle of inhumanity. These substitutes for proper feeling have certainly their use, but, in the mean time, the heart is almost debarred from those pleasures which constitute its choicest gratification, and which fertilize it for the growth of every virtue—the pleasure of doing good from the pure impulse of sympathy, and that of receiving it as the generous donation of benevolence.

Pursuing the subject still further, we shall find reason to lament a general and astonishing apathy of mind, in regard even to interests of the greatest importance. All the causes, which have led to the present state of depravity, have combined to produce this effect: but luxury has been its principal cause, by rendering mankind indifferent to every thing, excepting personal gratification. The direful result has been that the present most calamitous and perilous state of the world has failed to make that impression, without which it would denote the most egregious folly to indulge a hope, that the still greater dangers which impend, may be averted. While a great part of Europe has exhibited the most heart-rending tragedy which, for years, has threatened, and which still threatens, to involve, in its catastrophe, the whole human race, men have scarcely displayed a more than ordinary concern for the present, and, literally, they have manifested no solicitude for the future.—Councils and senates have treated, as a common war, a contest which menaced
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with ruin every existing government, and which, from its commencement, was fraught with instant danger to every institution, Religious and civil. The most horrible scenes of carnage, commotion, and anarchy, have been unable to disturb, except in the very spot where they occurred, and for the moment while they lasted, the course of luxury and dissipation—and mankind are now standing on the brink of an abyss of ruin, which seems to yawn for them, with as much carelessness and indifference, as if they were roaming in a garden of sweets, far remote from every danger, and secure of the uninterrupted possession of every delight*.

It remains to be observed, that the ordinary habits of modern life partake of, and serve to increase, the general depravity. The age exhibits a manifest relaxation in regard to industry, regularity, and punctuality. A general love of ease and pleasure, the natural fruit of long indulgence, makes it an object of constant and universal endeavour to transact every business with as small a degree of exertion as possible—and the extraordinary facilities which have been discovered, to relieve labour, both of mind and body, favour, in a remarkable manner, the success of such an endeavour. The consequence is, that, in spite of those facilities, no business is so well done as formerly, when diligence was agreeable, because it was habitual—when it was the practical maxim of the useful part of society, *labor ipse voluptas*. In the most respectable lines of utility the character of a real man of business is in danger of expiring with those persons, who formed their habits during the Old Stile: and the

* A most awful example of this insensibility was exhibited in Dublin, in the winter immediately succeeding the horrors which attended the Irish Rebellion, at its most dreadful period, and even when that Rebellion was likely again to burst forth; at a moment so awful, when scarcely a family but had to deplore the loss of some relative, who had fallen a victim to the most savage outrage, and when all families had just cause to dread their total destruction, the career of luxury and dissipation was pursued with an eagerness and with a thoughtless levity, which had not been exceeded, and, indeed, scarcely equalled, in the most quiet and peaceable times.

evident inferiority in the most common products of industry, when compared with their former excellence, is a standing proof of a diminution of care and diligence, even in what are called the labouring classes. Indeed the diminution of productive labour among mechanics and artisans is become a very serious evil, both in a political and moral point of view. While the most useful, because the most necessary labourer, the cultivator of the soil, is under the *happy* necessity of employing unremitting industry, a very large proportion of those persons, who are employed in the various branches of manufacture, are enabled, by a high rate of wages, to pass one, two, and often more days in the week in idleness and dissipation—and it may, among such persons, be considered as a general rule, that their labour and their pay are in an inverse ratio to each other*. The consequences are, that the state loses a large portion of its effective strength—the industry of its inhabitants—the morals of the unfortunate individuals are corrupted, and a spirit of insubordination endangers the security of property, and the existence of social order.

Among the higher classes, the modern arrangement of time is unfavourable both to industry and morals; an arrangement, which is commonly described by the epithet—late hours, and which allots to enervating repose, or to debilitating dissipation, portions of time, the devotion of which, according to the dictates of nature, to activity, or to rest, would conduce to invigoration and health. Such an arrangement of time has a pernicious effect in all the concerns and duties of life, particularly in those which have any other

* Surely the happiness as well as the utility of the various and valuable classes of artisans and mechanics, and indeed the safety and good order of the State, call loudly upon the Legislature to counteract, more effectually, their combinations for an increase of wages. They have already succeeded in this object to a degree which almost ensures their own misery—which has given a dreadful blow to subordination, and greatly lessened the security of property.

object than personal interest. Equally just and striking is the proverbial observation, that if a man lose an hour in the morning he is running after it the whole day. But what a scene of hurry must that day be, the very commencement of which is postponed to a late hour. Business in such a case will be imperfectly, because hastily performed—dependents, released, in a great degree, from supervision and controul, will slacken in their care and attention—and punctuality, essential as it is to convenience and comfort, will be banished, not merely from engagements of the first importance, but from those of friendship and conviviality, and the festive board will partake of the general want of regularity and precision*. The physical effects of such an arrangement of time are too obvious to require enumeration. But it should not escape observation, that the pernicious influence of late hours on bodily health, must produce a proportionable diminution of mental vigour—a consequence certainly injurious to morals. For habits of virtue, particularly in a corrupted age, (abounding with snares,) cannot be formed without many struggles; and to sustain, with sufficient resolution, those struggles, much vigour of mind is necessary. It is, moreover, evident, that late nocturnal hours, by being favourable to dissipation, tend exceedingly to encrease temptations to vice. In short, it may be considered as an indisputable truth, that no habit which is not in its own nature vicious, can be more injurious to virtue than that which now generally prevails, in regard to the arrangement of time—and persons of rank and weight in society, will render it an essential service, if they employ the powerful influence of their example, in restoring modes of life more congenial with utility, with health, and with good morals.

* It is not undeserving of notice, at this period of scarcity, that the lateness of the fashionable dinner hour conduces much to encrease the consumption of provisions, by rendering a previous dinner, under another name, necessary in regard to health.

Should it be thought that some of the topics, which have been here noticed, have received more attention than they deserve, it should be remembered that nothing can be of trifling importance, which relates to morals; and that an imperceptible stream may, by undermining the foundations, gradually endanger the safety of a building, which might securely defy the violence of a torrent. Many things which appear trivial to a superficial observer, are intimately connected with the welfare, and, indeed, the existence of Society; and, at a time like the present, the importance of such things is inconceivably encreased—Of this the foe to Society is well aware; for there is nothing, however unimportant it may appear, by which he does not endeavour to promote the success of his attack. In no instance has he shewn a more profound knowledge of human nature, or displayed a more artful adaptation of means to object, than in his endeavour to serve the cause of general subversion by superseding those external appendages, which are used to distinguish the various classes of Society. It is with the deepest artifice, as well as with a perfect consistency of character and views, that the Modern Philosophers, in pursuance of their levelling system, have declared War against Titles and Armorial Bearings; and that they have even attacked those forms of dress, which have been used to distinguish the higher orders, and endeavoured to introduce a garb which really tends to confound all distinction of rank. The signal for this attack was given in France, and it has been repeated, in every country, by all who wished to promote the cause of anarchy. Unfortunately many, who in their hearts abhor that cause, have been prevailed upon to shew a contempt for outward appearances*.

It

* It is a fact, that a gentleman, known to the author, saw lately in a high assembly two persons, whose appearance was so *undignified*, as to make him wonder at their being admitted into such a situation. His wonder, however, was greatly encreased when he was informed that

It behoves such persons to consider, that the sentiment denominated respect is a necessary bond of the Social Union—that this sentiment, by its mild operation, gives vigour to authority, and efficacy to laws—that it harmonizes the whole system of Society, and, without any effort, keeps every part of it, from the lowest to the highest, in its proper place. But this highly valuable sentiment never can, with the mass of mankind, be the result of reflection. It would be impossible, by any chain of reasoning, to convince the multitude that it is essential to their happiness. Neither can it be, according to the system of modern philosophers, a pure homage to merit and virtue.—To secure its existence, it must depend upon causes more certain and universal in their operation, than the claims of virtue or merit. It must even operate where no such claims are known to exist. It must be, in short, as it has ever been, a spontaneous impulse, which no reflection is necessary to produce; and it must be excited by the mere presence or idea of its object. It is to some external distinction that the child is taught to bow with reverence, until an association is formed, in his mind, between that distinction and a feeling of respect; so that the latter is sure to be called forth by the appearance of the former. It is thus that, according to the philosophy of nature, all our beneficial impulses, (even that of filial affection itself,) are produced. For according to that philosophy, man is a creature of sensation and habit, as well as of reason. Not only are all his impressions originally derived from the senses, but, even in relation to the most important concerns, they frequently terminate there, without exciting a single reflection in his mind. The most improved and cul-

that those persons were no less than the Duke of ——— and the Earl of ———, whose cropped heads and Gassic Pantaloons, as well as the rest of their garb, would have qualified them, in appearance at least, to assume the character of Members of a Robespierrian Committee.

tivated understandings are not capable of freeing themselves from this dominion of sense. It is thus that nature effects the most important ends by the most simple means; and provides for the attainment of whatever is indispensable to the well being of Society, by the operation of causes, which, instead of being partial or precarious, are universal, certain and invariable. It is thus that emblems, which are used to denote the most elevated dignities, although abstractedly considered, of very trifling value, excite in the minds sentiments of the most beneficial awe and reverence—sentiments favourable to liberty as well as good order, since they assist government in performing its functions with the least possible degree of force, by rendering the submission of subjects voluntary, cheerful and habitual, rather than the effect of compulsion. Nay, even the influence of Religion upon the human mind is most usefully promoted by the observance of solemnities which operate by the senses. Nothing, it is plain, can serve more effectually to promote the mischievous design, which has lately been formed of disturbing, and, indeed, of dissolving all the relations of Society, than to bring into contempt such emblems and solemnities. What could tend more to withdraw the allegiance of subjects from their Sovereign, than, like the infamous Paine, to teach them to consider the Crown as an artificial bauble, of no more value than the gold and jewels which it contains?—What could more effectually serve to bring Religion into contempt, than to prevail on mankind to despise the solemnities which they have been accustomed to observe in its public celebration? But the emblems of Royalty, and the solemnities of Religion, excite only that high degree of respect, which is denominated Reverence, and they are therefore calculated only for occasional display. It is in the common intercourse of life that the sentiments of respect, which, by preserving the gradations, constitute the chief bond of Society, must be formed and maintained. But it would be impossible either to pro-

duce or to keep alive those sentiments, without the aid of some external distinction, which, operating directly upon the senses, may, by the instinctive force of habit, invariably excite the accustomed impression. The two species of external distinction, which are best fitted to produce such effects, are manners and dress; which, while they are necessary to support a claim to respect, are not calculated to raise in the mind any of those invidious ideas of painful comparison, which other distinctions are apt to call forth. A difference which is expressive of some exclusive personal gratification, as a splendid house, a sumptuous table, is, of itself, more likely to excite envy than respect; but the latter sentiment alone is produced by manners and dress, when they correspond with the rank of the individual. Indeed, these personal distinctions tend materially to counteract the invidious reflections which the disparities of fortune are apt to suggest. Hence the luxuries of a polished and elegant nobleman, and those of a wealthy quaker, are seen with a very different eye. Of these two kinds of external distinction, manners and dress, indispensable as they both are, the latter is the most operative upon the bulk of mankind. Cultivated manners are calculated chiefly to make an impression on cultivated minds; but dress is more exclusively an object of sense, and it is, therefore, most fitted to operate on the mass of Society. It wants no aid from reason, education or reflection. It is simple and obvious—it instantaneously strikes the senses, and it is uniform, constant, and invariable, in its operation. It is a symbol which no one can misunderstand, which every one, entitled to it, may without difficulty possess, and it denotes a claim, which being founded in custom, (the most solid foundation of all claims) every one is ready to allow. The necessity of exterior appendages, in order to keep alive sentiments of respect, and to afford additional aid to authority, is recognized by the most barbarous nations; and the Indian Chief, when he displays his gaudy feathers and

tinself ornaments—when his scarified body exhibits a painful pre-eminence beyond the extent of plebeian privilege—he proves himself a much better judge of human nature and of Society, than the ablest advocate for the sublime system of modern philosophy.

The result of these reflections should be to induce, at this time, a more than ordinary attention to the ceremonial usages of well ordered society. The daring attempt which has been made, to overthrow all social establishments, gives to every barrier and outwork of such establishments a great additional importance; and it should impel every one, who wishes for their preservation, not only to observe the solemnities of Religion, and to treat the emblems of authority, with an unusual degree of reverence, but also to preserve, with scrupulous attention, every form which has been accustomed to command respect. The manners of cultivated life, which, while they characterize station, serve also to promote the general observance of decency and decorum—the laws of heraldry, which have for ages been the hereditary guardians of birth and dignity—nay, even the distinctions of dress, which are necessary at once to mark and to defend the gradations of rank in society—all these considerations acquire new claims to attention, because a contempt for such manners, laws, and distinctions, is made subservient to the cause of Anarchy, and because every neglect of them, is a sacrifice in favour of that cause.

Such, alas! upon the whole, is the present moral state of society—such are the direful effects of luxury, co-operating with the modern systems of infidelity and philosophy—effects which appear, indeed, in various degrees in different countries, but which are dreadfully conspicuous in all. It is obvious that such a state must, in the nature of things, lead, at length, to general disturbance, contention, and anarchy—to the subversion of all established Government—and to the subjection of the human race to the merciless and incessantly fluctuating dominion of the most ferocious and sanguinary monsters. For what less than these dreadful consequences can be expected to result, when human de-

pravity, which, unless it be most powerfully checked by means the operation of which is now greatly enfeebled, must be rapidly progressive, shall have arrived at such a pitch, as to have extinguished every spark of Religion and virtue in the human breast—to have rendered the passions of men absolutely ungovernable—to have produced an universal restlessness and dissatisfaction, an utter contempt for every species of authority, human and divine, and a hatred of every restraint, Religious, political and domestic—when, in short, it shall have effected a dissolution, not only of those broader ties of respect and subordination, in which consists the vigour of authority; but also of those finer ligaments—the social affections, the Religious principles, and the virtuous habits, which constitute the *stamina* of society?

Happily for mankind, they are not yet arrived at this state of extreme depravity; happily, the situation, in which the civilized world is now placed, is not the consequence merely of its irreligion, its corrupted principles, and its vicious habits. Other circumstances have co-operated with the degeneracy of the age, in producing the explosion, which has shaken the social edifice to its foundations. If that explosion had been delayed, until the human race had approached the last stage of moral corruption—until the volcanic elements of infidelity, luxury and vice, had acquired sufficient force to produce it, without the concurrence of extraordinary political causes, it would have been fatal in the first instance, and the barriers of society would have fallen at the first blast of the trumpet of Anarchy. But the deleterious influence of human depravity was a necessary, though it has not been the sole cause of the evils, which we have now to deplore, and of the still greater dangers which we have to apprehend. Without that influence the French Revolution could not have proved so general and so grievous a scourge to mankind. This dreadful Revolution has derived, if not its existence, at least its main force, from the vitiated state of society. To this it is indebted for the most atrocious,

cious and destructive character which it has assumed for the production of such monsters as Robespierre, Marat, Le Bon, and Buonaparte, and for the dreadful ravages by which it has desolated a great part of the earth. The great progress which it has made, in so short a space of time, is evidently owing to the decay of Religious and moral principles. If those principles had been in a flourishing state, the attack, if it could have taken place, could not have been so violent, and the defence would have been unspeakably more vigorous. But unhappily the influence of those principles was greatly enfeebled, and the opposite ones had attained a very high degree of force, when mankind were surprised by this terrible conflict: hence it is, that the Revolution has made such astonishing advances towards the overthrow of all social establishments; and, to judge from present appearances, it will accomplish that overthrow, unless it be resisted by means very different from those which have been hitherto employed.

What means should be resorted to, in order to prevent so dreadful a catastrophe, it cannot be difficult to discover. In a great Moral contest—in a struggle involving the existence of all the Religious and political Establishments of the World, where can any adequate defence be found, but in the mass of Religion and Virtue still remaining in Society? Happily, notwithstanding our great depravity, that mass is still considerable. Happily, the Establishments which are attacked, are still cherished and venerated by a large portion of mankind. But our stock of Religion and Virtue will not avail us, unless it be called forth, in an extraordinary manner, into action. It must be excited and exerted in a degree, proportionate to the immense interests it has to defend. In a contest like this, every individual should consider himself as put upon his trial, and as called upon to rouse all the faculties of his soul, and all the energies of his heart, for the preservation of whatever is dear and valuable in social life. He should do his utmost to inspire others with a sense of the common danger, and to stimulate them to come forward in the
common

common cause. If all persons who are still really attached to the Government, which protected them in the helpless and exposed state of infancy, and to the Religion, which they have been taught, from their tenderest years, to consider as their unerring guide, both to temporal and eternal felicity, were to raise their voice in support of these invaluable Establishments, and to avow a just and manly indignation against every attempt to subvert them, a new impulse would be given to society, and the danger would be instantly, and almost incredibly diminished. But such persons, if they really mean to secure the blessings which they wish still to enjoy, and to transmit them to posterity, must not be satisfied with raising their voice, or giving vent to their indignation; they must consider themselves as engaged in a conflict, in which defeat must be fatal, not only to themselves but to all for whom they have any regard.—They must take care to be armed at all points, and, by the utmost circumspection in the whole of their conduct, they must be cautious not to give the enemy any advantage. They must remember that they are combating with an adversary, who seeks to pierce the vitals of social order, through the sides of Christianity and good morals; which, therefore, it is necessary, in a peculiar manner, to guard and to strengthen. For this purpose, they must be more than ordinarily mindful of their own deportment, and deem it incumbent upon them to observe all the ordinances of Religion, and to perform all the duties of morality, with exemplary regularity; remembering that every neglect of those ordinances, and every violation of those duties, is an injury to that cause, which involves, in its issue, all their hopes and all their interests, at least on this side of the grave. But in addition to these common and universal duties, still higher duties devolve upon all who are endowed with any extraordinary talents or opportunities beyond the usual lot of mankind. Every talent, which, at a time like this, is buried, will certainly rise up in condemnation against him to whom it is entrusted. Every one who would escape such condemnation, should

be studious to discover how he may best exert the powers, which Heaven has given him. He should, after great and unwearied exertions, think that he has done nothing, so long as any thing, within the compass of his ability, remains to be performed. He should consider every situation which may afford him peculiar means of utility, as imposing upon him the most solemn obligation to improve it to the utmost. The possession of wealth, rank, office; the functions of the Magistrate or the Legislator; should be considered by him as an imperious call for eminent and appropriate services.

Most of all the sacred profession obliges its members to great and peculiar exertions. At all times it is incumbent on a Christian Minister to recommend, with all the earnestness in his power, the performance of every duty, Religious, moral and civil, prescribed by the Christian Code, and particularly of those in which the age may happen to be remarkably deficient. Now, besides a general corruption of Religious and moral principles, and a consequent depravity in practice, the present age is peculiarly deficient in its attention to the obligations of subjects to Government, and even in a knowledge of those obligations—though clearly unfolded in the sacred volume, which is the unerring rule both of principle and of practice. Nay, so far has human presumption extended itself on this important subject, that systems are openly promulgated, even as a part of education, which, in direct contradiction to the express declarations of Scripture—that all Power is of God—as well as to the invariable course of nature and of experience, (which would itself be sufficient evidence of the Divine Will), teach the preposterous and most disorderly doctrine, that the origin of power is the will of the many. The consequence of such doctrines has been a disposition to disregard, and even to despise the Divine commands, by which the governed are most solemnly enjoined to obey and to honour their governors; and this disposition is one of the prevailing sins of the age. A Minister of Religion would, therefore, be guilty of a gross neglect of duty if he did not at
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such a time most emphatically enforce the necessity of obedience to those commands.

The introduction of such topics into the Pulpit is often invidiously censured by means of the misapplication of a remark, very vague and superficial in itself, that the Pulpit is not the proper place for Politics. But what must be that perverseness, or that stupidity, which cannot distinguish between those temporary questions—which excite the animosity of contending parties, and which afford the proper definition of the term politics, in its usual acceptation—and those universal and permanent obligations, which are not only prescribed by morality, but clearly and positively enjoined by Divine Authority.

As Christian Ministers are bound to excite to the performance of every duty, whether Religious, moral, or civil, which is inculcated by the Sacred Scriptures, it is also incumbent upon them to improve all opportunities, which are peculiarly calculated to give effect to their exhortations. When the mind is softened by calamity, and alarmed by danger, then may the functions of the Pulpit be exercised with the greatest hopes of success; in warning men, by repentance and amendment, and particularly by laying aside those sins, of whatever kind, by which the times are distinguished, to avert the displeasure of that Being, who, either by the ordinary, or the extraordinary dispensations of his Providence, is sure to requite great wickedness by severe suffering. Never was an opportunity for such warnings so favourable—never was their urgency so great—as at this moment. The mind of man must be impenetrable as the adamant rock, if it be not now susceptible of admonition. And while, on the one hand, the extreme depravity of the age must be considered as the great source of its misfortunes, there seems, on the other, abundant reason to conclude, that the Supreme Disposer of all things is specially interposing, to visit the sins of the world with the heaviest afflictions. At such a time, shall not the sacred monitors cry aloud, and warn men of the evils by which they are surrounded?

Shall

Shall they not explain the moral causes which have led to so awful a situation, and point out those means of deliverance, which they are authorized, by their mission to offer? Shall they be deterred, by cavils, from describing, in the strongest manner, the perils, to which the Religious as well as the civil establishments of society are exposed? Shall the Pulpit be silent when the Altar is attacked? Or shall its ministers fail to animate their auditors to stand forward, in defence of Christianity itself, against the host of enemies by which it is assailed? But, particularly, when the rare and awful period of a change of Century is enveloped in so deep and portentous a gloom, shall they not avail themselves of the solemnity of such a moment, to conjure the human race to pause in their career of folly, dissipation and wickedness; and to prevent, by an instant and thorough reformation, the century, on which they are entering, from being filled with miseries, which the tongue of man cannot express, nor even his heart conceive?*

But a contest so important and so arduous, calls for more than individual exertions. It demands all the aid which sympathy and co-operation can afford it.

* It is impossible to witness the extraordinary efforts of many Ministers of the Church of England to produce suitable impressions, at this alarming crisis, upon the minds of the people of this country, without indulging the pleasing hope that, under Divine favour, we may yet be spared. The Charges which have been delivered by several of the Bishops to their Clergy, and which have also been made public, afford the happy presage, that the salutary impulse will pervade the whole of the sacred Order. Those Charges, though strictly confined to topics which are clearly within the Province of a Christian Bishop, cast such a light upon the present state of society—upon the causes which have reduced it to so melancholy a situation—and upon the means in which alone it can hope for safety—that they deserve the serious attention of the Statesman and the Legislator.

Among the Laity too, notwithstanding the general insensibility which prevails, there are encouraging instances of suitable impressions, and of seasonable exertions. Societies have also been formed, consisting both of Clergy and Laity, which have a most beneficial tendency at a time like the present. One of these, the Society for the Reformation of Principle, has done much good, and will, it is hoped, do much more. Another, an infant society, called the Endeavour, embraces the important object of administering relief to distress when accompanied with merit, and, by means of the circulation of cheap tracts, to promote the general diffusion of good principles.

The

The cause is general—the danger is universal.—The assailants set an example of the closest union and concert. They act upon a regular and thoroughly digested system. They sacrifice all private differences to their common object. Shall their opponents be destitute of the same advantages? Shall they who defend their Altars and their Thrones, be satisfied with separate and unconnected endeavours? Shall they be outdone, either in vigour or in harmony, by the agents of infidelity and anarchy? Shall they not smother their mutual differences; and regarding all who are engaged with them in the same cause, as united by the strongest ties of reciprocal duty and of congenial feeling, reserve all their animosity for the common enemy and his coadju-

At a period of darkness and barbarism, the friends of society successfully encountered the evils of the times by a regular, well-cemented, and durable Association, which corrected the manners of the age, and diffused the most valuable blessings over successive generations. An Association which, while by its heroic achievements it afforded protection to the feeble—deliverance to the oppressed—and security to the innocent—cultivated the most refined sentiments, and rendered urbanity, honour and justice, objects of universal admiration. Does not the present period imperiously demand a similar resource? Should not the friends of Religion, of virtue, and of social order, throughout the Christian world, consider themselves as forming, from this moment, A GRAND ASSOCIATION for the preservation of those inestimable blessings? Should they not consider themselves as pledged to each other, and to society at large, by the strongest ties of honour and conscience—by the highest obligations of Religion and morality, to engage in a steady,

* All persons who are engaged in supporting the great cause, on the success of which so much depends, should, with regard to one another, adopt the resolution of the Psalmist, "Let the righteous smite me, it shall be a kindness, and let him reprove me, it shall be an excellent oil:" but of those who are hostile to that cause, instead of acting upon the pusillanimous and treacherous system of modern liberality, they should say, "Do I not hate them, O Lord, that hate thee, and am not I grieved with them that rise up against thee?"

resolute

resolute and interminable conflict with infidelity, vice, and anarchy—and to cultivate, to the utmost of their power, both by precept and example, those sentiments, principles and qualities, the prevalence of which would afford the best security against the attacks of the above foes to social happiness? If even the comparatively few and unconnected individuals, who, in different countries, have distinguished themselves by their endeavours to stem the torrent which threatens to overwhelm the world:—if those persons were animated by the confidence which is produced by a certainty of mutual support—if they were inspired by that generous and emulative ardour, which the consciousness of being jointly and solemnly engaged in so glorious a cause, could not fail to inspire; and if their efforts were harmoniously and systematically directed, by an unity of means, to a common object, they would form a social phalanx, which it would be out of the power of the enemy to pierce, and around the standard of which the friends of lawful government would every where rally and unite.

But whoever enlists in this great cause, must be careful not to forget, even for a moment, the awful truth, that the present calamitous and perilous situation of the world is chiefly owing to its moral depravity. For, from this truth it follows, as a necessary consequence, that there can be no effectual remedy, but a thorough and radical reformation—a general correction both of principle and practice. Every other expedient will be, at best, but a palliative, and will leave the cause of the evil untouched. Although the impending dangers should be averted—although society should be restored to the state of apparent safety, which it enjoyed before the French Revolution—although the restoration of lawful Government in France, should inspire mankind with the most confident expectation of general and permanent security, yet nothing more than a temporary escape will be effected, unless the baneful influence

ence of infidelity, immoral philosophy, and luxury be overcome. Nay, the general satisfaction and confidence which would be inspired, by a deliverance from those political dangers, that fill every reflecting mind with consternation and horror, and the prospect, which the too sanguine eye of hope would discover, of a long enjoyment of general and uninterrupted prosperity, would infuse fresh vigour into the above implacable enemies of social order, and free them from that partial restraint, which a sense of present and extreme danger may have imposed on their progress. The causes which have enabled the French Revolution to menace the earth with universal anarchy, will give the same force to future convulsions, when Society shall be less able to withstand the shock; and political events will never be wanting, to afford occasion for disturbance, when all the principles of social order shall be still more enfeebled, and those of strife and confusion shall have received further accessions of strength. If, therefore, the existing social establishments, the overthrow of which would involve the human race in calamities, which, for extent and duration, surpass all powers of thought—if those establishments should escape the perils to which they are now exposed, they would not attain any security beyond the actual moment; nay, they would be speedily exposed to fresh danger, unless their natural bulwarks—Religion and morality, be greatly strengthened: unless a thorough change take place in the morals and manners of society.

The nature of this necessary change must be obvious to every one, upon a moment's reflection. It is not, like that proposed by the absurd system of human perfectibility, incompatible with the nature of man, at variance with his original feelings and his earliest habits, and hostile to all his institutions as a social being. No; it has for its object the attainment of practicable ends by natural means; it would not profess to render him a perfect—but only an improved being; it is to be produced by the aid of original

im-

impressions and early attachments, which for that purpose must be reinforced; and it is friendly to all the institutions to which he has been accustomed from his birth. Neither would it tend to alter his condition, or to deprive him of any advantage which he now possesses. On the contrary, its effect would be, to render him more fit for that condition, and for those advantages—it would qualify him for that state of high prosperity, in which he has been placed by wealth and civilization, and which has hitherto proved his greatest misfortune, because it was not accompanied with a proportionate improvement in his moral character. That, without such an improvement, prosperity is a curse instead of a blessing, is a truth too obvious to require illustration. What is it which renders a sudden acquisition of fortune highly dangerous, and often destructive, to the individual who is thereby, in general estimation, rendered an object of envy, but that his mind and heart have not been trained for his new situation? What is it but a difference in Religious and moral principles and habits, which renders the possession, even of *inherited* opulence, in one man a blessing to himself and others, and a source of the most exalted pleasures—the pleasures of benevolence; and in another, the cause of debauchery, infamy, misery, remorse, and premature death? Nay, even in the humblest stations, how is the same truth exemplified in the profligate lives, in the miserable existence, physical and moral, of those manufacturing labourers, whose high wages enable them to support their families by the industry of four days in a week—when contrasted with the comparatively virtuous and happy lives of the cultivators of the soil, whose utmost hope never extends beyond the procuring of a tolerable maintenance, by the unremitting labour of six days in seven throughout the year. In short, as an English writer, eminently distinguished for the profundity of his researches into human nature, observes, “ Prosperity itself, whilst any thing, supposed desirable is not our own, begets extravagant and unbounded thoughts. Imagination is altogether

“ gether as much a source of discontent as any thing
 “ in our external condition*.”

Society, like an individual, is a moral being, and subject to the operation of the same causes; with this material difference, however, that those causes operate with encreased influence, in proportion to the number of persons on whom they collectively act; but in a ratio greatly exceeding the progressive encrease of those numbers. Therefore, general prosperity, still more than that of an individual, requires a corresponding degree of moral improvement; not merely to render it a blessing, but to prevent its being an inexpressible, nay, a fatal misfortune. We have seen, in the foregoing reflections, that the prosperity of modern times has been attended, not with a suitable improvement, but with a dreadful deterioration of the moral state of man†. And unless that beneficial change, which

should

* Butler's Analogy, c. 5.

† The effect of abused property is to disqualify alike for prosperity and adversity. It has pleased Heaven to afflict this country with two successive seasons of scarcity, and the latter is, as might be expected, the most severely felt. Though this calamity produces a degree of alarm and agitation, much beyond what would have attended a similar dearth in former times, yet the feelings it has excited are, strange and inconsistent as it may appear, insufficient to call forth resolution and virtue to submit to privations, which would afford almost certain relief. For while the human mind has lost much of its sensibility to crimes, to the sufferings of others, and even to great and general dangers, both of the political and moral kind, it has acquired an extreme and morbid sensibility, which makes it tremblingly alive at the very apprehension of personal inconvenience.—While mankind see with indifference all the securities of social life gradually undermined, they cannot endure the thoughts of losing, or even of suspending any gratification, the continued enjoyment of which, as well as of every other comfort, depends upon the stability of such securities. Hence it is, that such difficulty attends the adoption of those measures of economy and frugality, which would immediately lessen, in a great degree, the evil which fills us all with the utmost alarm. Nay, though a positive law has been made, prohibiting the sale of new bread—a law which when, by the aid of first impressions, it was observed for a few weeks, was found, according to authentic report, to produce the effect intended to be derived from it in a remarkable degree—this law has since been evaded in such a manner, as to be almost totally inoperative: so that new bread is publicly consumed with as much unconcern as if the

should have gone hand in hand with prosperity, can now be brought about, the advantages which we possess beyond our ancestors, and on which we set so high a value, will plunge us into an abyss of misery, which will swallow up the happiness of the present generation, and the hopes of generations yet to come.

It is plain, then, that the proposed change, if it could be accomplished, far from being attended with a sacrifice of our present prosperity, would be favourable to its continuance, and that the moral improvement of mankind, in proportion to its degree and its permanence, would tend to perpetuate their welfare. It would be conducive to social happiness in all its forms. It would be friendly, in the highest degree, to good order and general tranquillity. It would be peculiarly favourable to freedom; for it is obvious, that in proportion to the prevalence of irreligion and licentiousness, the natural force of government must be enfeebled, and it must be driven to maintain itself by extraordinary restraints*. The real source of despotism is not the depravity of governors, but the corruption of the governed. Nor let it be supposed that such a change would interfere with

the use of it were not a violation of an existing and most salutary law. Who can refrain from exclaiming, *Quid leges sine moribus!* At length, the duties of economy and frugality in the use of bread are enforced by a call which, unless the country be, indeed, thoroughly depraved, will instantly produce its due effect. A gracious and affectionate Sovereign, the Father of his people, at the request of his Parliament, has by Proclamation solemnly enjoined his subjects to reduce their consumption of bread, in families where substitutes can be procured. Every master of a Family who does not instantly and strictly observe such an injunction, must be alike insensible to decency and duty, and in case still heavier misfortunes, than those we now experience, should await us, he will have his share of them greatly aggravated by the reproaches of his own conscience.

* This has been clearly exemplified in the effects produced, in this Country, by the disorganizing and licentious principles of the French Revolution, which have rendered necessary, for the preservation of Government, those additional restraints, of which those persons who are fettered by them, complain as infringements on their liberty, but which the well-disposed cordially approve, because necessary, at such a time, to the existence of freedom.

any of the enjoyments of life. On the contrary, it would, in an unspeakable degree, encrease the sum of those enjoyments. By the irrevocable decrees of him who gave to man all his powers and faculties, there is no happiness for moral agents without virtue. The licentious sensualist may, indeed, for the moment, fancy himself the ture voluptuary—he may appear satisfied, nay, delighted with his gratifications—so does the voracious swine with his feast of garbage—nay, the sordid brute has the advantage; he has no apprehension to embitter his meal—he wants no internal satisfaction to give it a relish. But man is doomed, by the constitution of his nature, to be a stranger to true enjoyment, unless it be accompanied with the approbation of his own mind; and this, however callous the conscience may become, can never be the companion of vice. The virtuous man, on the contrary, has that within him which sweetens all his pleasures. He is not, as some suppose, debarred of any of the comforts of life. He rather thinks it his duty to enjoy them all, in their place and season. It is one of his maxims, “to enjoy is to obey.” Virtue is not an austere monkish system of harsh severity and rigid mortification; neither does it in the least favour of the formal stiffness of puritanical affectation. It is, indeed, a system of self-government, and, whenever necessary, of self-denial. It often demands severe struggles. But it prescribes no rules which have not happiness for their object. It imposes no restraints which are not necessary to prevent misery. It requires no struggles which are not essential to safety. It abundantly compensates for all the struggles it occasions, for all the prohibitions it enjoins, by giving to all the pleasures of life a higher relish, and to all the beauties of nature a brighter hue. Those enjoyments which, when illicitly obtained, are accompanied with the reproaches of conscience, and followed by the pangs of remorse, afford, when received at the hands of virtue, a pure and unalloyed, though certainly an imperfect gratification. In fine, the vir-

tuous man alone can bring to the banquet of life that frame of mind, without which no banquet can afford any real satisfaction; and provided his virtue be founded upon Religion, his pleasure is heightened by knowing that he has stores behind which will ensure him still higher and more permanent delights. The scene before him is serene and unclouded, and the prospect opens still brighter views, and enlivens enjoyment by the cheering rays of hope.

But desirable, in every point of view, as this great moral change may be, it is so difficult of accomplishment, it is so strongly opposed by inveterate habits, that the proposal may seem to many to be absolutely chimerical. The task is, indeed, truly Herculean; so foul are the Augean Stables of modern depravity. Yet, let it be remembered, that the object is indispensable—that nothing else can ensure the preservation of civil society—that nothing else can warrant a parent to look forward, without horror, to the future existence, even in this life, of those whose happiness is dearer to him than his own—while the impressions and dispositions, which are necessary to produce such a change, would be the most effectual, perhaps the only preservative or security against speedy and general destruction; they would give a new energy to virtue; and enable it to cope with the energy of crime, which threatens to reduce the whole world to its dominion. In such a case difficulty should only invigorate resolution, and stimulate to exertion. It should induce every one to set about the arduous task without delay—to form the fixed and unalterable determination that the moral improvement of mankind, as far as he can, by any means, contribute to promote it, shall be the great business of his life.

The first step towards the attainment of this most important object, obviously must be to check that contagion, by which the mind of man has been already so far contaminated, as to endanger his social existence. Numberless are the channels through which the most destructive poison is conveyed into his

his mind; innumerable are the communications by which he is taught to disbelieve Christianity—to doubt even the existence of a God—to despise the obligations of morality—to contemn the authority of government and of law—to dislike his place in Society—and to pant, with incessant restlessness, for a change, of which he cannot form any idea, and which would involve the destruction of every establishment that can afford him protection, and would expose him, without the smallest defence, to the outrages of ruffian violence, and savage cruelty. The press is the chief vehicle by which these mischievous impressions are produced. Other means are certainly resorted to for the same detestable purpose; but none is so much calculated for the universal circulation of bad principles as the press, which is incessantly employed, at once to corrupt the fountains of science, and to stimulate the lower orders to tumult and insurrection. To these baneful effects it is made subservient by every mode and species of publication—by grave and solemn essays on education and morality—by works of historical compilation*, by novels teeming not only with allurements to vice, but with the horrors of blasphemy†, by new Annual Registers, by Monthly Magazines, and Critical Reviews, by cheap tracts, and by Jacobin Newspapers—and even by reports of Parliamentary Speeches—which reports often contain matter of the most inflammatory nature, evidently calculated to promote sedition, to excite to treason, and to render the very labours of Parliament, for the relief of the Country from the pressure of scarcity, a source of discontent, disaffection, and outrage.

* It is not merely by new publications of an historical kind, like the New Annual Register, that the public mind is infected, but old ones of good authority, and of unexceptionable principles, are continued to the present time, and thereby made instrumental to the perversion of the youthful mind. Of this description is the new edition of Guthrie's Grammar.

† A work of this sort has been unblushingly avowed by a Member of Parliament: for its merits see the Pursuits of Literature.

It is, therefore, of the first and most urgent necessity to check and counteract the various endeavours, which are used to corrupt mankind, to render their principles depraved and their passions ungovernable. Every person who really wishes, not merely for the ultimate escape, but for the immediate preservation of society, should exert all his vigilance and all his activity for the above purpose. He should particularly set his face against every publication which has a pernicious tendency*. He should be constantly on the watch, to guard

* It is a truth which would scarcely obtain belief were it not confirmed by daily experience, that the prints, which have for years outraged every Religious, Moral, and Social feeling, which have teemed with blasphemy and treason, and which, though more guarded since they have been subjected to an encrease of legal responsibility, are still labouring incessantly to inflame the public mind, to corrupt the public principles, and to dissolve all the ties which connect Government and subjects—it is equally true, and astonishing, that these execrable prints are enabled to pursue their mischievous purpose, by the encouragement they receive from persons, who detest the cause which is thus promoted: for otherwise those prints would not have a sufficient sale to defray their necessary expences. In defence of such suicidal encouragement, the common place, though preposterous excuse, is urged, that it is desirable to see what can be said on both sides of the question—as if the cause of infidelity, treason and anarchy, were supported by fair discussion, instead of depending for its success on falsehood, misrepresentation and sophistry; as if, while some minds may be capable of detecting the fallacy of such artifices, others are not in danger of being misled by them; as if the poison which may be repelled by a vigorous constitution, or a powerful antidote, could not be fatal where the constitution is feeble, or no antidote can be administered.

Another circumstance, by favouring the impunity, promotes the encouragement and support which these mischievous prints receive from the well disposed part of the public. It is a prevailing, though a very erroneous opinion, that all restrictions upon the press would be injurious to the cause of freedom. Such restrictions are undoubtedly abridgments of liberty—so are the laws against robbery, forgery and murder—so is the decalogue. But it is licentious liberty that is thus abridged; and thereby better protection is afforded to that salutary freedom, which consists in an undisturbed right to do whatever is not injurious to society. If it can be proved that it is not thus injurious to disseminate the worst specie of poison, that which corrupts the mind, then it must be admitted, that restraints on the press are tyrannical. But if, on the contrary, such dissemination be one of the deepest injuries (perhaps the deepest) which can be inflicted on society, then it follows that it ought to be checked by adequate restraints; and every true friend to civil liberty is bound to exert the utmost vigilance, to promote the efficacy of those restraints. It proves a remarkable want of such vigilance, that the public houses resorted to by the lower

guard every avenue by which the foe to society makes his approaches to the human mind, and determined, in whatever shape that enemy may appear, to oppose his progress—to expose his mischievous attempts to the execration of the wise and good, and, wherever that is possible, to subject such attempts to legal retribution.

Thus, perhaps, the great moral plague, which threatens society with speedy dissolution, may be happily stayed, and fresh vigour may be acquired to encounter the political evils, which that plague has rendered so formidable. But at best the danger will be only protracted—the ruin will be only delayed, unless the force of vitiated habits can be broken—unless the dominion of luxury can be overthrown—unless man can be qualified for his present highly cultivated and prosperous state, by the infusion of virtuous principles, the cultivation of virtuous dispositions, and the formation of virtuous habits. The only course, in the nature of things, by which these ends can be attained, is **EDUCATION**. Not, indeed, in the sense in which this term is generally understood, and in which, unfortunately, it is almost exclusively applied, a cultivation of the mental faculties. This has been the fatal error, to which the world is chiefly indebted for its present calamities. The education of man has been principally, and, indeed, almost solely directed to the formation of his mind, to the purposes of literary instruction and scientific attainments: objects undoubtedly of vast importance, and which, it is to be hoped, will continue to be pursued with undiminished ardour; but which are absolutely insignificant in value when compared with the higher and nobler purpose of education—the Cultivation of the Heart. It is this which alone can improve those qualities that are necessary to render mankind fit for social intercourse—qualities, which are so

lower classes, particularly in the metropolis, though under the immediate controul of the magistrates, almost invariably take in newspapers of a pernicious tendency!

essential, that Providence has ordained them to spring out of the original feelings of the human breast, and to be fostered by the domestic relations in which we are placed, by our very birth. But these qualities, the existence of which is thus wisely secured, because they are absolutely indispensable, are sure to degenerate, unless they receive a most careful and unremitting culture. The infirmities of our nature, its proneness to evil, its tendency to selfishness, the violence of passion, the force of temptation—causes which “grow with our growth, and strengthen with our strength”—are sure to give a perverse bias to the mind, and a corrupt propensity to the heart, except the character and disposition be trained to virtue. It is by the aid of such a training alone that the social affections can be preserved in due vigour—that the social duties can be made to take deep root—that conscience can acquire its due authority—that the auxiliary virtues, such as gratitude and humility, can be formed, to guard and cherish virtues of a higher class—that, above all, Religious sentiments can be so strongly impressed, as to maintain an ascendancy through the whole of life. In short, it is by such a training alone that man can be qualified either for happiness or utility; that he can become a good member of society, even in its most simple state. But when, without such a training, he arrives at a high degree of civilization—in which every object tends to inflame desire—in which every acquisition tends to excite covetousness—in which every attainment, even of the scientific kind, tends to inspire confidence and presumption—then, indeed, his state is inexpressibly deplorable and perilous. He is like a vessel in a tempestuous sea, without a rudder and compass, without a skilful master and experienced mariners—he is exposed to be dashed in pieces on the rock of universal contention, or to be swallowed up in the unfathomable gulph of anarchy.

To remedy as soon and as completely as possible the dreadful omission which has been attended with such fatal consequences, that of preparing man for improved

society, a regular and systematic course of Religious and moral education, should be the serious endeavour of every one who feels the smallest solicitude, either for the present age or for posterity. Every care should be taken, and every exertion made, to form the rising generation for the arduous part which they will have hereafter to act, and on their qualifications for which (supposing the present age to escape the fury of the storm, which has burst over its head) it will depend whether their existence be a scene of as much happiness as man can hope to enjoy in this imperfect state, or of a degree of misery which would exceed all powers of description.

But without the superintending care of Government, it will be vain to hope for the establishment of such a system of education. To the want of such care, properly exercised, may, in a very great degree, be attributed the evils under which the present age is now suffering. It is astonishing, and, indeed, almost inconceivable, that the most important of all the concerns which can engage the attention of Government, should have been almost wholly neglected by it—that while it has every where been exerting its utmost endeavours to render the nation under its direction great and prosperous, it has omitted the means most necessary to make its subjects happy, by training them to virtue—to the knowledge and the practice of their Religious and Moral duties.* To sustain fleets and armies for the protection of the state—to raise taxes for its defence—to enact laws for the punishment of criminals, or for the security of property, while education is left to take its chance, is a folly no less egregious, than it would be to preserve with great expence and care the fences of a cultivated enclosure, to guard it against “the boar out of the wood,” and “the wild beast of the forest,” while the tender plants, on which

* The folly and the mischievous consequences of this omission are displayed in a masterly manner by M. Gentz, Conseiller de Guerre à Berlin, in a work entitled *Journal Historique*; quoted in the *Mercur* Britannique of the late M. Mallet du Pan.

depend the hopes of the year, are perishing for want of attention—while they are suffered to be choked by the luxuriant weed, or ravaged by noxious vermin.

Of all the errors which lead to social infelicity, no one can be more mischievous than that which seems, for centuries, to have generally prevailed in the civilized world, that education is not a state concern. If there be one duty belonging to Government, more important than all the rest, it is that of preserving the rising generation from the infection of bad principles, and of preparing them, by the implanting of good ones into their tender minds, for the important character of members of society. The manner in which this duty ought to be performed, in a free and highly cultivated state, without appearing to put any violence on domestic feelings, or disturbing the sacred connection between parents and children, deserves the most serious consideration. The difficulty is greatly encreased by the almost total neglect of that duty which has prevailed, and by the great degree of depravity which exists in consequence, chiefly, of such neglect—and which unavoidably pervades the established system of education. The object, which in this respect it would be desirable to attain, is that, without any interference with fatherly care and authority, education should be rendered the certain means of preparation for a virtuous life, as far as such preparation can operate with certainty upon a creature like man. The attainment of this object would involve so great a change from our present state and habits, that it can only be brought about by slow degrees. But every person, who really wishes well to the next generation, must desire, at least, that the Legislature should instantly take effectual means to restrain the very gross abuses of education which actually exist—to prevent such persons from being entrusted, by inconsiderate parents and guardians,* with the care of

* The inconsideration of parents in this respect is alike astonishing and lamentable. Some, indeed, are guilty of a worse fault, than inconsideration, for they purposely select as instructors for their children,

of youth, as would teach them to despise the duties of subjects—duties, as we have seen, of Religious and moral, as well as of Civil obligation—and to provide, particularly, that the children of the poor, throughout the kingdom, shall be brought up in the practice of attending Divine worship every Lord's day, with sufficient instruction to enable them to understand and join in that worship. It is a most lamentable consideration, that a small, a very small proportion of the labouring poor, ever attend the public ordinances of Religion—and that their children, as far as depends upon them, are mostly destitute of all Religious instruction. Can it excite wonder that their morals are so depraved? This is an evil which calls for an instant and effectual remedy. The institution of Sunday schools, if not, under that name, carried to such an extent as to interfere with the duties of humble life, may be of admirable utility. But even those schools have, in some instances, been perverted to the purpose of disseminating pernicious principles, and they, therefore, require legal supervision, as well as legislative encouragement.

Happily no one can be at a loss to find a perfect model, by which not only the education, but the entire conduct of man, throughout life, should be directed, in order to qualify him for social happiness here, as well as for a far higher degree of felicity hereafter. It has pleased the all-bountiful Creator to communicate to his creature, Man, such a system—the choicest gift, surely, which infinite goodness could bestow; and the abuse or neglect of which in-

dren, men who are distinguished for their disloyalty. But others, without any enquiry as to principles, send their offspring to seminaries where it would be a miracle if they were not trained to become disaffected subjects, and, if occasion should offer, rank traitors. Parents of a third class, make full enquiries of every kind; but, finding a man of deep and extensive erudition, but whose principles they detest, they sacrifice every consideration to the fond, and, when prudently indulged, the laudable wish of seeing a favourite son make a brilliant figure in life, and resolving to run all risks, they trust him in the very midst of contagion, in the preposterous hope that he may not be infected.

volves the deepest and most accumulated guilt of which human nature is capable. What a dreadful aggravation is it of the depravity of mankind, that it has encreased to such a degree as to endanger the very existence of society, while they were making a solemn profession of Christianity. A Religion the purity and perfection of which would fully demonstrate, if other proof were wanting, its divine origin—a Religion which contains a perfect rule of conduct, and instructs us how to act in every condition and character—a Religion which inculcates with clearness and precision the duties of Rulers and subjects—of Parents and Children—of Husbands and Wives—of Masters and Servants—of Friends and Neighbours—of Pastors and Flocks—of the Affluent and the Needy—of the elevated in Rank and the industrious Poor. It is impossible to conceive a situation in which man can be placed, but he may be sure of finding directions for his conduct in the sacred code of this Religion. Nay, it is impossible for him to act wrongly in any one respect, without violating some injunction of that code*. By the aid of Christianity, he may even be prepared for all the vicissitudes of life; an advantage of peculiar value, in times of calamity. Whatever may be the result of this awful and eventful period, the true Christian may look forward, even to the worst, with fortitude and composure. He may be confident of support under any trials which he may be destined to undergo. He is sure of consolations, more than sufficient to counter-balance the weight of the heaviest afflictions. He may defy the wrath and fury of his enemies, for the interests which he most values are

* An attention to the duties of Christianity would tend exceedingly to promote an unity respecting its doctrines and worship. If true Christian purity were to prevail, the doctrinal errors which exist (for in every disputed point one party must be in error) would mostly be done away. What but a disposition to evil works could produce a belief in that most dangerous of all doctrines—a doctrine as repugnant to Scripture as it is favourable to vice—that Faith without Works is sufficient to Salvation.

out of their reach. At the stake or on the scaffold he triumphs over his persecutors. How enviable the sufferings of a Charles the First, or a Louis the Fourteenth, when compared with the prosperity of a Cromwell, a Robespierre, or a Buonaparte !

To the gross neglect and abuse of so high and inestimable a privilege may justly be attributed the extraordinary calamities and perils, which distinguish the present crisis from all former periods. By the irrevocable decrees of Heaven, misery is inevitably the consequence, both in individuals and states, of vice—and in proportion to the value of the Religious and moral advantages which are abused, that misery must be expected to be severe. But the events of this wonderful time are of so astonishing a nature, and of so uncommon a magnitude—they lead apparently to consequences so vast and tremendous—they have been brought about by causes which, in their operation, have so completely violated all the rules of probability, and set all calculation at defiance—and they are attended with circumstances so strange and unaccountable, that it is impossible for the serious mind not to consider them as marks of Divine displeasure, manifested by an extraordinary interposition, for the punishment and correction of guilty man. To suppose that such events can happen without the immediate agency of a superintending Providence, would be almost to presume that the Ruler of Heaven takes no concern in the government of the Earth. Without, indeed, the reflection that the Deity is now specially interfering in the affairs of the world, for purposes known only to himself, but which we may with certainty conclude to be ultimately directed to the welfare of his creatures, it would be beyond human fortitude to support the scenes which excite sensibility, or to endure the prospects which embitter expectation.—But while we find relief and even consolation from the thought, that we are in the hands of Him who
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can say to the desolating torrent, *thus far shalt thou go, but no farther*, and who undoubtedly desires the happiness of those, whom he has made with a capacity for happiness, it is impossible to say to what extent his justice, nay, even his general goodness, may require the punishment of those who now inhabit the earth. If, as there seems abundant reason to conclude, he be now displaying, in a signal manner, his vengeance against a guilty world, if he be vindicating his Laws, which have been broken, and his Religion, which has been contemned, if he be inflicting his fatherly chastisement for the correction and improvement of his disobedient children—we may be sure that his present awful dispensations will, like all his means, be adequate to the accomplishment of the end which they are intended to produce. But how far, both in severity and duration, they are to be carried before they answer their intended purpose, is a consideration which, at all events, must inspire us with dread, but which is peculiarly calculated to excite alarm, if we reflect on their failure, hitherto, to produce any material effect. This is, perhaps, the most awful symptom attending our situation. Already has the visitation lasted ten years—already has it laid in ruins half the establishments of the civilized world, and convulsed all Society to its foundations. Already has it produced carnage, and desolation, and anarchy, not to be equalled in the history of the world—and yet mankind do not seem to be roused—luxury and dissipation have experienced no abatement, and vice has not slackened her career. Even in the most virtuous country of Europe, in the very midst of so dreadful a scene, incredible to relate, an attempt to pass a law to restrain the crying sin of adultery, has failed of success! In short, in the midst of all its sufferings, the world seems to exhibit the shocking spectacle of a hardened and impenitent race, determined to brave the vengeance of the Almighty—to despise his threats, and to defy his wrath.


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If this statement were not confirmed by the evidence of our senses, it could not gain the smallest degree of credit. It would appear absolutely impossible, that such signal marks of Divine displeasure, as are displayed in the present state of the social world, could fail to impress the human mind with the most serious alarm, to produce an instant change in the manners of Society, and to fill the churches with devout and earnest supplicants, of every rank and condition, imploring Heaven, at least to suspend its vengeance, and vowing, with the deepest contrition, to seek its favour by a thorough amendment of heart and life. But, alas! no such propitious symptoms as yet appear.—Nay, it is impossible to discover any symptoms which indicate that mankind are even at all aware of their real situation.

Still, however, thanks to the indulgence of Heaven, we have reason to hope that the door is open. Hitherto, amidst all its dangers, Society has been saved from destruction by the magnanimous efforts of a country, which, because it possesses more Religion and virtue than any other, seems to have been the chosen instrument of general preservation. To that country it properly belongs to set an example, without which all its efforts will be ultimately of no avail—of GENERAL REFORMATION. Unless such an example be set, and unless it be followed, all the miseries which mankind have hitherto experienced are, to judge from appearances, but a slight fore-taste of those which are still in store for them. But if the severe chastisement, with which they are now visited, should at length produce its due effect—if it should excite them to serious reflection—if it should inspire them with heartfelt compunction for the impiety and vice, which have drawn such severe judgments upon their heads, and make them loathe, and for ever abjure, those accursed systems of infidelity and immorality, which they have suffered to acquire so dreadful an ascendancy—if they determine, with unalterable resolution, strictly to conform to the Holy Religion which is
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given them as the rule of their conduct, and the standard of their lives—if, by means of education, they render that Religion an object of early veneration and attachment, and thus establish its empire in the human heart, and secure its influence in Society—then may they reasonably hope that this night of blackness, and tempest, and horror, will be followed by a bright and glorious day—then may they, without presumption, expect the nineteenth century, not only to be signalized by the Greatest Deliverance ever yet experienced by the human race—but also to be distinguished by a great and progressive encrease of social happiness.





ORIGIN OF THE WAR.

It has been noticed in the former part of this publication, that Citizen Talleyrand, in his letter to Lord Grenville, ascribed the existence of the war, and "the evils which have afflicted Europe," to "the projects of subjection, dissolution, and dismemberment which were prepared against France."

Although this charge has been repeatedly advanced, and as often repelled, it acquires fresh importance by being renewed on so solemn an occasion. Being connected with overtures for pacification, it seems designed to involve us in the double guilt of an unjust commencement, and of an obstinate continuance of the war. As Citizen Talleyrand was a public character, in the confidence of the Revolutionary Rulers of France, at the beginning of hostilities, he must be supposed to have it in his power to substantiate it, if true, by incontrovertible evidence; and when could he have so strong an inducement to bring forward such evidence, as when he undertook to repel the charge of French aggression, which had been pointedly advanced by Lord Grenville? Such an occasion is therefore peculiarly favourable for an investigation of the grounds, on which the origin of the War is ascribed to the adversaries of France. But another consideration presents itself to induce such an investigation at the present moment. An eminent English Orator and Statesman has taken upon himself to repeat, in substance, the charge of the Citizen Minister. Mr. Fox, during
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his coruscation in Parliament, at the beginning of the present year, took the opportunity which the discussion of the recent overtures from France afforded him, to declare his opinion, that Great Britain and her Allies were the aggressors in the war *; and in support of that opinion he relied with much triumph on a document which had recently transpired. That document was the declaration at Mantua, which Mr. Fox quoted from M. Bertrand de Moleville's "Annals of the French Revolution." This reference produced a correspondence (since published) between Mr. Fox and M. Bertrand de Moleville, in which the latter Gentleman principally confined his attention to the exculpation of his late Sovereign Lewis XVth, from an imputation which was cast by Mr. Fox on the memory of that Monarch, and which M. Bertrand de Moleville observes, is the "point most interesting" to him. But Mr. Fox, in this correspondence, persisted in the opinion he had delivered in Parliament respecting the origin of the war, and he contended strenuously that the declaration at Mantua amounted to a decisive proof that Austria and Prussia were the aggressors, and that France was perfectly justifiable in declaring war against those Powers. The great importance attached by Mr. Fox to this document renders it a matter of much curiosity; but the opportunity which that Gentleman has thus afforded of ascertaining the grounds, which he considers as conclusive of the great question of aggression, is too valuable to be lost. It is but seldom that he or his friends are to be found within those lists, in which they may be fairly met and encountered.

* "I continue to think, and, until I see better grounds for changing my opinion, than any that the Right Hon. Gentleman (Mr. Pitt) has this night produced, I shall continue to think and to say, plainly and explicitly, that this country was the aggressor in the war."—"But for Austria and Prussia, is there a man, who for one moment, can dispute that they were the aggressors?" And again, "that Austria and Prussia were the aggressors, not a man in any country, who has given himself the trouble to think at all upon the subject, can doubt." *Debrett's Parliamentary Register*, No. 99. p. 349, and 353.



The reasoning which is contained in Parliamentary speeches, is out of the reach both of general and of deliberate discussion. It has its effect, indeed, far beyond the walls of Parliament; but it cannot be brought within the pale of regular controversy. The Senator is not, like the writer, amenable to the Tribunal of the public. When, therefore, Gentlemen who, as Parliamentary leaders, have great weight in society, come out of their entrenchments, and appear upon the arena of literary discussion, such an opportunity of ascertaining the solidity of their doctrines, and the force of their reasonings, ought not to be neglected. Another honourable Gentleman had the candour thus to submit his opinions respecting the present war to the fair test of public investigation. And although the respectability of his name, aided by that sympathetic zeal, with which all persons, who are hostile to Government, propagate writings which, in any respect, favour their views (a zeal, unfortunately, peculiar to persons of that description), gave an astonishing currency to his publication, yet the controversy to which he afforded occasion, has, in the result, contributed still more firmly to convince the people of this country of the justice of their cause. Mr. Fox does not, indeed, in the letters which appear with his name before the public, enter so fully into the causes and consequences of the war as his learned and honourable friend has done. But he concurs with Citizen Talleyrand, in ascribing, in the most positive terms, the origin of the war to the Powers allied against France, and in asserting that their conduct was such as to justify that country in declaring war; should it appear that such persons, with all their zeal, and with all their information, have not been able to adduce any solid grounds in support of this charge, the most incredulous must be convinced that it is unfounded, and that the enormous crime of aggression is imputable only to Revolutionary France. The proposed

investigation will lead, and by a process the most favourable to the cause espoused by the advocates of France, to an examination of the various topics involved in the question respecting the origin of the war: but, in the first place, those advocates shall be severally heard; and it will be readily admitted that priority of attention is due, at least from an English writer, to Mr. Fox.

MR. FOX.

SOME observations made by that Gentleman in Parliament (as has been already observed) gave rise to a correspondence between him and M. Bertrand de Moleville, which has been since published. And as M. B. de M. in the first letter of that correspondence, quotes (from the Morning Chronicle) the passage in question in Mr. Fox's speech, that quotation, being admitted, by Mr. F. with a trifling alteration, must, when so corrected, be considered as a faithful and accurate report. It is given as follows in the translation of M. B. de M's. letter which is published with the original.

“ It would be vain to set up long and ingenious
 “ reasonings against the evidence of documents which
 “ are in every one's hand, and which demonstrate,
 “ beyond all refutation, that the unfortunate Monarch
 “ himself (Louis XVIth) and his confidential
 “ advisers had entered into negotiations with foreign
 “ powers, not to partition France, but to dictate by
 “ force of arms to France, and to compel them
 “ to depart from the system which they thought
 “ necessary to their happiness. Are Gentlemen
 “ pre-

“ prepared to deny the truth of the declaration made
 “ by the Emperor at Mantua ? Are Gentlemen pre-
 “ pared to deny the story as it is related by M. Ber-
 “ trand de Moleville * ? ” Of this quotation Mr. Fox
 only objected to the one expression, and thereby gave
 his sanction to the rest. In a postscript to his second
 letter to M. B. de M. he says, “ on re-perusing
 “ your former letter, I see that the last expression in
 “ the report of the Morning Chronicle is not correct.
 “ I did not say, “ *to compel them to depart from a*
 “ *system which they thought necessary to their own*
 “ *internal happiness.* I think I said, *to dictate by*
 “ *force of arms changes in their internal Govern-*
 “ *ment ; or to interfere by force in their internal Go-*
 “ *vernment.* ”

It appears then that the charge which Mr. Fox
 advances against foreign Powers, and which he con-
 siders as involving the crime of aggression, is, that
 they entered into negotiations with Louis XVIth, not
 to partition France, but to dictate by force of arms
 to the French people changes in their internal Govern-
 ment ; or to interfere by force in their internal Go-
 vernment. And he is reported to have said in Parlia-
 ment, that this, though not “ a plan for the partition of
 France,” was, “ in the eye of reason and common sense,
 “ an aggression against France†.” A sentiment which is
 entirely in unison with his reasoning in the correspond-
 ence, in which he says that “ the declaration made
 “ there (at Mantua) with other circumstances, which,
 “ as well as that declaration, were not known till a
 “ long time after, furnish incontestible proofs that
 “ the Austrian Government had taken a part in
 “ hostile designs, that had in view the internal Go-
 “ vernment of France, which is in my opinion a very
 “ just cause of war : I say hostile designs, because to
 “ declare war and advance troops, appear to me une-
 “ quivocal hostilities.”

* See Correspondence, &c. p. 9.

† See Debrett's Parliamentary Register, No. 99, p. 349.

It is a circumstance which deserves particular attention, that Mr. Fox here expressly acquits the confederated Powers of a design *to partition France*. In this respect he not only differs with Talleyrand, who accuses those Powers of "projects of subjection, dissolution and dismemberment;" but he candidly lends his authority to prove, that all the accusations which have imputed such projects to the Powers of Europe, and which have sometimes been even sanctioned by his name, are entirely destitute of foundation.

In support of the charge of confederating, not to partition, but to dictate by force of arms changes in the internal Government of France, Mr. Fox quotes the declaration of the Emperor of Germany at Mantua; and he calls as a witness, to prove that declaration, M. Bertrand de Moleville. It is therefore necessary to hear the evidence of this Gentleman. In his account of this transaction, M. B. de M. represents the King of France, who had been dragged by a sanguinary and ferocious mob from his Palace at Versailles, as a prisoner in his capital, exposed to the outrages of popular tumult, and obliged for the immediate safety of himself, his family, and his faithful adherents, to comply with the demands of the factious demagogues, in whose power he was. The Palace where he resided, says the author, "began to assume all the marks of a State prison, into which, as was formerly the case with the Bastille, only the Governor, the guards, and the servants were suffered to pass*."

Such was the situation of the King. What was that of the country? M. de la Fayette himself has thus described it: "Paris was divided by factions, and the Kingdom oppressed by anarchy." The same nobleman adds, in relation to his imprisoned Sovereign, whose *Gaoler* he was, "The King wished only for the happiness of his people, and for the general tranquillity to begin his own†."

* Annals of the French Revolution, Vol. III. p. 390.

† *Ib.* p. 396.

It was natural for the unfortunate Monarch to be desirous of effecting his deliverance from such a situation. And surely so staunch a friend to freedom as Mr. Fox will not deny him, because he was a King, that common privilege of humanity. Nay, when it is considered that the great wish of his heart was the happiness of his people, and that he had no means of accomplishing the noble and generous wish, unless he could escape from confinement, his endeavour to attain that object must appear to be even meritorious and praiseworthy.

Various plans suggested themselves to the King and his friends, as calculated to deliver the Royal Family from imprisonment, and the Kingdom from "anarchy." But that which relates to the present enquiry, as being quoted by Mr. Fox in support of his charge, was the one proposed by M. Montmorin. The object of that plan was "to invite the Emperor of Germany to form a feigned coalition with the Empire, Prussia, Russia, Spain, and the King of Naples and Sardinia, *to declare, but not to make actual war against France*." It was proposed that this coalition, "once formed, should publish a Manifesto, the chief grounds of which should be the maintenance of the rights of the Princes who had possessions in France, and the common interest of all the Powers to stop a Revolution, the principles and manœuvres of which tended to nothing less than the subversion of all the Governments of Europe."†

By the influence of such a coalition, and of the formidable preparations which it was proposed to make, it was expected that the King would be enabled to regain his liberty, and to resume his lawful prerogatives, which were to be employed in their very first exercise, in removing all apprehension of war, by obtaining "an armistice," and concerting with the National Assembly "conditions of Peace." Nay, so far was he and his advisers from wishing to employ force against the nation, that it was part of the plan

* Ibid vol. v. p. 9.

† Ibid.

to convoke, as soon as the tyranny of "Faction" and "Anarchy" should be suppressed, the Bailiwick Assemblies throughout the Kingdom, that they might "be consulted not only respecting the demands of the different Powers, but respecting the plan of a Declaration drawn up according to the desires, contained in the majority of the instructions to the Deputies, and which was no more than a summary of the ancient Monarchical Government, cleared from all its abuses, and improved on principles the most prudent, and the most proper to secure the stability of the French Constitution*."

Such was the plan which was suggested by M. Montmorin, and which was proposed, through the intervention of M. de Mercy, to the Emperor. To this proposal that Monarch returned "the most satisfactory answer," promising that "without delay he would enter upon the negotiation proposed to him." In the performance of this promise M. Bertrand de Moleville says "he did not lose a moment;" and afterwards, on the 20th of May, in an interview with the Count d'Artois, at Mantua, he made the famous Declaration, on which so much stress is now laid, and which is thus described by the author of the annals:—"The joy and surprise of his Royal Highness" (the Count d'Artois) "were extreme, when he learned that a powerful coalition was forming for the relief of the King and Queen; that the Emperor was already assured of the concurrence of the Circles, Switzerland, Spain, Sardinia, and other Powers; and that it only remained to determine, by a well-concerted plan, the most advantageous manner of employing their forces, and the measures to be taken in the interior to second this movement, and ensure its success, without their Majesties being reduced to the necessity of executing the project of retreating to Metz, of which M. de Mercy had informed the Emperor†."

* Ibid. p. 24.

† Ibid. p. 65.

Some doubt has been thrown upon the above statement by the author of the *Mercure Britannique*, No. 34, in which the whole story is treated as chimerical, on account of the pacific system which the Cabinet of Vienna had unalterably adopted. But the statement shall be taken for granted in all its circumstances, that the case may be considered in the light most favourable to France, and that it may be ascertained whether the facts most relied on by her advocates, afford any just cause for her declaration of war: and should it appear that they do not afford such cause, it must, of necessity, be allowed that she was the aggressor.

In the prosecution of this enquiry, it is immaterial what opinion any one may form of the policy and expediency of the plan of M. Montmorin. Some may think a more manly and open assertion of the King's rights would have been preferable to so complicated and circuitous an attempt to effect his deliverance. It should not, however, be forgotten, that this Prince, virtuous as he was, and history scarcely records a character, public or private, more eminent for virtue, unfortunately for himself, his adherents, his people, and, indeed, the whole world, was destitute of that firmness, decision, and energy of mind, which are at all times essential requisites in the character of a Monarch, and which were peculiarly wanted in the extraordinary circumstances in which Louis XVIth was placed. The fate of this Monarch, and of his country, will be, to the end of time, an instructive lesson in the school of Princes; inculcating, by the most dreadful experience, that a wavering and inconstant policy, though proceeding from an amiable diffidence, and a conscientious fear of acting wrong;—that a disinterested and conciliating readiness to concede rights which may seem to be personal, but which are attached to the station of a Prince;—that a compassionate reluctance to employ just severity, and to shed that blood which is due to the law and to the general security;—that these qualities are infinitely more mischievous, both

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to Prince and people—more productive of misery, oppression, carnage, and ruin, than the most ferocious, sanguinary, and tyrannical disposition.

In enquiring whether the declaration at Mantua justified the subsequent declaration of war by France, which is the real point in issue, the case shall first be considered without any particular allusion to the danger, to which all states were exposed by so violent and outrageous a Revolution, as that which had broken out in France, or to the just alarm which all Princes might feel, lest their own authority should be disturbed by the principles, upon which that Revolution was founded. Laying aside, for the present, such considerations, it must, on general principles, be admitted, that Foreign Powers were entitled, by the laws of nations, to give assistance to the King and the Royalist party in France, against the adherents of the Revolution. Even in the case of a civil war, such Powers may lawfully “assist the party “ which they shall judge to have right on its side, in “ case this party shall request their assistance, or accept “ the offer of it*.” And Mr. Fox himself, on the occasion of our interfering, in the year 1787, in favour of the Stadtholder of the United Provinces, admitted in the House of Commons, that *when two parties divide a State, a Foreign Power may lawfully interfere, to support the party which is friendly, and to oppose that which is hostile to its interests.* *A fortiori*, then, was it lawful for the Powers of Europe to assist a legitimate Sovereign, whose right was acknowledged by the whole nation, but whose authority was overborne by faction, and whose country was oppressed by anarchy. The request, or the acceptance of such aid, by the King, would have rendered the interference perfectly justifiable, and have prevented it from being in the least hostile to the independence of the country.

If, therefore, instead of acceding to a plan, the object of which was, not to make, but only to declare War, the Emperor had, with the approbation of the King, sent his armies into France, for the purpose of rescuing the Royal Family, and of restoring the Royal authority, such a measure would have been completely justified by the law of nations, even without any reference to the peculiar and unprecedented circumstances which called upon Foreign Powers, for their own preservation, to put a stop to a Revolution, which endangered the existence of every Government, and the tranquillity of every State, and which has actually convulsed the whole fabric of civil society to its very foundations. In regard to some of the Powers of Europe, it was not only a right but a duty to lend their aid to the King of France, under the circumstances in which he was placed. At the treaty of Utrecht, the Protestant succession to the Throne of Great Britain, and the succession of the reigning branch of the House of Bourbon to the Throne of France, were mutually recognized by the Sovereigns of the two Kingdoms: and by the 7th article of the Triple Alliance between France, England and Holland, signed at the Hague in 1717, it was stipulated that if the states of any of the Allies should "be disturbed by intestine quarrels, or
 " by rebellions, on account of the said successions, or
 " under any pretext whatever," the Ally thus in trouble should have a right to demand of his Allies the succours stipulated in the treaty. Further, by the 4th article of the Quadruple Alliance, signed in 1718, between England, France, Holland, and the Emperor of Germany, the contracting parties (that is England, Holland, and the Emperor) engage "to
 " guarantee and defend the right of succession to the
 " kingdom of France," according to the tenor of the treaty of Utrecht, "against all persons whatsoever
 " who may presume to disturb the order of the said
 " succession." These treaties have been confirmed by
 every

every subsequent treaty between Great Britain and France, down to the last definitive treaty in 1783, of which those treaties, with others therein specified, are declared to serve as the basis, and in which they are also declared to be renewed and confirmed in the best form*.

Now

* In the pamphlet already noticed, written by the Rev. John Brand, the obligation incurred by England, by virtue of the above treaties, is shewn to be not merely of the *positive*, but also of the *moral* kind: for, at the time the treaties were made, the succession to the Throne of France was exposed to no danger, and, in fact, it has derived no actual aid from the guarantee. But the Protestant succession in England was then exposed to the utmost danger, and (as Mr. B. has shewn), it was, in all appearance, preserved by the faithful adherence of France to her engagements. "By the terms of the treaty (says this writer) the advantage to both seems to be mutual, but the circumstances of the period considered, when no danger menaced the Throne of France, and that of the Hanoverian Family in England was assailed by a strong domestic faction, and by the coalition of the two most able Sovereigns who have reigned in Europe in the present century," (Charles the XIIth and Peter the Great, who secretly combined against George I. and whose conspiracy was revealed to that Monarch by the Regent of France), "the benefit of this mutual guarantee was entirely on our side."—And again, "These treaties were in terms equal; as preserving to each Sovereign the honourable appearance of being seated with an equal stability on the Throne. In effect, they bound France to the support of the Hanoverian Family; at first, certainly, not firmly established here, and at that particular juncture in much additional hazard; and Britain to the support of the Crown of France, seemingly in the firmest security. This obligation, as undertaken spontaneously, was almost a *nudum pactum*, and conventional only upon the latter; whereas on the side of Britain it was conventional and moral. And the nation thereby came under a moral obligation, to give to the Prince reigning in France the same support the King of Great Britain had received, the circumstances being the same; that is, to aid him against all rebels during the time of peace: for it is dormant, from its nature, in every war, and revives on its termination. It was, therefore, in force in the year

Now as positive engagements existed to assist the House of Bourbon in case France should be disturbed by intestine quarrels, or rebellions, on account of the succession of that house, or under any pretext whatsoever, and still more particularly to defend that succession against all persons who should presume to disturb it, it is undeniable that the *casus federis* occurred at the time of the French Revolution; for no persons could more effectually disturb the order of the suc-

cession year 1792, when Louis was deposed: and not having been discharged to him, is yet due to his heirs."

Mr. B. afterwards applies this subject to Mr. Fox, who was in office when the Definitive Treaty of 1783, between Great Britain and France, was signed; by which Treaty the Triple and Quadruple Alliances, containing the mutual guarantee, *were renewed and confirmed in the best form.* The inconsistency of Mr. Fox is then displayed in a strong point of view; as that Gentleman, after having, as a Minister, contributed to bind the Crown of Great Britain to the performance of the above guarantee, and having, as a Member of Parliament, spoken in favour of the Preliminary Articles, and voted for a resolution, purporting that the public faith, which had been pledged by those Articles, ought to be preserved inviolate, has since, as a Member of Opposition, laboured to force the Crown to violate its faith, by endeavouring, during the present war, to obtain from Parliament declarations that the war ought not to be directed to the restoration of the House of Bourbon.

So far Mr. Brand. But this subject, as it regards Mr. Fox, is open to another observation. That Gentleman has not merely endeavoured to prevent the Crown of Great Britain from preserving that faith, which he contributed to make it pledge, but he has been distinguished as a most violent, a most rancorous enemy of the House of Bourbon, the succession of which he engaged the British Crown solemnly to guarantee. In the teeth of such an engagement, he has openly exulted in the overthrow of that House! He has most vehemently deprecated its Restoration! He has neglected no opportunity of declaring it to be the object of his utter abhorrence; not, indeed, on account of any thing it has recently done, but for transactions which had occurred in remote times, and of which he was fully apprized when he renewed the above stipulations in its favour.

cession of the House of Bourbon than the French Revolutionists. Such a measure of actual force would not have borne any of the constructions which Mr. Fox put upon the scheme of mere intimidation adopted by the Austrian Government, when he accused it of "dictating by force changes in the internal Government of France;" of "interfering by force in their internal Government;" or "of taking a part in hostile designs that had in view the internal Government of France*." The privity of the lawful Monarch would have repelled all idea of a *dictatorial* interposition, or of a hostile interference with the Government; and instead of being directed to the introduction of changes, it is plain that the object of such an interposition would have been the prevention of any change, and the preservation of the ancient authority. As to the expression of "interfering by force in the internal Government of France," it is so vague as to include both a lawful and an unlawful interference. That a forcible interference might be lawful has been shewn, and must be admitted by Mr. Fox, unless he disclaim the authority of the law of nations, nay, unless he be inconsistent with himself—unless, indeed, he contend that in no case those who are assailed by domestic violence may be succoured by a Foreign Power. But for this he will not contend. He will be ready enough to admit, that a people acting against their Sovereign may lawfully receive Foreign assistance; but will he go the length of asserting that such assistance may not justifiably be given to a Sovereign, menaced, insulted, and imprisoned by his own subjects, and whose crown and life are in danger? This doctrine he must maintain, or he must allow that the other Powers of Europe, with the consent of *Louis* XVIth, might lawfully have marched their armies into France, to deliver the Royal Family, and to preserve the Throne of the Bourbons.

* See ante.

It appears, however, that it was not in contemplation to employ force in support of the King's authority. His Majesty considered the attachment of his people as so strong, that, in order to restore tranquillity to the State, and security to his Government, nothing more was wanting than to suppress the domineering influence of faction. For that purpose only did he solicit foreign interposition; that, by a shew of powerful support, and without any violence or bloodshed, he might be enabled to awe disaffection, to repress sedition, and to subdue anarchy. Not that this distinction between force and intimidation is necessary for the argument. The interference which he requested would have been lawfully granted, if its object had been, not merely to declare or to feign war, but actually to reduce by arms all who should resist his authority.

But although the sanction of the King would, upon established principles, have made the interference of Foreign Powers, to any extent, justifiable; although it would have rendered such interference compatible with the independence of France; perhaps it may be urged that a Revolution, founded upon the Rights of Man, furnished an exception to the general rule—that by such a Revolution the *delegated* Powers of Government were taken from the King, and resumed by the people—that both the King and Foreign States were bound to recognize and respect this recurrence to original principles—that to combine, for the purpose of interfering in any manner in the affairs of a nation so circumstanced, was a treasonable conspiracy against the Sovereignty of the People, and a violation of those sacred principles, which are paramount to all law, public or municipal, and to all institutions and establishments of society.

It is on such grounds that Mr. Fox must support his charge, or he must abandon it altogether. Nay, it is by such reasoning alone that he can render the terms of his accusation intelligible. On the supposition of the Sovereignty being in the King, it is not
only

only repugnant to the law of nations, but it is absolute nonsense, to describe the interference of Foreign Powers, at his request, as an attempt to dictate, by force, changes in the internal Government of France. But if, on the contrary, the case be decided upon the principles of the Whig Club in England and the Jacobin Club in France, the charge is perfectly comprehensible, and the interference in question, in favour of a lawful government, to suppress rebellion, and to prevent revolution, is a gross infraction of the sovereignty of the people—an unpardonable violation of that beautiful system which inverts the ancient order of society, by making the people supreme, and their Rulers subordinate; and, according to which, there are scarcely one hundred subjects in the world who are so wicked as to hold above one thousand millions of their sovereigns in bondage.

It cannot, surely, be necessary, after the experience of the last ten years, to enter a formal protest against this system, or to shew that the doctrine of the Sovereignty of the People is alike absurd and mischievous—that it is at total variance with the nature of man as a social being, and with the law of God, who gave to all being its essential nature—that an attempt to reduce it to practice tends only to involve mankind in miseries, of which they would not otherwise be able even to form an idea—miseries so great (as France can testify) that, in exchange for them, the most unjust, violent, and degrading tyranny of an individual usurper, would prove a welcome deliverance. Neither can it be necessary to remind the reader, that the French Revolution, instead of being an effort of the people to resume a Sovereignty, alike incompatible with their duty as subjects, and with their nature as men, was in no respect *their act*—that they did no more than nominate, at the call of their Sovereign, their Deputies to the lawful States of the Kingdom—not for the purpose of producing a Revolution, which never entered into their imagination, but of supporting and aiding their lawful Government—that they

expressly ordered their Deputies, under the sanction of an oath, to maintain and preserve the ancient Constitution of France—but that a factious, though, unfortunately, a major part of those Deputies, in direct violation of the mandates which they had sworn to obey, conspired against the Government, subverted the Constitution, denominated themselves a National Assembly, submitted themselves to the direction of Clubs, imprisoned the King, and, by the confession of M. de la Fayette himself, who had a great share in these atrocious transactions, “involved the country in all the horrors of anarchy.”

But notwithstanding the full refutation which experience has given of that system on which alone Mr. Fox's charge, against Foreign Powers, of an unjust interference in the affairs of France can be supported—notwithstanding the clear and decisive evidence by which it appears, that the French Revolution; far from investing the people with the Sovereignty, counteracted their wishes, violated their mandates, and compelled them to exchange the mild rule of a lawful, a virtuous, and a beloved Sovereign, for the galling yoke of blood-thirsty demagogues, and the insufferable oppression of anarchy—still, however, in order to shew that the advocates of France cannot maintain her cause even on their own grounds, the case shall be considered upon Revolutionary principles. It shall be assumed that the rights of Government were lawfully vested, by the people, in the National Assembly—that the authority of that body, though directed by factions and clubs, was sacred as well as supreme—that its power, though derived from insurrection, was more holy and inviolable than that of a Monarch, recognized by ancient law—even the authority which the new Constitution allotted to the King, shall be left out of the question, and the unfortunate Monarch shall be considered, as he was meant to be, as a mere cypher. In return for such concessions, nothing more is asked than that these Sovereigns by Revolt and Revolution shall be considered as bound, towards Foreign Powers, by the same rules as other Sovereigns.

reigns. Otherwise, they would not only overthrow all established authority at home, but supersede all the maxims which regulate the mutual intercourse of States.

See then the Revolutionists of France in possession of the Sovereignty—see them declaring War against the Emperor, because that Prince, as appears from the Declaration of Mantua, had concerted with the King of France for the restoration of the Royal Authority, and the overthrow of their usurpation—an interference which Mr. Fox declares to be *a very just cause of War*. But it happens, unfortunately, that however *just* a cause of war such interference might be, it was not, in point of fact, the *real* cause of the War declared by France; for it was not known to exist by any individual of the Assembly which decreed the Declaration of War. M. Bertrand de Moleville says, “Both the project and the Declaration” (at Mantua), “remained buried in the most profound secrecy, and “were known neither in France nor England till “published in my last work *;” that is to say, till the year 1800. This, it is apprehended, is not quite accurate; as the Declaration at Mantua is stated in the volume of the Annual Register for 1792, which, however, (being part of a work friendly to Order and good Government), was not published till 1798. But it is quite enough for the argument, that the Declaration at Mantua was not published previously to the Declaration of War; and Mr. Fox, in his second Letter to M. Bertrand de Moleville, admits that what passed at Mantua was “not the *motive* by which “France was determined to declare War.” Now, if this was not her motive, it surely cannot be pleaded in her justification; for the true question is, whether the motive by which she was induced to act on that occasion was a just one? But what was unknown to her could not possibly be her motive. Such a case must

* See Correspondence, page 47.

be decided by the rule "*de non existentibus et de non apparentibus, eadem est ratio :*" and as the motive in question did not exist, it could not operate, and it devolves upon France and her advocates to assign another in her vindication. This they have not done; of course, it must be concluded that she declared War without a justifiable motive, or, which is the same thing, that she was the aggressor.

But, says Mr. Fox, "France, though ignorant of the Declaration at Mantua, had many reasons for believing a league of that kind, which has been since demonstrated. It seems to me that, in believing it, she had good grounds; she declared War upon appearances more or less convincing; and the Declaration at Mantua, among other facts, proves that she was not deceived in those appearances*."

Here is a new code of Political Morality, promulgated by the *zealous* advocate of Peace. To justify a Declaration of War, it seems that nothing more is wanting than "appearances, more or less convincing," provided it turn out that the party was not deceived by those appearances;—that suspicion is a good ground for War, provided that it ultimately appear that there was good ground for that suspicion.

If the greatest slave to warlike ambition had endeavoured to frame a doctrine favourable to his predominant passion, he could not have contrived one better calculated to answer that purpose, than this of Mr. Fox. What could tend so much to encrease the frequency of Wars, as the admission of the principle that States may lawfully resort to hostilities, without any other ground than appearances, leaving it to futurity to shew that they *were not deceived by those appearances*? What could be so copious a source of contention as a principle, which would afford a never-failing pretext for

* Correspondence, page 48.

Nations to have recourse to arms upon mere suspicion? What would avail the apparent restriction that a War so begun would not be really just, unless it should ultimately appear that there existed at the time a good cause for hostilities? The party commencing the attack would always assert the existence of such a cause. He might, even with the best intentions, deceive himself, and be induced to act rashly upon unfounded apprehensions of leagues and conspiracies against him. He would be freed, in a great measure, from that powerful check, the restraint of public opinion, at the moment when that check is of the greatest importance—the moment of action; for it would be unjust to condemn him, while it remained possible for circumstances to transpire which might eventually justify his conduct. He would be sole judge in his own cause, instead of standing before the tribunal of the world; and his prejudices and passions would be released from all external restraint, by such a suspension of responsibility to that tribunal. But if actuated by evil dispositions—if urged by ambition or avarice to disturb the peace of others—what a cloak would the doctrine in question afford him for the gratification of such propensities! Nay, what means would it furnish for the accomplishment of his mischievous purposes! How would it supply him with pretexts to attack the most inoffensive States, to surprize them when off their guard, and to prevent other States from affording them assistance! To the most serious and pressing remonstrances he might reply, that his attack would be justified *in future*; that he made War *upon appearances more or less convincing*, and though those appearances were visible only to himself, it would afterwards be proved that *he was not deceived by them*. In the mean time, he would easily find colourings and pretences to render his conduct plausible. In proportion to his guilt, he would be loud in accusation, and the world has lately seen with what audacity the most atrocious cri-

criminals can persist in accusing those who are most deeply injured. In short, the doctrine in question would be an inexhaustible source of self-deception, chicane, injustice and War.

Happily for mankind, this pernicious doctrine is as much at variance with the law of nations as with the peace of the world. It is one grand object of that law to prevent States from going to War upon appearances—to restrain them from having recourse to arms, without the most clear and urgent necessity. It was the principle of this salutary system, even before the benign influence of Christianity had ripened it into a complete Code of Humanity, that *War is just only when it is necessary—that arms are lawful only when there is no other resource.*—“*Justum bellum quibus necessarium; et pia arma quibus nulla nisi in armis relinquitur spes**.” In modern times a more precise Code has been formed, the authority of which was considered as indisputable, until Revolutionary France assumed a right to supersede all the principles, which had been recognized in the intercourse of mankind, in their various relations, public and private.

It is a fundamental principle of that Code, according to the writers whose authority upon the subject is universally admitted to be conclusive, that no War is justifiable unless it be necessary either to redress or to prevent an injury. “*Causa justa belli suscipiendi nulla esse alia potest nisi injuria†.*” And in order to preclude, as much as possible, all uncertainty in the motives which may induce States to engage in War, in order to prevent them from acting in such a case upon “*appearances more or less convincing,*” the fear of uncertain and distant danger is expressly declared to be insufficient, and it is required that the danger be not only real, but *immediate*, and that there exist a moral

* Tit. Liv. L. 11.

† Grot. de jur. bel. & pac. L. 2. c. 1. § 2.

certainty of the hostile intention of the party to be attacked. "Periculum præsens hic requiritur et quasi "in puncto*"—"Quod si quis vim non jam præsentem intentet sed conjurasse aut insidiari compertus sit, hunc nego jure posse interfici si aut aliter evadi periculum potest †."—"Adversus incertos metus non a vi præsidium petendum est ‡."—"Metus rei incertæ jus ad vim dare non potest †."—"Ut justa sit defensio necessariam esse oportet, qualis non est nisi constet, non tantum de potentiâ, sed et de animo; et quidem ita constet, ut certum id sit eâ certitudine, quæ in morali materiâ locum habet ||."

"The causes of every War, especially of the offensive, ought to be evident, and without mixture of doubt and uncertainty: for it is very usual in cases of this nature for doubts to arise, either perhaps out of ignorance of matter of fact, when it is not absolutely certain whether it was done or not, or with what intention it was done, &c. ¶"

But to justify an appeal to arms, it is not sufficient that the injury to be redressed, be certain, or the danger to be repelled, immediate—that the causes of War be evident, without any mixture of doubt: it is also necessary that all possible endeavours be used to remove those causes—that all other means to obtain satisfaction or security be employed in vain and exhausted, before it can be lawful to resort to hostilities. This principle, indeed, flows from the fundamental rule, inculcated by reason itself, and recognized by the ancients, that "War is just only when it is necessary**:" for it cannot be necessary if its object may be otherwise obtained. Therefore whatever provocations may have taken place, it is not lawful to resort to arms, without endeavouring to the utmost to accommodate differences, in a peaceable manner: and every

* Grot. de jur. bel. & pac. L. 2. c. 1. § 5. † Ibid. ‡ Ibid, § 17.

† Ibid, § 18. || Ibid, c. 22. § 5.

¶ Puffendorff, Law of Nature and Nations, B. 8. c. 6. § 4.

** See ante, p. 21.

death produced by War is a wanton murder, chargeable on the party *commencing* hostilities, if that party neglected any thing in his power to preclude the necessity of so dreadful an expedient. On this subject the law of Nations is no less explicit than on the other :—

“ As no uncertain pretensions ought to be made use of, so neither should men immediately seek redress by arms, but sincerely endeavour to compose the differences, before they break out into a War*.”—
 “ Two things are necessary to render offensive War just: first, a right to be asserted; that is, that the demand made on another Nation be important and well-grounded; secondly, that this reasonable demand cannot be obtained otherwise than by force of arms. They who, without trying pacific measures, on the least motive run to arms, sufficiently shew that justificative reasons in their mouths are only pretences; they eagerly seize an opportunity of indulging their passions, and of gratifying their ambition, under some colour of right †.”

What a contrast to this wise, cautious, and pacific system is exhibited in the doctrine of Mr. Fox, that *France was justified in “ declaring War upon appearances, more or less convincing;”* and that, although she did not know of the league proved by the Declaration at Mantua, but had only “ reasons for believing a league of that kind;” that is to say, had grounds for suspicion; yet as some years afterwards evidence transpired to shew that “ she was not deceived in those appearances” to which she trusted, she was not the aggressor, but the whole guilt of the War is chargeable upon those whom, under such circumstances, she attacked.

Such, in the very teeth of the law of Nations, is the opinion of an English Orator and Statesman: but in giving such an opinion that Orator and Statesman

* Vattel, Law of Nations, B. 3. c. 3. sect. 37. † Ibid.

not only set at defiance the public Code, but sinned against his own knowledge, unless all the reports of his speech, on the occasion alluded to, are grossly incorrect: for in that speech he is reported, in allusion to the conduct of this country, which *did not declare War*, thus to have expressed himself:—"A Nation, " to justify itself in appealing to the last solemn resort, " ought to prove that it had taken every possible " means, consistent with dignity, to demand the re- " paration and redress which would be satisfactory; " and if she refused to explain what would be satis- " factory, she did not do her duty, nor exonerate " herself from the charge of being the aggressor*."

If Mr. Fox really expressed himself in this manner, what a melancholy instance does he exhibit of the inconsistencies, contradictions and absurdities, into which the greatest talents may be betrayed, by an implicit submission to the blind impulse of party zeal!—Not only did he, in the character of a friend to Peace, maintain doctrines which, if once admitted, would remove all the ob-

* See Debrett's Parliamentary Register, No. 99, page 351. This observation was made by Mr. Fox, by way of criminating Great Britain for not explaining what would be satisfactory to her before the War. Any one, judging merely from such a charge, would suppose that she had commenced the War: for otherwise she could not be culpable towards France for not explaining what would be satisfactory to herself. But, though under no obligation to explain demands which she did not attempt to enforce, still the statement that she did not explain what would be satisfactory to her, is completely disproved by the following passages of Lord Grenville's letter to M. Chauvelin, dated Dec. 31, 1791.—"This Government, adhering to the " maxims which it has followed for more than a century, will never " see, with indifference, that France shall make herself, either directly " or indirectly, Sovereign of the Low Countries, or general Arbitress " of the Rights and Liberties of Europe.

" If France is really desirous of maintaining friendship and peace " with England, she must shew herself disposed to renounce her " views of aggression and aggrandizement, and to confine herself " within her own territories, without insulting other Govern- " ments, without disturbing their tranquillity, without violating " their Rights."

These demands were at once so explicit, and their object was so indispen- sible, that a refusal on the part of France to comply with them, would have justified Great Britain in declaring War.

stacles which the law of Nations has interposed to prevent unnecessary War, but, for the purpose of condemning his own country, he asserted the authority of that law which he had just before, in the very same breath, endeavoured to supersede in order to vindicate the conduct of France. When Great Britain is *attacked*, she is the aggressor because she does not explain *what would be satisfactory to her*. But when France *declares War*, she is justified in doing so *upon appearances*; and, far from being bound to make any explanation, *she* is authorized to kindle the flames of War, without even a knowledge of the cause, the existence and subsequent discovery of which are pleaded by her own advocate as her sufficient justification.

But had France been fully informed of the interview and Declaration at Mantua, would she have been entitled to declare War on those grounds? Mr. Fox has answered this question, unless he mean to consider France as absolved, by virtue of her Revolution, from the rules which are obligatory on other States: for, in conformity with the public law, he has declared it to be necessary for “a Nation, in order to justify “itself in appealing to the last resort, to take every “possible means, consistent with dignity, to demand “the reparation and redress which would be satisfactory.” Before, then, she could have been justified in making the Declaration at Mantua, and the league of Princes, causes of War, she must have uttered her complaints, and have *demanded the reparation and redress which would have been satisfactory to her*—and only in case “her reasonable demands “could not be obtained otherwise than by force of “arms*,” would she have been authorized to resort to hostilities?

The explanations, however, which must have taken place, had France, knowing the Declaration of Mantua,

* Vattel, ante p. 23.

made the circumstances contained in it a formal ground of complaint, would have precluded all necessity of appealing to arms. For it would then have appeared, supposing the truth to have appeared, that the project specified in that Declaration, had been proposed by her King, and could not be carried into execution without his co-operation; consequently, it was not directed against her independence as a Sovereign State—that it was not a hostile project, to be effected by force, but that its utmost object was to feign or declare War, for the purpose of procuring for the King security of person, and free exercise of the authority which was nominally vested in him by the new Constitution. But perhaps ~~she~~ might have said, like Mr. Fox, “to declare War and advance troops are un-“equivocal hostilities*.” Admitting the applicability of this doctrine, however foreign from the case, still the facts would have furnished a most satisfactory answer. The King, who had requested the interposition of foreign powers, instead of relying upon their assistance with that unsteadiness of mind by which he was unfortunately distinguished, pursued other measures, attempted to escape to his frontiers, and, failing in that attempt, accepted the Constitution, and withdrew himself entirely from the project, which could not be pursued without his co-operation; that project, therefore, became impracticable, and was necessarily abandoned: and it deserves particular notice, though it seems entirely to have escaped the observation of Mr. Fox, that the Declaration at Mantua, which is the document chiefly relied on by that Gentleman, to justify the declaration of War by France, was made on the 20th of May, 1791, and War was not declared till the 20th of April, 1792. During which interval of 11 months, none of the measures which Mr. Fox considers as “unequivocal hostilities,” and which had never been more than *projected*, were carried into act,

* Correspondence, p. 47.

A conclusive proof that nothing was to be apprehended from a plan which was framed and calculated only for immediate execution, independently of the change of circumstances which rendered its execution impossible.

The facts, therefore, by means of which, though unknown by France before the War, Mr. Fox endeavours to defend the conduct of France in declaring War, would not, if fully disclosed, in consequence of those explanations which she was bound to require before she could lawfully appeal to arms, have justified her in resorting to that extremity. Those facts did not amount to any actual injury—they did not expose her to any danger—they had not even subjected her to any insult, for which her nice sense of honour could require satisfaction: for the only proceedings of which she could complain were, in their essential nature, altogether private, and did not come to light till long after hostilities—and her security was not in the least affected by a project, which was stifled in embryo, and laid aside many months before she saw any necessity for drawing the sword.

Thus the Declaration at Mantua, when viewed in its true light, and in its connection with concomitant circumstances, far from proving, as Mr. Fox asserts, that France “was not deceived by appearances,” would operate as the severest condemnation of her conduct in trusting to appearances on so momentous a subject; if, indeed, it could be supposed that she drew from them those conclusions which are supposed to have directed her conduct. But it will appear hereafter that she was actuated by other and still more unjustifiable motives. So much for a document which has been caught at most eagerly, to save, if possible, the reputation of Revolutionary France; but which, instead of affording her any support, serves only to plunge her still deeper in disgrace and infamy.

The reader will not, it is hoped, think that too much notice have been taken of the correspondence between Mr. Fox and M. Bertrand de Moleville, since that

that correspondence has afforded an opportunity of exposing one of the most specious pretexts, which the advocates of France have yet discovered, to justify her conduct in commencing hostilities. Nor will it be thought a trifling advantage, if an opportunity has been afforded of rescuing from perversion and sophistry, and of displaying the wisdom and utility of that sound and salutary system of public law, the authority of which has been long recognized by all civilized States. But a peculiar advantage arises to the people of this country from the discussion which has been pursued so much at length. That people are enabled thereby to form a just estimate of the principles of the party now in opposition to his Majesty's Government. The leader of that party, Mr. Fox, whose sentiments must be supposed to be those of all who acknowledge him in that character (and the other Members of Opposition are known to pride themselves in having such a head) has, on this occasion, avowed doctrines which are at direct variance with the most sacred and valuable principles of the law of Nations—in order to justify the enemies of Great Britain, he has pleaded for their right to infringe that law with impunity; while, to criminate his own country, he has *most unjustly* accused *her* of its violation—proving thereby that he was perfectly well acquainted with the spirit and provisions of that law, of which he was ready to make a sacrifice at the shrine of Republican France. But this is not all. Professing to stand forward in the character of a sincere and zealous friend of Peace, he has invented a system, never before thought of, which would, if generally adopted, prove a never-failing source of War, by dissolving all the restraints which, for the sake of general tranquillity, have been imposed on the ambition or injustice of States. Such are the men who would make the world believe that the War would not have existed if they had been in office! Such are the men who would now gladly co-operate with Buonaparte in the great work of general Pacification! Such, when they

they come to be analyzed, are the reasonings, to which men of the first talents are driven, when they undertake to prove that Great Britain and her Allies were the aggressors in the present War !

CITIZEN TALLEYRAND,

MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AT PARIS.

THIS Minister, like Mr. Fox, ascribes the War to the formation of a hostile league against France. He says, " As soon as the French Revolution had broken out, almost all Europe entered into a league for its destruction*." So far the French Secretary and the English Statesman agree tolerably well ; but these authorities are very soon at variance. For Talleyrand proceeds—" Thus it is to the projects of subjection, dissolution and dismemberment, which were prepared against her, that France has a right to impute the evils which she has suffered, and those which have afflicted Europe." On the contrary, Mr. Fox declares, that the project of the confederated Powers was "*not to partition France*, but to dictate by force of arms changes in her internal government†.

When two witnesses contradict each other in a material part of a criminal charge, they not only destroy each other's testimony, but invalidate the charge itself. For it is the nature of truth to be consistent, though told by a thousand mouths. When therefore Mr. Fox and Citizen Talleyrand stand forth to prove the existence of a hostile league against France, previously to the War, and differ essentially respecting the nature and objects of that league—when one of them represents it

* Note from Talleyrand to Lord Grenville, dated Paris, January 14, 1800.

† See ante, p. *5.

as "founded in projects of subjection, dissolution and dismemberment," and the other declares that its object was "not to partition France," but "to dictate by force of arms changes in her internal government;" it would be a just presumption, without any further investigation, that the league itself had no existence, and that the charge is false and malicious. This presumption would be greatly strengthened, if indeed it could want any additional support, by the consideration that as such a league must, if real, have been formed above eight years ago, the proofs of it would, in all human probability, have been by this time in every one's hands: but certainly two such eminent characters in the political world, as Mr. Fox and Citizen Talleyrand, must have had it in their power to state it with the utmost precision, and to prove it by the most conclusive evidence. The variance of two such men on such a subject must be admitted by every candid mind to be fatal to the charge of a hostile league against France before the War.

But as the statement of Mr. Fox has been distinctly examined, that of the French Minister shall be noticed in like manner. There exists indeed a particular reason to induce such an investigation. Talleyrand has peculiar advantages, even beyond Mr. Fox, to enable him to elucidate the political transactions of the period to which he alludes. He then held a public situation, and he appeared in this country as a diplomatic character. He took a very distinguished and leading part in the French Revolution, and he must be supposed not only to have been privy to the motives and the views which directed the conduct of France, but also to have watched, with the closest attention, and with the best possible means of information, that of neighbouring countries. He must, therefore, have it in his power to adduce the fullest proof of the aggressive league against France, if such a league was the real cause of the War.— And on no occasion could he feel a stronger inducement to bring forward such evidence, than when he undertook to prove that Lord Grenville's official Note, containing

ing the rejection of Buonaparte's overtures for negotiation, rested upon "an opinion which (as he asserts) is "not exact respecting the origin and consequences of "the present War."

It was, besides, *incumbent* upon Talleyrand to establish, by clear and irrefragable proof, the existence of the league to which he ascribed the War. For he does not attempt to deny that France attacked every one of the powers with which she has been at War; and it cannot be disputed that she thereby became the aggressor, unless she was obliged to resort to that extremity by some actual injury, for which she could not otherwise procure satisfaction, or by some immediate danger, against which she could not otherwise obtain security. If therefore the alleged league be pleaded as the provocation which induced her to commence hostilities, it devolves upon her advocate to maintain, by proof, the truth of that plea: otherwise it cannot conduce either to her justification, or to the condemnation of her adversaries.

There is not, however, throughout the letter of the Republican Secretary, one tittle of evidence in support of the plea, on which he rests the defence of France. Instead of resorting to proof he confines himself to vague and general allegations, which have been worn threadbare by repetition; and he advances those allegations in a more indistinct form than they had before assumed, and without giving them the smallest particularity of time or circumstance. In fine, a French Minister can find no better means of justifying the hostile attack made by France upon every European State, excepting only two, and upon part of Africa and of Asia, than the following loose, declamatory, and totally unsupported assertions:

"Very far from its being France which provoked it
 "(the War) she had, it must be remembered, from the
 "very commencement of her Revolution, solemnly
 "proclaimed her love of Peace and her disinclination
 "to conquests, her respect for the independence of all
 "Governments; and it is not to be doubted that, oc-
 "cupied

“ cupied at that time entirely with her own affairs;
 “ she would have avoided taking a part in those of
 “ Europe, and would have remained faithful to her
 “ declarations.

“ But from an opposite disposition, as soon as the
 “ French Revolution had broken out, almost all Eu-
 “ rope entered into a league for its destruction. The
 “ aggression was real long time before it was public;
 “ internal resistance was excited; its opponents were
 “ favourably received; their extravagant declamations
 “ were supported; the French Nation was insulted in
 “ the person of its agents; and England particularly
 “ set this example by the dismissal of the Minister ac-
 “ credited to her. Finally, France was in fact attacked
 “ in her independence, in her honour, and in her safety,
 “ long time before the War was declared.*”

And is it by such loose and ambiguous declamation that we are to be convinced that the party attacked was the aggressor in the War? Is France, by the force of such mere allegations, to be justified for going to war with more than one half the civilized world? A murderer is detected in the very perpetration of the crime. He is covered with blood. He has the deadly weapon in his hand. He is standing over his slaughtered victims. He is proved to have been the assailant, to have butchered all who were within the reach of his fury, and to have displayed a general and indiscriminate malice against all mankind—And being put upon his defence, without bringing forward a single witness, without stating one positive fact in his justification, he merely asserts, in the most general terms, that there existed a hostile disposition against him; that a league was formed for his destruction; that the aggression was real before it was public; that his enemies were favourably treated; that his agents were insulted, and that he had been first attacked in his honour and safety. What jury would hesitate for a moment to pronounce a verdict of GUILTY?

* See Note from Talleyrand to Lord Grenville, No. III. dated Paris, 24th Nivose, 8th year of the Republic, or Jan. 14, 1800 of the Christian æra.

The only allegation advanced by Talleyrand which displays even an appearance of precision, is that by which he represents England as *setting the example* of insulting France, in the person of its agents, by the dismissal of the minister accredited to her. But as it is a notorious as well as an indisputable fact, that the war had existed eight months before the dismissal of M. Chauvelin (the person here alluded to as an *accredited Minister*) it required the assurance of a Jacobin to enumerate, among the causes of the War, the example set by England in that dismissal. This *ex post facto* example exhibits, indeed, a curious specimen of Jacobin reasoning as well as of Jacobin assurance; and it affords just ground to regret that Citizen Talleyrand did not make more allusions to matter of fact, instead of confining himself, except in this solitary instance, to general and indefinite description.

It should not, however, be forgotten on this occasion, that the accredited Minister, whose dismissal was so gross an insult, was really no more than a private individual. He had been, indeed, the accredited Minister of the French King; but he lost that character, and ceased to be an Ambassador, upon the dethronement of his Sovereign, and the subversion of the Monarchical Government in France. And the Republican Rulers, who usurped the Supreme Power, were in no hurry to re-invest him with the character of Minister, for they themselves date their abolition of Royalty on the 10th of August 1792, and Chauvelin did not apply to be received, at the British Court, as their accredited ambassador, till January 17, 1793, before which time it has been proved, by conclusive evidence, that they had resolved on War with Great Britain*. It is true, though not an ambassador, he had very important services to perform in this country, independently of his endeavours, by fallacious explanations, to amuse the British Government respecting the intent of the

* See Mr. Herbert Marsh's Politics of Great Britain and France, c. 14.

Decrees of November 19 and December 15. For it cannot admit of a doubt that he was entrusted with the application of the five millions of livres, which Brissot states to have been deposited, by the French Government, in the hands of Messrs. Bourdieu and Chollet of London; and also of the twenty-five millions of livres, which, according to the same good authority, were sent to England from the national treasury of France; as well as of any other part, which might have been sent to this country, of the unlimited sums which the Executive Council was by decree authorized to take for "secret expences, partly for the purpose of dividing the cabinets, partly for the purpose of exciting the people against their tyrants," which sums were said to be wanted "for the North, for the South, and for the Indies.*" M. Chauvelin was also, doubtless, the organ employed by the French Government, for the purpose of making that solemn appeal to the English nation, of which Le Brun made his boast in the Convention†. And he himself urged to his Republican masters the importance of his stay here, by representing that though he was not well with the English Minister, yet he was perfectly so with Mr. Fox and some other Members of Opposition; and that it would not be prudent to lose the fruit of his labours with those Gentleman, and their subsequent services, for a vain form of etiquette‡.

But although, with an exception to the above allusion to the *example* of England, the French Minister does not advert to a single fact or document in support of his charge, that France was provoked to declare War by a hostile league against her safety, honour and independence; although he does not, like Mr. Fox, refer to any Declaration or Treaty by which the truth or falsehood of his accusation might be ascertained; it is impossible to read his statement of the league and projects formed (as he says) for the purpose of subjection, dissolution

* See Brissot à ses Commettans.

† See his Report to the Convention, Nov. 19, 1792.

‡ See Marsh's History, vol. ii. c. 13. note 34.

and dismemberment, without perceiving that it is an exact description of the pretended treaties of Pavia and Pilnitz; and it is also impossible to doubt that he intended to have all the benefit of an allusion to those treaties, without subjecting himself to the responsibility which would have attended an express reference to them. This artifice, however, which exhibits a notable specimen of Jacobin Diplomacy, will have no chance of success, even with the most credulous, if the grounds, on which the above treaties lay claim to authenticity, be examined. Such an examination is therefore due to the cause of truth, which is now more than ever the cause of order; particularly as those treaties are the only ones which have been announced to the world, in proof of a league for the subjection and dismemberment of France*.

The report of a League for the above purpose was industriously propagated at an early period of the French Revolution, in terms very similar to those which have been employed by Citizen Talleyrand, in the year 1800. To obtain speedy credit for such a report, nothing could be better calculated than the production of a treaty, in full and complete detail, with a specification of parties and dates, unfolding, article by article, an extensive and systematic plan of partition, not only of a great part of France, but of other territories, which might be supposed to tempt cupidity, or inflame ambition. It was evident, indeed, that such a fabrication was exposed to speedy detection; but, on the other hand, so circumstantial a detail was calculated to make at once a strong and universal impression; and it seems to have been the opinion of the first Jacobins, that their doctrines were so fascinating, and their arts so seductive, as to render all resistance to their projected attack

* It has been said that a treaty against France was formed at Vienna on the 18th of February, 1792: but this proved a Jacobin abortion; and it had besides, for its professed object, like the Declaration at Mantua, the Restoration of the French King to his Regal Authority.

unavailing, and that it was in their power to surprize both the principles and understandings of mankind, and to carry the fortress of civil Society by a *coup de main* :— an enterprize in which it is impossible to deny that they have been very nearly successful. Besides, the extent of Jacobin artifice and audacity was not then known, and it was much more probable that mankind, prejudiced as their minds had been, should at the first moment believe in the existence of a treaty, which, by its particularity of circumstance, seemed to court investigation, than that they should suspect it to be a fabrication. With such views and advantages was the treaty of Pavia ushered into the world, as an alliance formed at that place, in July 1791, between Austria, Russia, Prussia and Spain, for the purposes above described ; and to which Great Britain was said to have acceded in March 1792. This treaty was inserted in all the publications which favoured the French Revolution, with as much confidence as if it had been officially communicated by the Ministers of the supposed parties—and it was, for a time, quoted with as little reserve as the treaties of Westphalia and Utrecht. It was to be found, not only in French Journals, but in English Registers*. Soon, however, its

* In a collection of State Papers relative to the War, published by Debrett, this treaty is the first document that presents itself to the eye—and the recital of it is followed by a positive assertion that “the King of England acceded to it in 1792.” And the New Annual Register (which has displayed a most indecent zeal for Jacobin politics) not content with detailing it fully as a matter of undoubted authenticity, gives it to the public for the avowed purpose of unveiling “the mystery of iniquity” in which “the conduct of the allied Courts” had been involved, and of rousing, against those Courts the “indignation of every friend of liberty and justice.” Soon, however, it was mentioned in a very different manner, and those who had formally registered it among the public acts of the year 1792, were driven in 1793 to find a salvo for their own credit, by withdrawing the pledge they had unequivocally given for the authenticity of the document. In the New Annual Register for the latter year, the treaty which had been before given in the most absolute and unqualified manner, in a manner to involve the whole credit and authority of the work (which fortunately are circumscribed within very narrow limits), is mentioned with an *if*—a word which, when used in such a place, and under such circumstances, amounts to a complete direktion of the unfortunate treaty.

its credit was on the decline. Its progress, indeed, has been the very reverse of that which it must have had, if founded in reality. In that case, considering the number of persons who must have been privy to the arrangement, it could not have been long without the confirmation of indisputable evidence, in spite of every precaution to keep it secret. Every day would have brought with it fresh proof of its authenticity; and long, ere now, it would have rested on such solid grounds, that no man could have doubted its existence, without appearing to shut his eyes against the light. Instead, however, of this being the case, it was soon disowned even by those whose credit was staked on its authenticity; and, at length, far from aspiring to a place in the public Code, it is fallen into such disrepute, that its mention would throw discredit even upon the dispatches of Citizen Talleyrand. To crown all, this daring imposture, which, for a time, excited the most unjust prejudices against all the lawful Governments of Europe, and which greatly promoted the success of that mischievous cause, which has nearly proved fatal to civilized Society, far from being fabricated in an expert manner, contains, upon the face of it, proofs that it was a forgery; and a forgery too, of a very clumsy nature. Of this any one may be convinced by reading the letters signed Detector, in that valuable collection of Papers entitled the Anti-Jacobin, or Weekly Examiner, (long since, unfortunately for the public, discontinued) vol. i. p. 474. But without examining all these proofs, it may be sufficient to know that of four persons, who are stated to have concluded and signed the treaty of Pavia, in July 1791, (some of whose signatures are incorrectly given) it is ascertained

treaty. Still, however, Editors of this miserable and mischievous work wanted the grace to make the *amende honorable* for their falsehoods. But to supply that deficiency, they had the assurance still to insist that some treaty had been concluded at Pavia, although they could not obtain knowledge of its contents; and to cite before *their* Tribunal the Powers whom they had aspersed, giving them notice to produce the real treaty of Pavia, on pain of being convicted of that which was fictitious.

that only two were in any part of Italy in the year 1791, and that not one of them was at Pavia in the course of that year.

Jacobin ingenuity did not, however, confine itself to the fabrication of a treaty, in detail, which, necessary as it might be for temporary purposes, could not long impose upon mankind. A more lasting, though not so immediate and striking an effect, might be produced by a treaty, of which not the articles, but only the purport should be communicated to the world—of which only the outline should be exhibited, and the contents be left to be supplied by fancy or convenience. Such a contrivance was calculated to secure a double advantage. The fraud was less exposed to detection, and the shapeless mass was capable of being moulded into any form, and even of changing its appearance, as time or circumstances might require. Besides, the uncertainty and obscurity involving a treaty of that description, by enabling it to elude investigation, rendered it a document of which artifice might speciously avail itself to an indefinite period; and the very mystery in which it was enveloped was calculated to favour its operation with the bulk of mankind, always disposed to credulity with regard to objects which they cannot see distinctly.

Such was the Partition Treaty, said to be concluded at Pilnitz in August 1791. By this treaty is not to be understood the Declaration in favour of Louis XVIth, which was made at Pilnitz at the above period by the Emperor of Germany and the King of Prussia, and which, far from being secret, was openly and immediately avowed—but a secret treaty for the subjection and partition of France. This treaty may be considered as subsidiary to that of Pavia. Both are stated to have the same object; but the one having, in consequence of its gross and perishable texture, soon fallen into decay, the other, being a mere incorporeal essence, continued long to survive in the regions of delusion and imposture. What were the
express

express articles of this treaty no Jacobin authority has deigned to communicate; but great Orators * and eminent writers † have argued upon it with as much confidence, as if it had been already bound up in their *Droit publique de L'Europe*. Neither are we informed who were the precise parties to the engagement; but every Power which has been, or is, or may be hostile to Revolutionary France, must be allowed to participate of that honour. Great Britain has not been deprived of her right on this occasion, any more than on that of the treaty of Pavia. But Lord Grenville, in his dispatch to Lord Malmesbury, when the latter was engaged in the negociation at Lisle, in June 1797, declared positively that "his Majesty was no party to any such treaty." Not content however with rescuing Great Britain from such an imputation, his Lordship also spontaneously said, that the conclusion of any secret treaty at Pilnitz, between the late Emperor and the King of Prussia, was, "to say the least, very doubtful in point of fact." Such an observation, proceeding from such high authority, when there was no occasion to go further than an exculpation of this Country, and when, with regard to the other Powers thus mentioned, a British Minister could not with propriety assert a negative, much more than countervails all the unsupported assertions that have been made of the existence of such a treaty. It is impossible to suppose that his Lordship would have committed himself and, indeed, the British Government, so far, if he had not been fully convinced that the report of the treaty was a fraudulent invention. If any doubt could still remain that the treaty of Pilnitz, like that of Pavia, is an imposture, such doubt must be entirely removed by the consideration that, during upwards of eight years, no one circumstance has transpired in proof of its existence, although some of its supposed principal parties have, during the far greatest part of that time, been at open variance.

* Mr. Fox.

† Mr. Erskine.

It appears, then, that the allegation of Talleyrand, that "almost all Europe had entered into a league for "the subjection and dismemberment of France," derives no support from the treaties of Pavia and Pilnitz; treaties which, though clearly alluded to by that Minister, are too notoriously spurious to be even mentioned by him in his dispatches. The fabrication of such documents affords a strong presumption against the existence of the League, the belief of which they were intended to promote. Truth does not resort to forgery and imposture—and the employment of such means is sufficient, not only to repel any charge, but to stamp it with infamy.

If, however, it could still be supposed that such a league was the real cause of the War, and "the source "of the evils which France has suffered, and which "have afflicted Europe," some proof of its existence must surely be found in the Correspondence, which took place between the French Government and the Court of Vienna, respecting the differences between those Powers, and which was continued until a very short time before the breaking out of the War. It cannot be imagined that France would suppress, on such an occasion, any complaint, which she felt herself authorized to make, against the conduct of Austria, or that she would fail to state, in the strongest manner, any ground of dissatisfaction or apprehension, which either the real or the apparent views of that Power, could authorize her to bring forward. The violence and pertinacity with which she urged her complaints against, not only the Court of Vienna, but almost the whole of Europe, preclude the supposition that she omitted any thing, which she could, with the least colour of truth, make a subject of accusation. Nor can it be argued that her ignorance of such a league precluded her mention of it at that time. For the question respects the motives by which she was impelled to declare War; and nothing of which she was ignorant could operate as a motive of her conduct.

duct. Besides the report of the treaties of Pavia and Pilnitz had then been long circulated by her; the first had been formally detailed in the *Moniteur*, an official paper, and the most violent invectives against the latter, resounded daily from her Tribunes and her Clubs; and though she had possessed certain knowledge that such an alliance **was** formed, she was bound to make it a subject of complaint, before she could make it a ground of hostility. Admitting the league, which she now pleads in justification of her attacks upon the Powers of Europe, to have really existed, she would not have been entitled, on that account, to declare War, without previously endeavouring, by all means in her power, "consistent "with dignity*," to obtain satisfaction and security. It was incumbent upon her, according to the established law of Nations, to state her causes of complaint, and to demand reparation, before she could justifiably appeal to arms. She was, by that law, undoubtedly the aggressor, if she went to War on account of any injury, or supposed injury, for which she did not previously endeavour to obtain satisfaction. For "as no uncertain pretensions "ought to be made use of, so neither should men immediately seek redress by arms, but sincerely endeavour to compose the difference, before they break "out into War†." And "to take arms lawfully, it is "necessary that we have not only a just cause of complaint, but that a reasonable satisfaction has been "denied us‡."

But, strange as it may appear, the Correspondence in question does not contain the least notice of a league for the subjection and dismemberment of France, although such a league is now alleged to have been the cause of the War. There is not, throughout that Correspondence, the slightest evidence to shew that any person in France had the least suspicion of such a project. There is not even **any** reference to the

* Mr. Fox, ante p. *14.

† *Wendorn*, B. 8. C. 6. S. 4.

‡ *Vattel*, B. 3. C. 4. S. 5r.

treaties of Pavia and Pilnitz, although those treaties were then hot from the forge of Jacobin imposture, and were considered as genuine by a great part of Europe.

Was France, then, silent, with regard to existing injuries or apprehended dangers? By no means. The correspondence was, on her part, altogether expostulatory. She accused the House of Austria, and other Powers, of unjust proceedings, and of injurious designs, though not of any attempt or intention to divide her territories, or to subject her to a foreign yoke. Her complaints and her demands, either of satisfaction or explanation, related solely to an encouragement said to have been given by the Emperor and some German Princes, to the Emigrant Nobility, in their plans for restoring by force the ancient French Monarchy;—and to a Concert of Powers, which undoubtedly took place in consequence of the French Revolution, which was not disowned by those who were parties to it, and of which the object was at no time alleged to extend further than the re-establishment of the French King, in the full possession of his former power. Although these complaints are now abandoned, in order to make way for the more weighty charge of a project for partition and dismemberment, and although France now establishes, beyond all dispute, her own aggression, by assigning as the cause of her going to war, a league of which she made no complaint, no remonstrance whatever before hostilities; it may, nevertheless, be expedient to examine the grounds of those complaints which she did make, in order to do full justice to the question respecting the real origin of the war.

As to the first of these grounds of complaint, the assembling of the Emigrant Princes and Nobility of France, there is no doubt that those unfortunate exiles, the early victims of a Revolution which has since preyed upon every class and description of people, sought the assistance of Foreign Powers to enable them, in conjunction with the Royalists remaining
in

in France, to rescue their Sovereign and their country from the hands of a desperate faction. If, indeed, they had omitted any thing in their power for the attainment of this object, they would have forfeited that honour and that respectability, which now shed a lustre upon their misfortunes; and if their cause, and that of their King, had been supported by the Powers of Europe (which, as has been already proved, might have been done consistently with the laws of nations), the calamities which have afflicted the world for the last eight years, in all human probability, would have been prevented, and millions of human beings, whose blood has been shed upon the scaffold or in the field, would have still been in existence. But so far from Revolutionary France having any cause to complain of the encouragement or support given to this much injured body of men—so far was she from having any ground for apprehension on their account—the greatest number of them, who, previously to the war, formed themselves into corps, under the King's brothers and the Prince of Condé, did not at any one time exceed 4700; a mighty force to frighten thirty millions of *men determined to be free!* and it appears from a report of the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, in the month of October, 1791, that no complaint was made against the Emperor for affording them countenance, but, on the contrary, that this Monarch had issued the most peremptory orders to prevent any Emigrant Assemblages in the Austrian Netherlands. For a time, indeed, they were permitted to assemble in the Electorate of Treves; but a remonstrance having been made on that account, both to the Elector and the Emperor himself, in answer to the official communication made to the latter by the French Ambassador at Vienna, Prince Kaunitz, in a letter to that Ambassador, dated December 31, 1791, declared that the Elector had signified to his Imperial Majesty that he had adopted, respecting the Emigrants, the same principles and regulations which had been put in force in the Austrian

Low Countries*. And accordingly, in a paper entitled " Substance of dispatches from M. Sainte Croix, Minister Plenipotentiary of France at Treves," and communicated by order of the King to the National Assembly, that Minister declares that " the dispersion was as real and as complete as the Nation has desired and the King directed ;"—that " all hopes on the part of the Emigrants, of receiving succours from the most considerable Powers," were " annihilated ;"—that " arrangements had been made to produce the *removal* of all bodies of Frenchmen formed in the Electorate ;"—that " many of them were already removed ;"—in short, that " the Emigrants were dispersed on all sides ;"—that " they were upon their route by the most frightful roads, in spite of the snow ;"—that " no ammunition or arms, no magazines of any kind remained at their disposal ;—and that if they had any cannon they had been obliged to sell them." It also appears that the Prince of Condé, whose corps, according to the most exaggerated accounts, did not exceed 1100 men, having quitted Worms and retired to Eltenheim, was driven from this latter place upon the *requisition* of the Emperor to the Cardinal de Rohan. Such, indeed, was the condescension of the above Monarch, such his compliance with the requisitions of France, that he was reproached with pursuing, from asylum to asylum, a Prince of the House of Bourbon, who had escaped from the poniard of assassins, and who, forty years before, had fought gloriously for Maria Theresa. It is true M. Delessart, in his above-mentioned dispatch to M. Noailles, notices, in a file of complaint, an order which had been given by the Emperor to Marshal Bender, " to march to the assistance of the Elector of Treves, if he should be attacked †." But as the Emperor

* Annual Register, 1792, part 2, 209.

† See *ib.* page 209, part 2.

was certainly entitled to take precautions to succour the States of the Empire in case of attack, such a complaint was not only unjust, but impertinent and domineering in the highest degree: particularly as it was accompanied with an acknowledgment, on the part of the French Minister, that the order was made subject to the express condition that the Elector of Treves should imitate the example which had been set in the Low Countries respecting the Emigrants; and that "on the previous compliance with this condition" depended that assistance which General Bender was "to afford to the Elector in case of an ulterior attack by France." These considerations render a reference to the explanation, given on the subject of that order, by the Prince de Kaunitz unnecessary, and they fully justify the remark with which that explanation is terminated, that "there was no ground for requiring the explanation, if the French Minister had not been absolutely determined to start objections."

It is not, however, to be supposed that the assembling of the Emigrants, or the conduct of the Emperor towards them, excited any real alarm in the minds of the French Revolutionists; loudly as the latter chose to vent their complaints on the occasion. Not only did some Members of the National Assembly openly declare that emigration was lawful, that the Constitution was impregnable, that millions of armed men had nothing to fear, and that there was not the smallest danger, but Brissot himself acknowledged that he saw in the Emigrants of Coblenz, only knights-errant, weak men who were duped by the Emperor*. And even the Members of the Diplomatic Committee expressed the utmost contempt for the Emigrant Associations, which they described as "soldiers of the Church and an Opera fire†." Also the Minister for foreign affairs, M. Montmorin, reported to the Assembly, that "in the Belgic Provinces the Emigrants were not permitted

* Sitting of December 29, 1791.—Lally Tolendal.

† Sitting of November 27, 1791.

" to assemble; that the Government of Brussels had
 " redoubled its precautions, that it might not afford a
 " pretext to consider, as hostile to France, the hospitality
 " afforded them; that even at Coblenz they were
 " without arms."

But dispersed and despised as the Emigrants were, they still afforded a pretext for immense military preparations on the part of France. To face these wandering knights-errant, these soldiers of the Church, to put out this Opera fire, 240 battalions and 140 squadrons, with artillery for 200,000 men, were assembled on the borders of France, and magazines sufficient for 200,000 men and 22,000 horses for six months, were collected. To employ such a force against the whole body of Emigrants, if they had been marshalled in battle array on the French frontiers, would have been " to break a butterfly upon the wheel." It cannot be said that these preparations were either required or warranted by any symptom of hostility in the dominions of the Emperor, whose military force in the Netherlands did not exceed the ordinary Peace establishment, and, indeed, was not, when the War broke out, in a state of readiness to defend those provinces.

It is plain, therefore, that the encouragement afforded by the Emperor to the unfortunate and persecuted fugitives from France, instead of being a cause of the War, or even a just ground of complaint to the new French Government, scarcely amounted to a compliance with those claims on hospitality, which are justly considered as sacred, particularly among civilized nations. While on the other hand the immense hostile preparations of France, unauthorized as they were by any real or even apparent danger, nay, by any actual alarm, and burdensome as they must have been to a country, which was stated to have been principally indebted to a deficiency of finances for its sanguinary Revolution, unequivocally indicated a fixed determination for War. Considering, indeed, the internal situation of France, the mere circumstance of making such immense preparations rendered War on her part inevitable,

inevitable. The inactivity of such a force would have been fraught with the utmost danger to the newly constituted Powers. M. Roland, the Minister for the interior, is stated to have said on that occasion, "Peace is out of the question, we have 300,000 men in arms, we must make them march as fast as their legs will carry them, or they will return and cut our throats." Thus, it appears, that the French Rulers, when they made hostile preparations, which were not at all wanted for the defence of the Country, and for which they had not even a plausible pretext, passed the Rubicon, and, in effect, plunged Europe in a War, the most bloody and destructive that is recorded in the history of the world.

But the complaint most insisted upon by the French Government, in its correspondence with the Court of Vienna, respected the Concert which had been formed between several European Powers, in consequence of the French Revolution. This is a much more important consideration than the assembling of the Emigrants, not only because it is still persisted in by the advocates of France, as the real cause of the war, but because it is insidiously confounded with the pretended league for the subjection and dismemberment of France, of which no evidence whatever has been produced.

The existence of a Concert of Powers, far from being denied, was made a subject of express communication by the Emperor himself, and the remonstrances of the French Ministers, on the subject, were actually founded upon that communication. In an official letter of Prince Kaunitz to the French Ambassador at Vienna, dated December 21, 1791, and communicated by a Royal Message to the National Assembly December 31, 1791, his Imperial Majesty, after alluding to the unsettled and agitated state of France, declared his apprehensions lest, in spite of the King's intentions, the tranquillity of neighbouring States, and particularly of the Electorate of Treves, might be disturbed by acts of violence; and his Majesty further

further expressed an ardent desire for "the prevention of this extremity, and of the infallible consequences which it would produce, as well on the part of the Chief, and the States of the German Empire, as of other Sovereigns, who have united in Concert for the maintenance of the public tranquillity, and the safety and honour of Crowns*."

As the Concert which is here openly avowed is the only remaining topic which France made a subject of complaint, in her expostulatory communications with the Court of Vienna, the controversy is now brought to this single question—did that Concert afford to the former Power a justifiable cause of war? If it did not, it necessarily follows that she was the aggressor, by her commencement of hostilities. It will not be denied that a Concert really formed for the maintenance of the public tranquillity, and the safety and honour of Crowns, far from affording any just ground for complaint to other Powers, is perfectly defensible; and that a state, in taking offence at such a Concert, would only prove its necessity, by evincing a disposition unfavourable to the public tranquillity and safety. It is necessary, therefore, to enquire whether the Concert complained of was sincerely and honestly formed, for the sake of the objects which it professed to have in view, or whether it was directed, under the cover of such professions, to objects of an injurious nature.

The voluntary, frank, and open avowal of the existence of a Concert of Powers, which is contained in the above mentioned letter of Prince Kaunitz, certainly affords a strong presumption that it had no other object, than is expressly assigned to it in that letter; for otherwise an acknowledgment of its existence might have led to a discovery of its real tendency. Parties who confederate for a purpose they wish to conceal, are cautious not to divulge their connection. But if, notwithstanding this presump-

* See Ann. Reg. for 1792. Part II. p. 209.

tion, any reasons existed to induce the supposition that the Concert, instead of aiming at tranquillity, was directed to hostility, that instead of having for its object the safety and honour of Crowns, it sought to molest and endanger France, such reasons must doubtless appear, in their full force, in the correspondence which took place upon the subject; and in which, as has been already observed, she was bound to state, distinctly and fully, her causes of complaint, and to bring forward a specific demand of satisfaction, before she could be entitled to make an appeal to arms. But nothing appears, throughout the whole of that correspondence, which shews that the parties to the Concert were actuated, or even suspected of being so, by any other views than those which they avowed.

In consequence of the official letter from the Prince of Kaunitz, M. De Lessart, Minister for foreign affairs at Paris, sent instructions to M. Noailles, Ambassador from France at the Court of Vienna, directing him to obtain explanations respecting the Concert of Powers, and particularly as to the meaning of the above expression, "*the safety and honour of Crowns.*" But even in these instructions, in which the declaration that gave occasion to them, and which contained the avowal of the Concert, was represented as "*unexpected,*" nothing more than general expressions of uneasiness and apprehension are employed in reference to the "*article of the note,*" by which the Concert of Sovereigns was made known, and the perusal of which, it was said, had produced "the greatest number of reflections, and left the deepest impression." It was intimated that the words "the Sovereigns who have united in Concert for the maintenance of public tranquillity, and the safety and honour of Crowns," were "conceived to be an index to a league formed without the knowledge of, and, perhaps, against France;" and that those words had added a great degree of strength to a previous apprehension—that "there did indeed exist a combination between the principal Powers of Eu-

“ rope for the purpose of producing some change in the French Constitution”—that “ those Powers entertained a design of establishing a Congress for the *discussion* of that object”—and that “ uniting their power and their means, they would endeavour to force the King and the Nation to accept those laws which they might make*.” In such vague and general terms did the French Minister express the alarm occasioned by an “ unexpected declaration,” which he said “ was conceived to convey a degree of menace in its tone;” and of which it was the purport of his instructions to complain, and to require an explanation. No hint as to any project of ambition, subjection, or dismemberment—no notice of the treaty of Pavia and Pilnitz, which had been in circulation for months; although, if such treaties, or such projects had been supposed to exist, the inducement to bring them forward, when an *actual Concert of Powers* was complained of, would have been irresistible. In short, all the dread which was entertained respecting the views of foreign Powers, and which had received a great accession of strength from a formal, and, as it was conceived, a *menacing* notification of a Concert between those Powers, was confined to an “ apprehension that there did exist a combination”—for what? for the invasion, reduction, and dismemberment of France? No; merely “ for the purpose of producing some change in her Constitution.” An expression which, when translated from Revolutionary language, means nothing else than an exchange of that “ state of anarchy by which” (as M. de la Fayette had acknowledged) “ France was oppressed,” and which could not but endanger other countries, for a state more compatible with general security, as well as with the good order of France herself.

The remonstrance made by the French Ambassador

* See the instructions in the Annual Register for 1792. Part. II. p. 216.

at Vienna, in pursuance of his instructions, produced a very copious explanation from the Prince of Kaunitz, which shall be duly considered. But it may first be proper to trace the further progress of the correspondence, on the part of France, relative to the Concert, which is still considered by some persons as the real cause of the war. If that really was the case, it must be presumed that the complaints of France became more serious and more explicit as she approached nearer to that crisis, when she was induced (whether justly or not) by such a provocation, to resort to hostilities. But the very reverse of this took place. In all the subsequent notes and other communications from France, the Concert of Powers, was not even made the ground of any distinct or specific charge, and it was noticed in terms still more vague and general than those, which had been used in the first expostulation upon the subject; while the explanations which were given by the Imperial Minister, respecting the objects of that Concert, were not challenged as false or insincere. The French Ambassador at Vienna, in a note addressed to the Imperial Ministers, dated March 11, 1792, alluding expressly to the explanations given by the Prince of Kaunitz, merely says, "His Majesty cannot behold without uneasiness a confederacy, the object of which appears to give just cause of alarm;" and upon this weak and vapid declaration the King is made to demand of the Emperor, "to abandon that Confederacy." In a letter from M. Dumourier, (the Jacobin Minister for foreign affairs, brought into office by Brissot,) to M. Noailles, dated March 19, 1792, the interest and alarm excited by the Concert, instead of rising, as the war, of which it was the pretended cause, approached nearer, seems to have considerably subsided. In that letter it is said, "the Concert of Powers is evidently directed against him" (the King)—to any but Jacobin optics the reverse of this must be evident*—"this Concert," pro-

* Annual Register for 1792. P. II. p. 233. Ibid. p. 238.

ceeds M. Dumourier, " can hardly exist beyond the " present moment :"—then, surely, it could not alarm a stout-hearted Jacobin—but the reason assigned for the impossibility of its existence beyond the existing moment is curious, particularly in such a mouth, " because it strikes at the root of order and " sound policy." The conclusion, in regard to this most formidable Concert, is thus stated—"as to the " Concert of Powers, as it has only one object, which " will no longer exist, as it is a political Monster, it " will destroy itself, and there will remain only the " means of better securing the peace of Europe."

Enigmatical as all this may appear, one thing is extremely obvious, that the Concert of Powers, far from producing a necessity, did not even afford a pretence for war. In a subsequent dispatch from M. Dumourier to M. de Noailles, dated March 27, the French Minister seems further than ever from being able to fix any charge upon the conduct of other Powers, or to allege any specific complaint against the union they had formed. But to supply that defect he obliquely censures their union by means of a general and abstract observation. " A league," says he, " formed against us, must be intended for the purpose " of dividing our spoils." This, however, is not a substantive proposition, but an inference from premises which the reader will hardly be willing to admit; for (says M. Dumourier) " if we are plunged in anarchy we " cannot be formidable to foreign Powers*." Both reason and direful experience too fully refute this assertion, to render any exposure of its fallacy necessary. The premises in this notable specimen of Jacobin logic being false, both in theory and in fact, the inference, which is rather insinuated than directly stated, that the Concert was *formed to divide the spoils of France*, falls of course to the ground. Can a better proof be wanted of the impossibility to arraign, with any effect, the Concert of Powers, than this faint and

* Ann. Reg. for 1792. P. II. p. 240.

distant kind of attack ? Even Jacobin ingenuity could assail it with no better weapon than a metaphorical conclusion, obliquely deduced from a proposition notoriously false, and egregiously absurd.

France is not, however, the less peremptory in her demands because she can exhibit no cause for complaint. "If the successor of Leopold" (continues M. Dumourier), "be willing to observe his treaties with France, he must, without hesitation, break off those which he has made unknown to her, and with hostile intentions against her." That is, in more intelligible language, although the Concert which has been formed cannot be proved to afford any just cause of complaint or apprehension—although it can hardly exist beyond the present moment, and must indeed destroy itself—it must, however just, however prudent and necessary, be dissolved, or France will make it a pretext for lighting up the flames of War. Such a menace is clearly implied in the above dispatch, and it was so understood by the Ambassador to whom that dispatch was addressed ; for that Ambassador, in a letter to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, dated April 5, 1792, represents himself as having signified to M. Cobentzel, the Austrian Vice Chancellor, that he had a positive order to demand a declaration, by which the Court of Vienna should renounce her armaments *and the coalition*, or to make known, in default thereof, that the King would consider himself as in a State of War with Austria. No other reasons were assigned to Count Cobentzel, to justify this determination, than the general observation that "so many precautions" (alluding to some reinforcements sent to the Brisgaw, while the Austrian Netherlands were almost uncovered) "*after the Concert which was known to us*, justified our alarms." The Ambassador further reports, "that he insisted especially upon the cessation of this Concert." But although Count Cobentzel refused to accede to such a requisition, declaring that "his Master could not withdraw himself, but with other Courts, and that his Concert would

“ continue to have the same object till what remained
 “ to be settled with France was brought to a con-
 “ clusion;” still M. de Noailles concludes his re-
 port of the interview with a most important Declara-
 tion—“ According to all my notions, *the Court of*
 “ *Vienna has adopted a plan* PURELY DEFENSIVE,
 “ notwithstanding the instances of the Court of Berlin
 “ for the adoption of another*.”

Two days after the date of the last-mentioned dis-
 patch, M. de Noailles wrote another letter to M.
 Dumourier; but he there merely stated that the Vice
 Chancellor Cobentzel had, in answer to the foregoing
 requisitions, alluded to a former note, to which the
 Imperial Court adhered. This seems to have been
 the last communication between the two Courts, pre-
 viously to the War; and it appears, from the whole cor-
 respondence which took place, that no charge was
 urged by France against the Concert of Powers, which
 could in any respect justify her in making it a cause
 for War. The like observation has been shewn
 to apply to her complaints of the protection and en-
 couragement, said to have been afforded to the emi-
 grants, and of the warlike preparations of the Em-
 peror. Complaints so notoriously at variance with
 facts, that their being assigned (together with the
 Concert of Powers) as her pretexts for going to War,
 indisputably proved, on her part, an absolute and in-
 vincible determination for hostilities. Even the French
 Ambassador himself has, as we have seen, borne
 testimony to the aggression of France, by declaring,
 in his concluding report, that, in his opinion,
 “ THE COURT OF VIENNA HAD ADOPTED A PLAN
 “ PURELY DEFENSIVE,” notwithstanding the in-
 stances of the Court of Berlin for the adoption of
 another.

This opinion was equally just with regard to both
 Courts: for the King of Prussia (strange as it may

seem to those who consider the present politics of the Prussian Court), and also the Swedish Monarch, had a strong sense of the dangers which impended over all Monarchs, in consequence of the French Revolution; and they were disposed to repel at once those dangers, instead of allowing them to become too formidable to be vanquished. The invincibly pacific disposition of the Emperor of Germany, unfortunately for mankind, restrained the ardour of those Princes: a circumstance which gave him a fresh title to the forbearance of the National Assembly. Nevertheless, on the 20th of April, 1792, that Assembly passed a Decree of War against the King of Hungary and Bohemia. And although, in that Decree, one of the principal reasons assigned for so violent a measure was, that the King had excited, formed, and refused to renounce the Concert of Powers, no other accusation was advanced against that Concert than the general one, that it was "formed against the independence and security of the French Nation." These words must find their explanation in the correspondence that had previously taken place; and there it will appear that they are as devoid of truth as they are destitute of precision.

It should not escape notice, that in a formal and official application, made by the French *chargé des affaires* at Turin, on the 28th of March, 1792, for the purpose of obtaining a categorical explanation of his Sardinian Majesty's intentions, not one word is mentioned of this *formidable* Concert, which was about to involve Europe in the horrors of War; although it could not be doubted that his Sardinian Majesty was a party to it, and although he had actually appeared as a party to the pretended treaty of Pavia. Such was the *real* importance attached to this Concert!—such was the anxiety which it excited!

If further evidence were wanting to prove that the reasons assigned for the War, by the French Councils, were fraudulent pretexts to cover their own unjust and ambitious projects, and that those Councils, while they

affected the utmost alarm on account of the Concert of Powers, were firmly convinced that the views of the Cabinet of Vienna were entirely pacific, the testimony of M. *De Lessart* (the late Minister for Foreign Affairs) would be conclusive on these points. That Minister, being under accusation, (a very common case with French Revolutionary Ministers), and being imprisoned at Orleans, addressed a private and confidential letter to M. Necker, dated July 8, 1792; in which letter, alluding to the documents on which he confidently rested his defence, he says that those documents afforded demonstration that "the Foreign Courts were not disposed for War, and contained irrefragable proof (preuve sans réplique) that it was France who provoked the War, who had commenced it, who set all Europe against her." These documents were never produced; for M. *De Lessart*, instead of being brought to his trial, was butchered in a massacre at Versailles. But his description of their effect must be considered as just, since he could have no interest in giving a false statement to a foreigner, who, though once Minister himself, had no longer any connection with the affairs of France, and who lived privately in another country.

Hitherto the enquiry has been pursued in a manner the most favourable to France. Only her own documents, her own allegations, have been considered; and it thence appears, that she commenced the War, without advancing any charge, or assigning any reason, which could, on the face of it, justify such an extremity. For her condemnation, and for the exculpation of the Austrian Government, the first object of her fury, nothing more can be necessary: but in order to do full justice to the cause, in the defence of which, as well as to repel an actual attack, that Government was obliged to draw the sword, as well as to place the atrocity of the French Revolutionists in a just light, it is necessary to examine the real causes and the objects of that Concert of Powers, in which his Imperial Majesty was certainly a leading party.

The

The real motives which induced the Powers of Europe to form that union, which was the subject of discussion, and the pretence for War, were unfolded in the official communications that were made by the Austrian Ministers to those of France. And although, in the first instance, the explanations given by the Court of Vienna were not entitled to be considered as evidence in favour of that Court, yet as those explanations were received without contradiction, and of course were tacitly admitted by the other party, to whose charge they formed an answer, they thereby certainly became very good evidence. They will acquire great additional weight if they be found to correspond with circumstances which were known to exist at the time, or which have since transpired. But their force will be irresistible if they appear to be confirmed by the express admissions of France herself. It has already appeared that the French Minister, at Vienna, was instructed by M. De Lessart to demand an explanation respecting the meaning of the expression, contained in a previous official letter of the Prince of Kaunitz, "the Sovereigns combined for the safety and honour of Crowns." The language of the Aulic and State Chancellor (the Prince of Kaunitz) was, indeed, more comprehensive; for he stated the objects of the union to be *the maintenance of the public tranquillity*, as well as *the safety and honour of Crowns*. Whether the omission of the first of these objects, by M. De Lessart, was casual or designed, it should not be forgotten that both appeared in the original notification of the Concert of Powers. In reply to the above demand of explanation, the Prince of Kaunitz furnished the Imperial Minister at Paris with a very copious instruction (as has been already observed*), for the information of the French Court, containing a frank and open exhibition of the causes which had led to the combination of Sovereigns—of the objects which that combination originally had

* See ante, p. *51.

in view—and of the change which had taken place in those objects, as circumstances had occurred to render such a change necessary.

From this important explanatory communication it appears, that the Concert of Powers took its rise, at the suggestion of the Emperor, from the arrest and detention of Louis XVIth and his family, after their unfortunate attempt to escape to Varennes, when, as it is forcibly expressed by the Prince of Kauntiz, “ France exhibited to Europe the spectacle of a lawful King forced by atrocious violence to flee,” and when “ he and his family were stopped and detained prisoners by his subjects, it then did concern the brother-in-law, and the Ally of the King, to invite the other Powers of Europe to join with him in a declaration to *France*, purporting that the Sovereigns of Europe viewed the cause of his most Christian Majesty as their own—that they demanded liberty, inviolability, and due respect for him and his family—that they would avenge any further violence against those Royal Personages—that they would not acknowledge, as constitutional laws in France, any but those which should have the voluntary acquiescence of the King, enjoying perfect liberty—and that, if these demands were not complied with, they would, in concert, employ all the means in their reach to put a stop to the scandalous usurpation of power, which, bore the appearance of an open rebellion, and which, from the danger of the example, it concerned all the Governments of Europe to repress*.”

This Declaration was proposed by the Emperor in a circular letter issued from Padua, on the 6th of July, 1791, to be adopted as the basis of a general Concert. It was similar, in effect, to the Declaration which the Emperor and the King of Prussia, at an interview between those Sovereigns at Pilnitz in the

* See Ann. Reg. for 1792, part 2, page 221.

following month, made to the Count d'Artois, and which has been confounded with the spurious treaty of Pilnitz. It was also conformable in principle with the Declaration of Mantua; both having for their object the deliverance of the King from captivity: but these transactions differ in the following unessential respects—The Declaration of Mantua announced privately to the Count d'Artois that a powerful Coalition was forming for the relief of the King; that of Padua was only a proposal to other Powers to interfere in his behalf—the former related to a concert which was projected at the express desire of his Majesty, and in pursuance of a plan of joint co-operation which he had communicated, which Concert appears to have been abandoned on his change of plans, when he resolved to attempt his escape by flight; the latter seems to have been made without his actual privity, though, from the *previous communication of his sentiments and wishes*, his acquiescence was certain—the former remained a secret for years after the war; the latter was publicly divulged before hostilities took place.

The Prince of Kaunitz, on notifying the Declaration of Padua, justly maintained that it was fully sanctioned by the most sacred principles of the law of Nations: a doctrine which, in the stronger case of the Declaration of Mantua, rests, as we have seen, upon good authority, and which has been confirmed by Mr. Fox himself*.

A Defensive Alliance is also stated by the Prince of Kaunitz to have been formed in July 1791, between the Courts of Vienna and Berlin, upon the principle of the Declaration of Padua.

But before the Concert which it was proposed to establish could be consolidated, the French King accepted the new Constitution, and was restored to a semblance of liberty. The Emperor instantly seized the opportunity afforded by this *apparently* favourable change, although he had not much confidence in its result, to propose to the Powers whom he had invited

* See ante, p. *10.

to form a Concert, to suspend their designs, and to wait the result of the experiment, which the French King had determined to make of the new Constitution. But as that result was extremely doubtful; as the new appearances which had been exhibited could not "dispel the apprehensions which preceding events did but too well justify;" as there was still reason to fear that "the French nation would be plunged in the most dreadful evil that can befall a great State—popular anarchy;" and as that evil was also "the most infectious towards other nations*;" it was only proposed to *suspend*, and not *dissolve*, the Concert, which had been projected with a view to all these considerations. From that time (it is stated) the Concert of Powers "only eventually existed on account of the apprehensions which it was natural to entertain in consequence of the Revolution," and of the dangers with which that Revolution menaced every civilized State. It ceased to have for its object an active interference in behalf of the French King; it was merely "a Concert of passive observation;" it was a precautionary alliance, founded in a sense of impending and common dangers; and it was intended to remain dormant, unless the apprehension of those dangers should be realized.

If the dangers which were apprehended from the French Revolution had been imaginary, still the Concert of Powers would have afforded to France no just cause for offence, since, in that case, it would have been but nugatory. Being directed to general tranquillity and security, France would have had nothing to fear from it, unless she disturbed that tranquillity, or sought to invade that security. States have, at all times, a right to render the bulwarks of their common safety as strong as possible; and the preservative system, denominated the balance of power, is founded upon this very principle.

* See Explanation of the Concert of Powers by the Prince of Kaunitz, Ann. Reg. *ibid.* page 221.

But

But it is impossible to contend that the French Revolution was not a just cause of the most lively alarm to other countries. The connection, which unites the different States of Europe in one body politic, is so powerful, and the mutual dependance of those States is so intimate—they are so similar in their origin, so uniform in their manners, habits, and fundamental principles of religion, morals, and government, that a revolution which tends to disturb and unsettle any one of them, in all its social relations, cannot fail to agitate, disquiet, and endanger all the rest. This was more particularly true with regard to the French Revolution, both on account of the great preponderance of France in the system of Europe, and of the direct and obvious tendency of that Revolution to operate externally, and to extend its influence to other countries. How could neighbouring nations behold, without terror, a Revolution, which the French Minister himself (M. De Lessart) in the very act of demanding an explanation, respecting the new combination of Sovereigns for their mutual safety, described as “one of the greatest Revolutions that ever happened,” and one which, “in its essential characteristic, wrought with an extreme rapidity;” adding, that “it was impossible that such opposition, and such effects, such innovations and such disasters, should fail of producing long agitations*.” Who can deny that all the European States had an interest in such a Revolution, and a right, not only to watch it with apprehensive vigilance, but individually and collectively to adopt every possible precaution to preserve themselves from its contagious influence. But the above mentioned Minister went still further in his concessions. He expressly recognized the interest of all Sovereigns of Europe in the cause of the King of France and of the Royalist party. “There was,” (he admits) “without doubt, an epoch” (before the King’s ac-

*See Ann. Reg. for 1793, P. II. p. 214.

ceptance of the Constitution) "in which their cause" (that of the Emigrants) "*connected with that of the King*, might have excited the interest of Sovereigns, "and more particularly of the Emperor*." If this interest existed at the above epoch, the Concert of Sovereigns which was then formed, had an additional ground of justification, besides the common principle (already noticed) of the law of Nations, which "when "two parties divide a State," permits a foreign Power to interfere "to support the party which is friendly, and "to oppose that which is hostile to its interests"—And as that interest was, at most, but *suspended* by the King's acceptance of the Constitution; as it might return, with increased weight, by the failure of that Constitution to protect the cause and the person of the King; and as the event has proved that the apprehension of such a result was but too well founded; it follows, that in suspending only, and in refusing to dissolve the Concert, the Sovereigns, who were thus united, acted in conformity with the dictates both of prudence and justice.

It appears, however, that not only the most notorious dangers, but even the admissions of France herself, fully authorized the Prince of Kaunitz, in his explanatory instructions to assert, that "there never "did exist a motive of alarm, and a general Concert, "more just, more urgent, and more essential to the "tranquillity of Europe†." Nor should it be forgotten that the grounds of that alarm, and the necessity of such a Concert, were greatly strengthened by the immense warlike preparations which France was making, under the direction of that violent Republican party, whose ascendancy, as the Aulic and State Chancellor observes, was "viewed with dread by all who "had the good of France," (and, he might have added, of Europe) "at heart;" and who had "induced the

* See M. De Lessart's Instructions to M. de Noailles, Ann. Reg. for 1792, P. II. page 214. Vattel ante p. *10.

† See Ann. Reg. *ibid.* page 224.

" Government to lavish the public revenue, insufficient as it was for the current expences, and the support of the credit of the State, in a War Establishment of 150,000 men, under the pretext of making head against about 4000, whom the emigrants had assembled, but whom they did no longer assemble in Germany*."

To this should be added the serious and just apprehension which, as the Aulic Chancellor further observes, " Foreign Powers entertained on account of the dark, yet detected projects" of that party, " of seducing other nations to anarchy and revolt," of which he mentions, as one instance, " their protecting and supporting the new conspiracy of a revolt, which had lately been discovered in the Low Countries, and of which it was known, beyond the possibility of a doubt, that the focus existed at Douay, and that the whole scheme was founded on the assurances of assistance from the Republican party in France.†"

* Ann. Reg. for 1792, P. II. page 225.

† The endeavours of the Republican party in France to stir up the people of other Nations to revolt against their Governments, have no where assumed more activity, or produced a greater sensation, than in this country. In the years 1791 and 1792 a most sympathetic correspondence took place between the French and English patriotic clubs. Some parts of that correspondence are detailed in the Annual Register for 1792, Part 2d; the perusal of which is well calculated to convey a just idea of the extreme danger to which all Governments were exposed by the seductive principles, the artful machinations, and the indefatigable activity of the French Revolutionists. In an Address (signed John Cartwright, Chairman) from the Society for Constitutional Information at London, to " the Friends of the Constitution, commonly called *Jacobins*," at Paris, after many Revolutionary effusions, the French Jacobins are told that they have no means of defence equal to that of establishing the *general freedom of Europe*; and the English Jacobins most heartily wish their brethren " success" in this *general cause*;" and in saying this, they declare their belief that they "*utter the voice of millions*." A congenial sentiment, avowed by authority in the National Assembly in the same year, proves that the chief promoters of the French Revolution had originally in view the subversion of all existing Governments. In a formal Report to that Assembly the Reporter concluded by saying—" It is to you that future ages, that the *universe* will be indebted for beholding the yoke of error, despotism, superstition, and ignorance broken by all men, who, tired like us, of the debasement and inertness into which the people had fallen, shall annihilate every species of tyranny."

Here was a direct charge against Revolutionary France, which, if true, not only authorized the utmost alarm on the part of the Emperor, but also amounted to an injury of the deepest kind, and, unless followed by full satisfaction, to a just cause of war. The truth of this charge might be inferred from its passing without refutation or denial by France, who, by a similar omission, sanctioned all the allegations and statements of the Prince of Kauritz. It is true, in a subsequent letter from M. Dumourier to M. de Noailles, the accusation of attempting to excite a revolt in the Netherlands is alluded to, but in such a manner as very much to aggravate the previous cause for complaint, by adding insult to injury. Instead of attempting to deny that the revolt was excited by the Republican party in France, M. Dumourier pretended to account for it, in the new Revolutionary stile, by ascribing it to the oppressive conduct of Government. "Allow," says he, "the Belgic Provinces to be happy, and to maintain their constitution; and they will remain in tranquillity*." This kind advice, which favoured rather strongly of an impertinent interference in the affairs of the Low Countries, was preceded by an intimation, that "a spirit of insurrection would not be prevented from penetrating into those provinces by keeping there a large body of troops;" for "*armies cannot restrain a people if they wish to be free.*" Thus, in order to repress or prevent revolt, the Emperor was not even at liberty to make use of military force, lest he should give umbrage to France; but he was to trust solely to Gallic assurances that *his people would be dutiful, if he would allow them to be happy.* Soon afterwards the Jacobin Minister makes a declaration of a most singular nature. "The Court of Vienna knows well that the Constituent Assembly rejected the Belgic Provinces because their *theocratic* constitution was the

* See Annual Register, 1792, Part II. page 237.

“ reverse of ours.” This is not only a daring acknowledgment, that the Constituent Assembly had been engaged in communications with the Belgic insurgents, but it involves the assertion of a right in that Assembly to take, at pleasure, the Netherlands into their own hands. To assign, as the *reason* of their rejecting those Provinces, a particular form of constitution, was to declare that they paid no regard to the Sovereignty of the Emperor, and that they were ready to violate that Sovereignty, whenever it might suit their convenience so to do. The impediment arising from a *theocratic*, or any other constitution, could be no very serious obstacle to such consummate constitution-mongers; but, at all events, no Government could be safe for a moment, if its existence depended upon the Constitutional notions, or the forbearance of the Constituent Assembly. This very curious passage in M. Dumourier’s letter, may be considered as highly important, both as it proves that the principles, upon which France afterwards regulated her conduct towards other countries, were adopted at a very early period; and as it affords a reasonable ground to presume, that the annexation of the Austrian Netherlands to France was actually in contemplation before the war, and probably one of the objects which induced France to commence hostilities.

If any doubt could remain that the Republican party in France had fanned the flames of revolt in the Netherlands, that doubt would vanish upon the perusal of the following letter of M. Rochambeau, President of a Club at Maubeuge, calling themselves the Friends of the Constitution, and addressed to the Patriots of the Low Countries, who had for a time emigrated into France, and were returning into their own country:—

“ To the Patriots of Brabant.

September 18, 1791.

“ You know how to value liberty; you have desired it, and unfortunate events have prevented you
 • F from

from conquering it. The Friends of the French Constitution *embrace the whole world in their system of philanthropy*, and under that title they express a hope that, returning to your own country, you will scatter the seeds of our benevolent projects, that they may produce an abundant harvest.

(Signed) ROCHAMBEAU, President.

Printed by Order of the Committee.

(Signed) MOREL, ALEXANDRE,

PHILIPPE, Secretar is."

The reflections which this letter necessarily excites extend far beyond the object for which it is here introduced. But it certainly affords unequivocal proof, not only that the charge brought, by the Prince of Kaunitz, against the Republican party in France, of endeavouring to excite an insurrection in the Netherlands, was well-founded, but also that the Emperor and every other Sovereign had abundant reason to form a Concert, to preserve themselves from the dangers, with which the French Revolution threatened "*the whole world.*"

There is, however, still better evidence, if possible, to shew that such a Concert was not merely justifiable, but indispensably necessary for the security of all regular Governments. In the sitting of the National Assembly, January 14, 1792, on the occasion of bringing up the report of the Diplomatic Committee, respecting the official dispatch of the Prince of Kaunitz, and after the reading of dispatches from the French Minister at Treves, who stated that the emigrants in that Electorate were totally disbanded, Brissot, fearing it should seem that this act of submission, on the part of the Elector, might pacify the Assembly, represented the Electors, to whose proceedings the greatest consequence had before been attached, as unworthy of the anger of that august body; but to make amends, the Emperor, at whose instance the Electors had complied with their wishes, was their irreconcilable

able enemy, and deserved all their resentment. The reason for thus exhibiting that Monarch as the proper object of their jealousy and hatred, (the most profligate, surely, that was ever avowed in the face of day) was, that the system which the Assembly had adopted—that the Constitution which they sought to establish—tended to the destruction of his Throne, and to that of every Throne; that, therefore, he and every Sovereign must, upon principles of self-defence, be hostile to that system—to that Constitution. Of course, it was necessary to treat him as an enemy, since it was determined to make him one; it was prudent to anticipate those measures of self-defence, to which he must ultimately resort for his own preservation, and to begin with ensuring his destruction, lest, by delay, he might find means to avert it. The following passages of Brissot's well-known speech, on that occasion, will prove, that the above statement is not an exaggeration. "The Electors are not worthy of your anger. Fear has prostrated them at your feet. The Emperor is now your enemy. Examine his situation and your own, and take advice from your principles and strength. Strength will avenge you; principles will absolve you. The nature of your enemy's hate must not be dissimbled, if you would measure the extent of it. *Your Constitution is an eternal anathema against all absolute Thrones.* ALL KINGS MUST HATE YOUR CONSTITUTION. IT BRINGS THEM TO THEIR TRIAL. IT PRONOUNCES THEIR SENTENCE. IT SEEMS TO SAY TO EACH OF THEM, TO-MORROW THOU SHALT BE NO MORE, OR," (which indeed is just as bad, as Louis XVIth fatally experienced) "THOU SHALT BE A KING OF THE PEOPLE'S CREATION. *This truth has sunk deep into Leopold's heart. He strives to ward off the fatal moment; and such is the secret of his hatred for the French Nation, of the protection which he has granted to the emigrants and to the Electors, and of the league of Kings, whom he endeavours to excite against us.* No, it is not the French no-

“ bility that he would re-establish. It is not the prerogative of a political phantom which he wishes to defend. LEOPOLD FEARS FOR HIS THRONE. IT IS HIS THRONE THAT HE ENDEAVOURS TO MAINTAIN *by a vain league against the torrent of liberty**.”

It may appear surprising that a man of even common discretion should venture to make such plain confessions, in so public a manner. But it was found necessary to stimulate the Assembly to declare War against the Emperor, and the conduct of that Prince, instead of stimulants, exhibited only palliatives and mitigants. It was therefore necessary to shew that, at all events, there must exist an hostility between him and the new French system. But as no proofs of such hostility were to be found in his measures, it could exist only in the system itself; and it was so predominant in that system, and so inseparable from it, as necessarily to overpower all the exertions of the Court of Vienna to preserve peace. This was the only argument which Jacobin ingenuity could find for immediate war; and the Orator, whose fancy, doubtless, anticipated, from the united force of war and insurrection, the speedy overthrow of all Thrones, little cared for the infamy which such reasoning would stamp upon himself, and his revolutionary coadjutors, to the end of time. But certainly he did not consider it as possible, that, after a series of years, when the edifice of civil society, though still assailed, should stand firm against all attacks, men should any where be found, and particularly in a British Senate, to justify him and his flagitious cause, and to contend, in spite of his open and unblushing acknowledgments, that the war was produced by the aggression of the enemies of France.

The arguments of Brissot, enforced by Condorcet, and other philosophers of the same school, notwithstanding the submissive conduct of the *despised* Elector

* See Annual Register for 1792. Part II. p. 273.

of Treves, and the peaceable dispositions of the more formidable Emperor, prevailed upon the Assembly to address the King, requiring him to demand of his Imperial Majesty to renounce all treaties and conventions against the Sovereignty, independence, and safety of France, (that is, the Concert of Powers) and to intimate that evasion, delay, or silence, would be construed into a Declaration of War.

The unfortunate King was not in a situation to reject any demand of the Imperious Assembly, although, on this occasion, he observed that they exceeded the Powers vested in them by the Constitution, according to which they were restricted from making War the subject of their deliberations, except upon the formal proposition of the King. He interposed all the delay in his power before he authorized his Ambassador to deliver the hostile *ultimatum* which had been imposed upon him; but, at length, M. Dumourier, by his dispatch, dated March 27, directed the French Ambassador at Vienna to tender to the Imperial Court the fatal alternative of War, or a dissolution of treaties which, it was well known, would not and could not be dissolved. The result could not but be anticipated; and the flames of War soon burst forth, which have continued to rage, for nearly eight years, with inextinguishable violence.

It has been made manifest by documents which no man can deny, and the effect of which, it is conceived, no man can seriously dispute, that the pretexts which have been urged, either by France, or her advocates, to justify her Declaration of War, are totally insufficient for that purpose; that the conduct of the Emperor, far from amounting to a cause of War, did not afford her any just ground of offence; and that her Revolution, and the views and conduct of its promoters, were so hostile, and fraught with so much danger, to all established Governments, that not only the Emperor, but all the Sovereigns in Europe would have been fully justified, upon principles of self-defence, in taking up arms for the overthrow of her

new system, and of the factions by which it was supported.

It must not, however, be supposed that the reasons which France assigned for her declaration of war were, according to any views which, even in her state of inflammation and effervescence, she formed upon the subject, the real motives by which she was induced to resort to that extremity. The speech of Brissot, which has been just quoted, and indeed the whole tenor of her language and conduct, fully evince that she was not misled by a blind and overheated zeal, that she had not even the merit of deceiving herself, that she assigned all her unfounded pretexts for hostility, with a full knowledge of their being absolutely false, and that she rushed into the War for the purpose of effecting the main object of her Revolution, the destruction of all regular Government. Of this, in addition to the proofs which have already appeared, the most convincing evidence is upon record. The best evidence, indeed, which, according to the established rules of evidence, can possibly be produced—the testimony of France herself against herself—the confessions of those very persons, who conducted her revolutionary concerns, who knew all the springs of her conduct, and all the secrets of her domestic and foreign plans.

Brissot, than whom no individual had greater influence on the councils and conduct of France, at the period in question, and who displayed, as we have seen, in strong and just colours, the dangers with which the French Revolution menaced all the Monarchs of the world, was no less explicit in unfolding the real causes of the War, and in proving that the motives, to which it was ascribed, had no share whatever in producing it. So far from its having been the result of any apprehensions, true or false, of the hostile views of the Emperor, Brissot, on the 20th of October 1791, when the conference and declaration of Pilnitz had been universally known for almost two months, told the National Assembly, “ I can assure you there is no
“ reason

" reason to be alarmed at the conduct of the Court
 " of Austria. Its Sovereign loves Peace, and wishes
 " for Peace. All circumstances unite to induce Leo-
 " pold to abstain from displaying the force of arms."
 On the 29th of December following, the same
 man said in the Assembly, " The wavering mea-
 " sures of the Cabinet of Vienna afford us no reason
 " to apprehend a War on the part of the Emperor.
 " As Prince, he wishes for Peace, as head of the Ger-
 " man Empire, he gives himself the air of wishing for
 " War." In the same speech, not content with ex-
 culpating the Court of Vienna from all hostile dispo-
 sitions, he positively, though unguardedly, declared
 that " War was a real benefit to the nation, and that
 " the only evil which they had to dread was their not
 " having War." In what manner War was to prove a
 real benefit to the nation, was a few days afterwards ex-
 plained by Isnard, who told the Assembly, that " War
 " was indispensable to perfect (*consommer*) the Revo-
 " lution." And after the Revolution of the 10th of
 August, when the War had existed several months,
 Brissot still more explicitly acknowledged that the War
 had been declared by France, for the express purpose of
 overturning the Monarchy and of establishing a Repub-
 lic. " Without the War," said he, in his paper entitled
Journal du Patriote Francais, September 22, 1792,
 " without the War, the Revolution of the 10th of
 " August would not have taken place; without the
 " War, France would not have become a Republic."
 And in an Address to all the Republicans of France,
 published about the same time, he said, " We made
 " him (the King) declare War in order to put him to
 " the test. But for the War, France had not been a
 " Republic. It was the abolition of Royalty I had in
 " view in causing War to be declared." Another dis-
 tinguished commentator upon the War, the Revolution,
 and the Republic, Louvet, in a work addressed to
 Robespierre, said, " We wished for War, we genuine
 " Jacobins, because Peace was inevitably (*a coup sur*)
 destructive

“destructive to the Republic*. Republicans, who were
 “worthy of the name, demanded the War; they dared
 “to aspire to the lasting renown, to the immortal honour,
 “of abolishing Royalty itself, of abolishing it for ever,
 “first in France, and then throughout the world.”
 In the same spirit the sanguinary Collet d’Herbois said,
 “We were desirous of War, because War would de-
 “stroy Royalty.” And Cambon (a minister) declared
 to the three united Committees of War, Finance and
 Diplomacy, that the object of the War was “the
 “abolition of all privileges.” He is also reported by
 Brissot to have expressly said, “It is necessary to break
 “with all the Cabinets.” Brissot himself went still fur-
 ther, by declaring that it was resolved to set all Europe
 at defiance; and afterwards, on another occasion, he ex-
 pressly said, “We must set fire to the four corners of Eu-
 “rope.” Such is the testimony of the very men who com-
 pelled their Sovereign, much against his will, † to draw
 the sword—testimony which would be absolutely conclu-
 sive, though it were not supported by other evidence—
 though it were not confirmed by that exact correspond-
 ence with every known fact, however minute, which
 never did and never can belong to any thing but
 truth, and by a most perfect consistency with all the
 events which have since occurred, and with all the
 documents which have since transpired. To suppose
 that such confessions are false is so monstrous an ab-
 surdity, that it would be an insult on common sense
 to attempt its exposure. It is not in the nature of
 things for men to invent lies so injurious to themselves,
 and to the cause which they ardently espouse. But
 that bad men should declare their own guilt and
 infamy, is a striking proof of the *moral* government of

* May not this be said, with equal truth, at the present moment; and if so, can the pacific protestations of the Rulers of France be entitled to any credit?

† A stronger proof could scarcely exist that Lewis XVI. was compelled, against his will, to declare War, than the singular circumstance of his requiring all his Ministers to sign their names to the opinion, which they gave in favour of the Declaration. Well then might Brissot say, “We forced him to declare War.”

the world. The various and clashing interests, which are continually arising in the pursuit of vice, tend to the prevention of its complete success, and to the detection and punishment of its votaries. Not only do the different individuals, who seem to start with the utmost cordiality and confidence in the career of profligacy, soon find it necessary to thwart, betray and even destroy each other, but the very same persons are often obliged, in order to encounter the difficulties of the moment, to expose their own councils and to defeat their own projects. Thus are wicked men the instruments in the hand of Providence of their own disappointment, disgrace and ruin.

The foregoing investigation of the origin of the War, though necessarily dry and unentertaining, has not, it is trusted, been unprofitable. It has enabled us, not merely to expose error, but to elicit truth; not merely to disprove the various false statements, which have been circulated with indefatigable industry, and which still continue to mislead the minds of many, but to attain the utmost certainty respecting the real causes of the War. It now appears, by the most incontrovertible evidence, that the War was altogether produced by the Jacobin Rulers of France; who pretending dangers, provocations and injuries, which they have since acknowledged to have had no existence, exerted the predominating influence which, unfortunately for mankind, they had acquired by means of the Revolution, in exciting a contest, for the avowed purpose of establishing their intended Republic, and of destroying Royalty, first in France, and then throughout the world. They perceived that War was the natural element of Jacobinism—that it would assist them in keeping up and increasing that fermentation which was necessary to the success of their schemes—that it would afford them additional pretexts for calumniating the King, and the means of accelerating his destruction—that it would enable them to excite a national spirit, which they well knew how to direct against their enemies at home as well as abroad, and to obtain the possession

of an immense force, without the aid of which all their plans of foreign insurrection would be ineffectual.

Such, according to the depositions of its very authors, were the causes and the original objects of that War, which has convulsed, to its foundations, the whole social world. Such was the source of that ensanguined and desolating torrent, which, after overwhelming a very large portion of Europe, has spread, with resistless fury, to the deserts of Egypt, extended itself to the venerable and hallowed plains of Palestine, and which, but for the astonishing valour and almost incredible perseverance of a Christian Knight, would probably have swept away the immense mass of the Ottoman Empire. *Hoc fonte derivata clades.*

It appears also that the War possessed, at its very commencement, the same character which it has exhibited in the moments of its greatest fury and success. It was from the first, on one side, a Revolutionary War, and, on the other, a War in defence of every thing that can be most dear to social man. It was commenced for the destruction of all Thrones. It was directed against all the institutions of society. Its primary object was, not merely the establishment of the French Republic, but the communication of the disorganizing influence of the French Revolution to the whole world. Before a drop of blood was shed, before the sword was drawn from the scabbard, its promoters had formed plans, not, indeed, so minutely arranged, but as extensively destructive, as any which their successors have displayed in the flush of victory and the exultation of triumph. Time has only matured those plans, but it has not in the least altered their nature or their tendency. All the crimes, perfidies and cruelties—all the schemes of rapacity, aggrandizement and subversion, which have rendered this War perfectly anomalous in the annals of the world, were contained in the folds of that system, which was laid open to the view of mankind at the very commencement of hostilities. “ *Una et ea vetus bellandi causa—profunda
“ cupido*

“ cupido imperii et divitiarum —” —nay, rather; “ nocendi cupiditas, ulciscendi crudelitas, implacatus et implacabilis animus, feritas rebellandi, libido dominandi, et si quæ sunt similia †.”

The history of the War is nothing else than a history of the attempts of the various parties, who have successively gained the ascendancy in France, to realize by force of arms, and by Revolutionary arts, the original and avowed projects of its first excitors, the early Jacobins.

In a very few months after its commencement, it enabled this desperate party to attain one of their main objects, the destruction of Royalty in France. Emboldened by so great a triumph, and by some military advantages which, about the same time, they most unaccountably obtained, they instantly endeavoured to make their sphere of action commensurate with the extent of their views. At that time their confidence of immediate success in their plan of universal subversion seems to have been unbounded. That confidence was derived, not from a consideration of the physical force at their command, which certainly was not adequate to the overthrow of the Powers, with which they were then engaged, but from a knowledge of their moral resources, of the efficacy of those means of excitement and seduction, by which they sought to undermine the foundations of all authority. Nor did they rely solely for that purpose on the efforts of ordinary sedition, on the co-operation of that part of every State which is disaffected to the lawful Government, and which, by their emissaries, they roused into the most vigorous action. They placed much of their reliance on the dazzling and seductive influence of their system of liberty and equality—a system which promised to render the condition of mankind inexpressibly more comfortable than it had ever been, or than, without such extraordinary aid, it could hope to ever be. The effect of such a promise was greatly promoted by the themes of human

* Sallust, *Fragm*

† St. Augustin,

perfectibility, by which the professors of the new philosophy had predisposed the minds of multitudes to embrace any proposal, which had for its object to realize such extravagant expectations. And these impressions were favoured by the incredible rapidity and force of the first movements of a Revolution, which presented such brilliant prospects of unbounded felicity, and which, overpowering the faculties of mankind with astonishment, disposed them to believe that a great and universal change was about to take place in human affairs, and to surrender themselves to a force which they deemed irresistible.

The Jacobin rulers of France, fully aware of the value of such advantages, lost not a moment in improving them to the utmost. They were sensible, not only that the effect of their revolutionary operations depended upon promptitude, but also that it was necessary for them to act openly, to throw off the mask, and to display their confidence of success, in order to inspire their adherents with boldness and enthusiasm, to overcome the timid, to attach the wavering, (ever ready to join the standard to which victory seems to incline) and to intimidate, every where, even Government itself, into concession, or, at least, into inaction. They therefore openly sounded, to the whole world, the trumpet of revolt, and, by a public Decree, (that of Nov. 19, 1792) they made a direct offer of their fraternity and assistance to every people, who should be desirous of recovering their liberty; that is, of subverting their Government. And it was provided, by the same Decree, that the French Generals should receive "orders to give assistance to all people who should be so disposed." To preclude the possibility of a doubt that this Decree was meant to be universal in its operation, it was translated into all languages: and, a few days afterwards, a Member of the Convention, M. Baraillon, who was desirous of restricting it to the Powers with which France should be at open war, moved that after the words "to a
" peo-

"people," should be added the words, "with whom France may be at war," the Convention gave another proof of its *unlimited* views, by decreeing that there was no room to deliberate.*

This Decree, though infinitely the most flagitious act which had ever occurred in the intercourse of States, was but a practical exposition of the doctrine of Rochambeau, "that the French Revolutionists embrace the whole world in their system of Fraternity;" and of the Declaration of Louvet, that the French "Republicans aspired to the immortal honour of abolishing Royalty throughout the world." To pass such a Decree was not only to draw the sword against every existing Government, but to throw away the scabbard. It was not only to invade the frontiers of all lawful authority, but, like the Romans who burnt the vessels which had brought them to the coast of Britain, to render retreat impossible. It was to declare, in the most unequivocal terms, that the French Republic and the Governments of other States, could not exist together; a doctrine which has since been expressly applied, by the authority † of Buonaparte, to the British Government. But no description can expose the atrocity of this Decree more effectually than the subsequent acknowledgement of Brissot, that it was "an absurd and impolitic Decree, which justly excited the disquietude of Foreign Cabinets;" or the admission of Mr. Erskine, that "no consideration can justify it." How glaring and consummate must be that guilt which extorts such confessions from the mouths of the party, and the advocate‡!

* See Annual Register for 1792, part 2, page 356.

† Through his agent Monge.

‡ Mr. Fox, indeed, is reported to have got rid of this stumbling block to the advocates of France with great facility, by denominating the Decree of Fraternity a *filly Decree**. His exposition of this daring attack on the rights of every Government, and the good order of every State, needs no better refutation than the above admissions of Brissot and Mr. Erskine.

* Debrett's Parliamentary Register, page 98.

In less than a month, the French Republicans, already in a state of open and declared hostility against all established Governments, passed another Decree, by which they unfolded still more explicitly the objects of the Decree of Fraternity, as well as the manner of its execution. By the Decree of Dec. 15, after announcing that their principles would not allow them to acknowledge any of the institutions militating against the Sovereignty of the People, they ordain that in all countries which were or should be occupied by their armies, (by which they clearly meant all the countries in the world,) their Generals should proclaim the abolition of all such institutions, and "the suppression of all existing authorities;" and they even go the length of declaring that they would treat as enemies the people who should be desirous of preserving their Prince and privileged casts, or of entering into an accommodation with them.

Having thus, by their public acts, thrown off the mask, and rendered it impossible for scepticism itself to doubt of the nature and extent of their views, these universal Revolutionists were every day giving vent to their fury and rancour against Monarchical Government. Every Commander of the French armies was furnished with a blank *formula* of a letter for all the nations of the world, to be filled up by him as occasion should offer:—"The People of France to the People of _____ Greeting. We are come to expel your Tyrants." On the 21st of November, 1792, the Abbé Gregorie, President of the Convention, delivered an Answer to a Deputation of the National Assembly of Savoy, which was decreed to be translated into all languages, as the Manifesto of all nations against Kings. In that Answer are to be found the following expressions, among many others of a like tendency:—"It was a glorious day for the universe when the National Convention of France pronounced these Words—'Royalty is abolished.'—Nations are now beginning to exert their collective strength for
" crush-

" crushing Kings. Like gun-powder, the more Liberty is compressed, the more terrible is its explosion. It will soon explode in both worlds to overturn Thrones*."

On the 28th of November the President of the Convention, in reply to an Address delivered by Deputies from the Society for Constitutional Information in London, said, " Royalty in Europe is either destroyed, or on the point of perishing on the ruins of Feodality." In the following month (Dec. 3), Barrere, the then President, said, " Our principles and our hatred to Kings are our Ministers Plenipotentiary." Even so early as the month of September, the National Assembly (the Convention not being then formed, with one voice, at the instance of Chabot, who called upon them to declare their hatred to Royalty, cried out, " Yes, yes, we swear it!" And Danton, immediately after the murder of the King of France, speaking of Kings, said to the Convention, " You have thrown down the gauntlet; this gauntlet is the head of a King, it is the signal of their approaching death." The same sanguinary demagogue also said, that " the National Convention should be a Committee of Insurrection against all the Kings of the Universe"—a character which not only the Convention, but every other assembly which has succeeded to it in France, has most consistently maintained.

The French Republic, however, not content with proclaiming, in the most unqualified terms, its irreconcilable hatred to Royalty, and its design to bring all Kings, like the unfortunate Lewis, to the scaffold, displayed at a very early period the principles which it had adopted, and to which it has ever since adhered with regard to foreign Treaties; proving that it was determined to be bound by no engagements, and to acknowledge no law in its dealings with other States,

* The whole of this Answer is inserted in the Annual Register for 1792, part 2, page 356.

whatever might be their form of Government, but its own arbitrary and capricious will. In the Report made to the Convention by Brissot, in the name of the *Diplomatic* Committee, on the 21st of November; relative to the convention with Geneva, a Republic, it is said, "Without doubt the question will be considered, whether a free people can and ought to bind themselves by treaties; whether they are not useless with Republics, which a community of interests should always govern; whether they are not indecorous with every Government which does not hold its powers of the People; for that is, perhaps, the secret of your Revolution, and of those you are preparing." And in another part, "What signifies the reserve of treaties—puerilities of the ancient diplomacy?" These questions, in 1792, were a very fair and explicit promise of the numberless perfidies and violations of faith, by which the French Republic has since endeavoured, and is still endeavouring to subject all nations to her accursed yoke. These questions display very legibly the treacherous character which has invariably distinguished that Republic, from her infancy to the military despotism of Buonaparte, who has done more than any other individual to carry that character to its greatest possible extent, and to render it the grand instrument of universal destruction.

But although the French Revolutionists thus openly manifested their designs against every throne, and indeed against every people, although they made so public a profession of their principles, nay, although in some instances they had already carried into execution their schemes of aggression, aggrandizement and subversion*; although, in short, both their conduct and their language were strongly marked with universal hostility, with boundless ambition, with the most atrocious in-

* Particularly in their usurpation of the Austrian Netherlands, of Avignon, and of the Duchy of Savoy and the County of Nice, which were all seized upon by France before the year 1793.

justice, and with the most destructive rage, still they found it worth their while to accompany such language and conduct with professions of moderation, justice, love of peace, respect to other Governments, and of a determination to renounce ambition and to refrain from conquest. It seems, indeed, impossible that such professions should have any other effect upon persons who gave the smallest attention to passing events, than that of exciting the utmost indignation at so gross an attempt to impose on their understanding. But strange as it may appear, they have proved highly useful to the cause they were meant to serve. They operated upon the weakness of that portion of mankind, (and a very large portion it is,) who, from indolence or prejudice, are ever ready to surrender their faculties, and to become the dupes of the most superficial appearances, of the most unfounded pretexts, and of assurances which contradict the evidence of their own senses, rather than take the pains of investigating facts, or give credit to what they are unwilling to believe. Such persons listened with eagerness to the professions, by which the French Rulers sought to lull mankind into lethargic security. Even Governments themselves, unwilling to lay aside the pleasing hope that they might, at least individually, escape the impending storm without sacrificing their present repose, suffered themselves to be amused by the perfidious explanations and assurances of an enemy, who was determined upon their destruction. Those explanations and assurances, however, derived their principal effect in this Country, from the importance which was attached to them by persons actuated by party views. Such persons, sacrificing every consideration of national honour, prudence and safety to their own constant and invariable object, the supplanting of the existing Administration, not only suppressed, in their reasonings upon the subject, all the atrocious acts and audacious menaces of Revolutionary France, but vouched her insidious protestations to prove that she was disposed for Peace, and to fix upon their rivals the imputation of being eager for

War. And although nothing could be more false and unjust than these conclusions, yet numbers, even of well-affected persons, accustomed to hear the question frequently stated in that manner, and inclined to view with jealousy the conduct of every Administration, have, by dint of repetition, been induced to give credit to such statements, and at length to raise their voice against their Government and their Country; and thus, by favouring domestic dissensions, to afford the enemy his best chance of effecting his destructive purposes.

It has been shewn, however, by indisputable evidence, that the French Republic, notwithstanding her insidious professions, had placed herself at the very commencement of her existence in a state of universal hostility with all Monarchs, and not only proclaimed her intention of destroying Monarchy, but, by public and solemn Decrees, tendered her assistance to every people to overthrow their Government, and even declared herself their enemy, if they would not join in her plans of Revolution. It is an inadequate description of such conduct to say that it amounted to a Declaration of War against every established Government. No example of such proceedings had occurred in the history of the World, and no expressions were to be found in any language which could convey an adequate idea of their injustice and atrocity. They were not only acts of open hostility, but the most mischievous that could possibly be conceived. They were infinitely more dangerous than a sudden and unprovoked attack of a country by military force; for such an attack would but unite a people the more firmly in their defence, and arm Government with the public indignation against the common foe. But the system of France was to begin by disuniting Government and people, by exciting sedition and revolt, by preparing the torch of civil War, (without, however, omitting the military preparations which were intended to assist insurrection,) and actually, by the Decree of December 15, prescribing the man-

ner

ner in which her Generals should proceed in the "suppression of all existing authorities." Nor was it a common War which she excited by these most daring and hostile acts. It was not merely an unjustifiable and unprovoked attack on other Powers of which she was guilty—room might then have been left for accommodation. If her arms could not have been repelled, her fury might have been appeased by concessions, her ambition, her avarice, her rapacity might have been sated by sacrifices, and a chance, at least, might have remained for other States, in more propitious times, to restore the balance which is necessary to their common safety. But she proved, as well by her early declarations, as by her subsequent conduct, that she would be satisfied with nothing less than the total destruction of those whom she attacked—that she was inflexibly determined not only to crush all existing Kings, but to exterminate Royalty itself, and with it all the institutions of society—that her purpose was entirely to abolish Aristocracy, which was in effect to threaten the overthrow of Republics, as well as Monarchies; for there was no Republican Government of which Aristocracy was not an essential part, and most Governments of that denomination were entirely Aristocratical.

Is there a man among the advocates of France who, after a review of these transactions, will venture to deny that every State in Europe was fully entitled to employ its whole force in the most prompt, active and energetic manner, against so malignant, so dangerous, so irreconcilable a foe? Is there one who will dare to assert, that after such flagrant, such insolent, such destructive acts of hostility on the part of France, War, though it had been begun at once by all the other European Powers, would not on their parts have been in the strictest sense defensive; so much so indeed, as to supersede the necessity of a Declaration? Nay, is there one who will deny that it was alike the interest and the duty of all States to unite their forces, for their common preservation, by the

overthrow of a Republic which aimed at universal anarchy? The right to form such a confederacy, for such a purpose, is not only founded in the supreme and irrevocable law of self-defence, but is expressly recognized in the Law of Nations, although that law could not possibly anticipate so gross an instance of universal and injurious aggression, as that which had been manifested by France. It is declared by a Writer on the Law of Nations, whose authority on that subject has been recognized by Mr. Fox, that " If
 " there be any where a nation of a restless and mis-
 " chievous disposition, always ready to injure others,
 " to traverse their designs, and to RAISE DOMESTIC
 " TROUBLES, it is not to be doubted that all have a
 " right to join in order to repress, chastise and PUT IT
 " EVER AFTER OUT OF ITS POWER TO INJURE
 " THEM *." The case above described falls very short of that which has actually occurred, and which affords an instance of a nation which sought not merely to injure others but to destroy them, not merely to raise domestic troubles, but to make insurrection the instrument of total subversion and of universal revolution. All the Powers of Europe would therefore have been justified in confederating for their security against the French Republic, and as that Republic had openly declared that she sought nothing less than their destruction, they were entitled to combine in order to effect her overthrow and utter extinction as a Republic. —That no such confederacy was formed, that the Powers of Europe, instead of combining in vigorous and well-concerted hostility against their implacable foe, sought only to avoid taking a part in the War, while destruction was advancing with hasty steps on every side, is perhaps the most wonderful circumstance of this eventful period, and is to be ascribed only to

* See Vattel, b. ii. c. 4. § 53. It may be allowable on this occasion to correct a mistake which, by means of an error of the press, appears in a quotation of the above passage in a tract published by the Author in 1793, and inserted in the Retrospect. The quotation there appears to refer to b. i. c. 4. See Retrospect, p. 154.

the operation of those moral causes which, as has been already noticed, constituted the chief strength and furnished the most formidable resources of the new Republic. But France did not permit those Powers to enjoy the perilous sweets of treacherous repose. Making War subservient to her system of general subversion, she forced them successively, but at her own time, to dissolve their pacific enchantment; and of all Europe, but two States, favoured indeed by their remote situation, have been able to preserve their existence, without engaging in actual hostilities. But her vengeance was particularly directed against Great Britain, which she justly considered as the great obstacle to her plans of universal revolution. She saw clearly that nothing would so much facilitate the accomplishment of those plans as the subversion of the British Monarchy, and to effect that subversion was the object of her most strenuous endeavours. In the pursuit of this object she employed her whole magazine of frauds, falsehoods, perjuries and revolutionary arts. She spared no pains to amuse the Government, to inspire it with hopes of maintaining Peace, to deceive it by false protestations, and to furnish its domestic opponents with pretexts, for obstructing it in the timely adoption of vigorous and preservative measures. But notwithstanding all her efforts to lull vigilance and to blunt suspicion, she displayed, (and without discouraging those on whom she principally depended for success, she could not but display), the most glaring proofs that she was labouring all the while to foment an insurrection for the purpose of overturning the Constitution, and she even manifested the utmost confidence in the speedy success of her labours. She did not confine herself to those secret excitements to revolt, which, by her emissaries and agents, she has most plentifully employed in every country of Europe; she did not keep within the bounds of a private intercourse with British conspirators, to whom, in common with all other conspirators, she had, by her public decrees, promised assistance; but she did what was even new

and striking in the daring and rapid progress of her revolutionary career—She publicly received those conspirators with open arms and with cordial embraces, at the bar of her supreme assembly, the National Convention; she heard with approbation and applause their assurances that Britons embraced her cause, and were determined to follow her example—that revolution was making a rapid progress in their country—and that in an incredibly short space of time France would “*send addressees of congratulation to a NATIONAL CONVENTION OF ENGLAND.*” Nay, she even returned, by the mouth of the President of her Convention, an exulting reply to these assurances, and—at the very moment when she was endeavouring to convince the British Monarchy of her respectful sentiments and peaceable intentions—she addressed the seditious subjects of that Monarchy by the endearing term of “*Generous Republicans,*” and declared her confidence that the moment was approaching, “*in which the French would send congratulations to the National Convention of Great Britain;*” while, to give still more publicity to these unprecedented proceedings, the Address and the Answer were ordered to be printed and sent to her eighty-three departments, and even *to be translated into all languages.*

Thus was Great Britain, after receiving her full share of the insults and injuries which France had heaped upon all established Governments, distinguished by an insult and an injury which infinitely surpassed all that had gone before, and which completed the climax of French Revolutionary aggression. Without the aid of the new lights, which have recently blazed out upon mankind from the Gallic meridian, it would have been impossible to conceive any thing so atrocious as the conduct of France on the above occasion. To give open countenance, in a Legislative assembly, to subjects conspiring against a Government with which *she professed to be at peace*—to hear them, with exultation and applause, announce the speedy downfall of that Government—and to promise them her congratulations

gratulations upon the success of their Treason—such conduct was a political Phenomenon which nothing but the French Revolution could have produced. To act in such a manner was to declare, not only that the Decree of Fraternity had a direct reference to Great Britain, but that the fraternal intercourse between the two countries had already made a great progress—it was to proclaim that British insurrection, fostered by French Fraternity, was considered as invincible—that the British Government, menaced and bullied from abroad, and undermined at home, was reduced to a situation so critical and embarrassing, that it would not dare to resent the grossest treatment, but must consent to hold the remainder of its existence at the sufferance of the Republic; and that it could only hope, by patience and submission, to delay a ruin which was irrevocably decreed by the rulers of the Great Nation.

The confidence which was thus displayed in the near approach of a Revolution in England, though happily very far from being warranted by the state of things in that country, was, doubtless, inspired by the statements of those who were most active in promoting such an event, and who were impatient for a rupture, which would ensure to them the powerful resource of Gallic assistance. And it must have been with boundless joy that they witnessed so decisive a proof that their Republican patrons were determined to keep no terms with a Government whose overthrow was the grand object of their joint-labours.

To contend that the proceedings, by which the French Republic had placed herself in a situation of avowed and implacable hostility with every existing Government, and particularly with every Monarchy, were not directed against the British Monarchy, would be no less absurd than to assert that the whole does not contain all its parts, or that an endeavour to destroy all Governments in the aggregate is not an attack upon each individual Government. But to maintain that a cordial and encouraging reception of deputies from

from traiterous Clubs, who plotted the destruction of the British Government, was not a distinct and complete act of aggression against this country, would exceed the utmost bounds of sophistry, and require the front and audacity of Jacobinism itself. What would have been the danger and the malignity of the most wanton, unprovoked and violent military hostility, when compared with such acts of Revolutionary hostility—acts as much more heinous than the most unjust employment of open force, as it is more atrocious to excite the servants in a family to rob and murder their master, than to endeavour to break into the house in order to commit those horrid crimes.

It is not true, however, that the military force of France was not, at that very time, employed in seconding her Revolutionary attempts against Great Britain. The War, which was then raging upon the Continent, was undertaken, as we have seen, with the view of destroying Royalty, not only in France, but *throughout the world*. It was, therefore, a War against every country in which Royalty existed, although every such country was not assailed in military form at the same moment. And to say that in such a War, any Monarchical State was not attacked, because it did not see the standards of the Republic or hear her cannon, is no less absurd than it would be to contend that, when a country is invaded, a particular province or country is not molested, because it is not the actual theatre of hostilities. The warlike operations of France, however furious and unjust, were, as has been shewn, the least atrocious of her proceedings. Her machinations, her decrees, her excitements to universal revolt, her attempts to scatter the Revolutionary fire throughout all Europe, were infinitely the worst of her aggressions. But even the forms of War were not long wanting to complete those aggressions against this country, which were themselves incapable of aggravation. She had, indeed, for some time, been making preparations which clearly indicated a hostile attack; but, even after the proceedings of the

28th of November, she still sought to amuse the British Government, in order to prevent it from taking measures to repel such an attack. Her Jacobin Rulers directed their confidential agent, M. Chauvelin, (for he was no more than *their* agent, although he had been the Ambassador of their King) to make professions and explanations, which were at direct variance with indisputable facts. Finding that they could not deceive by falsehood, they sought, as their last resource, to intimidate by threats; and they concluded a correspondence*, carried on through M. Chauvelin, by menacing open War, if Great Britain did not consider as sufficient, explanations which she knew to be false, and if she did not discontinue preparations, which were not begun till some months after France had been preparing for a *naval* War. This inadmissible *ultimatum* had been preceded by a public letter of the Minister of the French Marine, M. Monge, to the sea ports, announcing an intended descent, with fifty thousand caps of liberty, in this Island. But these threats, not inducing the British Ministers to lay the country which they were bound to protect, at the feet of the French Republic, the latter, by an unanimous Decree of the Convention, declared War against Great Britain and Holland; and, in the true Jacobinical stile, accompanied that declaration with an open invitation to British sailors to bring the vessels in which they served into French Ports.

To examine, minutely, the question of aggression, as it *distinctly* concerns Great Britain, did not enter into the plan of this publication. Much more, indeed, than is necessary to solve the above question, even in that point of view, has been here noticed†. But the design

* Jan. 13, 1793.

† If it were possible still to entertain a doubt upon this subject, such doubt must be removed by attending to the following very concise statement of the question. The War was declared by France against Great Britain, and the former country became the aggressor by that Declaration, unless she had received some injury or offence for which she

design of the present discussion was to trace the War to its origin—to investigate its motives—to unfold its objects—and to detect and expose the fallacious statements of those persons, who have ascribed it to causes

endeavoured in vain to obtain satisfaction. Before the War a correspondence took place between the two countries relative to all the grounds of difference, which existed between them, and was continued till within a few days before the Declaration of War. But in that correspondence France did not ask compensation for any one injury, she did not demand satisfaction for any one act of Great Britain—on the contrary, the whole of the correspondence, and particularly the latter part of it, which was necessarily the most important, consisted entirely of explanations, respecting her own conduct, by which she endeavoured to blunt the suspicions, and stifle the alarm, with which her decrees and other acts had inspired the British Government—and at last, when she concluded the correspondence by an *ultimatum*, denouncing War, she threatened hostilities, not if Great Britain refused to redress her wrongs, for she had not complained of any, but only in case her explanations of her own conduct should appear insufficient, or the British Government should continue preparations, which were begun only in pursuance of her own example.

Neither have the advocates of France, to this hour, pretended that they are able to charge this Country with a single act, which, according to the Law of Nations, has ever been considered as a justifiable cause for War. Their omission to do this amounts to the most complete exculpation of Great Britain from the charge of aggression. But it may, nevertheless, be satisfactory to know what Neutral Countries think upon this subject, and the opinion of America cannot fail to have considerable weight with a British Opposition. That opinion has been formally given, and has been acted upon. For as, by the treaty of 1776, between France and the United States, the latter are obliged to assist the former in defence of the French West India Islands, in any subsequent War in which France should *not* be the aggressor—when the present War broke out, it became a serious question with America, whether France or Great Britain was the aggressor.

On the 18th of April, 1793, the President, Washington, assembled those Officers of State, whom it was the custom to consult on important occasions; to wit, Mr. Jefferson, the Secretary of State; Mr. Hamilton, the Secretary of the Treasury; Mr. Knox, the Secretary at War; and Mr. Bradford, the Attorney General. To the council thus formed, the President put the following question:

“ Does the War, in which France is engaged, appear to be *offensive* or *defensive*, on her part? Or of a mixed and equivocal character?”

It was determined, that the War was, on the part of France, an *offensive* War; and, upon this ground, the President, without waiting for any information from France, issued a Proclamation, declaring to all the world, that America *would take no part in the War*.

In this opinion France herself acquiesced. For though entitled to call for the assistance of America, in defence of the French West India Islands, (which were never before in such danger), in case she was not the aggressor, she did not claim such assistance, nor pretend to be entitled to it, although she fought by all the means in her power to involve America in the War.

Thus

causes which had no share in its production. This analytical mode of investigation leads, it is conceived, to the most clear, satisfactory, and infinitely the most useful comprehension of the subject. For the War, thus considered, appears to have been, in the first instance, an attack made by France upon all established Governments—upon all civilized Society. It was begun in aid of an avowed system, which has ever since been unremittingly pursued, and which had for its object the subversion of all lawful authority, and the destruction of all social institutions. It was not, at its first breaking out, nor has it been, in its progress, directed merely against any particular Sovereign or Country, but it was, from the first, and is still, directed against every Sovereign and every Country. It is an injustice to the cause, in which all are engaged, to separate their provocations, their insults, and their injuries, to consider apart the attacks made by France against their individual honour and safety. Where is the State which has not, on its private account, and detached from the rest of the world, numberless and intolerable grievances to allege against the new Republic! But what are those grievances, compared with the atrocious endeavours of that Republic, to lay all civilized Society in ruins, and to oppress the whole world by her blood-stained Sceptre of Anarchy! The War has spread, indeed, from Country to Country, as its first projectors have found means to extend its progress, until it has made three quarters of the Globe experience the ravages of Jacobinical Revolution—but it has, throughout the whole of its career, preserved its unity unbroken—it has been in England, in Italy, in

Thus America and France have, by their deliberate conduct, given the best possible proof that their opinion is in favour of this country, upon the question of aggression. No doubt can exist respecting the opinion of any other country upon that question; and thus the whole world admits that the war is just and necessary, on the part of Great Britain, excepting only those British subjects, who seem determined to think it impossible for their country to be right, in any instance, unless they be permitted to change its Government; or which, in effect, would be the same thing, to choose the Ministers by whom the affairs of that Government are to be directed.

Swit.

Switzerland, in Egypt, in Syria—the same War, which was commenced, in the year 1792, in consequence of a determination to set fire to the four corners of Europe, and to destroy Royalty throughout the world. In its course to distant Regions, it no more loses its identity, or changes its nature, than the overwhelming torrent, which carries devastation wherever it can force a passage, or the conflagration, which pursues its ravages in every direction, until all within its reach exhibits one deplorable scene of smoking ruins. In such a War all States have but one interest—one duty. In such a War but one alternative attends all civilized Society—either to triumph over its implacable enemy, or to be crushed beneath his unappeasable fury,



THE END.